THE NATIONAL INTEREST

G.I.s in Europe
A Debate

SWORDS WITHOUT SHIELDS
by Albert Wohlstetter

WHAT'S HAPPENING IN MOSCOW?
Hannes Adomeit • Alain Besançon • Archie Brown
Robert Conquest • Alec Nove • Peter Reddaway
Françoise Thom • Adam Ulam

Immigration & Foreign Policy *by Nathan Glazer*

Out of Kilter: Turks, Greeks, and U.S. Policy *by Paul B. Henze*

Canada—the Empty Giant *by Daniel Casse*

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Essays & Comments:
Oscar Handlin, Angelo Codevilla, John W. Coffey,
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NUMBER 8 / SUMMER 1987 / $4.50

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THE NATIONAL INTEREST

NUMBER 8, SUMMER 1987

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THE NATIONAL INTEREST (ISSN 0884-9382) is published quarterly, in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter issues, by National Affairs, Inc. EDITORIAL AND BUSINESS OFFICES: 1627 Connecticut Avenue NW, Washington DC 20009. (202) 483-0630. SUBSCRIPTIONS: $18 for one year, $36 for two years (add $2 annually outside the United States). For subscription orders (prepayment required) please write: *The National Interest* Subscription Department, P.O. Box 3000, Dept. QQ, Denville NJ 07834; for credit card orders call toll-free 1-800-222-2990. Application to mail at second class postage rates is pending at Washington DC and additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: send all address changes to *The National Interest* Subscription Department, P.O. Box 3000, Dept. QQ, Denville NJ 07834. "The National Interest" is a registered trademark of News Group Publications, Inc., and is used by National Affairs, Inc. under license; it may not be used without permission of News Group Publications, Inc. Unsolicited manuscripts cannot be returned unless accompanied by a self-addressed envelope with sufficient postage. © 1987 by National Affairs, Inc. *The National Interest* is printed by the William Byrd Press, Richmond VA.

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What's Happening in Moscow?

Interpretations of recent events in the Soviet Union vary widely. Some see there the first steps in a process of fundamental political change; others, a serious attempt to make a totalitarian system more efficient; still others see reflected the dynamics of a power struggle; or even simply a public relations exercise designed to influence the West. Which interpretation prevails will have important implications for Western policy. In this symposium, eight leading authorities on Soviet affairs from both sides of the Atlantic were asked to comment on Gorbachev's aims and motives; his chances of "success"; the unintended consequences that might flow from his policies; what would follow if he were to achieve his aims; and the appropriate Western response to what he is doing. —*The Editors*

Robert Conquest

WHEN we look at the USSR today two different sets of questions present themselves. First, for the present, what is happening? Is there a political struggle? How strong is Gorbachev's position? Is economic restructuring coming about? What does *glasnost*, "openness," signify? Second, for the future, will Gorbachev win? What would the economic restructuring plans amount to? Can they make the USSR prosperous? Is a prosperous USSR in the Western interest? Is "democratization" on the way?

At the center of the present crisis are the facts that first, the economic and social system has been proved incompetent and possibly heading for disaster by all objective criteria. Incidentally, the much quoted recent CIA estimates of a rather high increase in GNP last year are (as previously) quite fallacious, being based on official (and internally inconsistent) statistics which include alleged but non-existent production and the production of unusable goods—statistics which have since been denounced by the Politburo itself. The real position seems to be about a 1 percent increase per annum, which is to say total stagnation. Second, this has penetrated the consciousness of Gorbachev and other high officials. There is no obvious reason a stagnant economy should not persist for a long time without disaster. If there can now be said to be an impending crisis, it is precisely because of the perception that this is so in the minds of Gorbachev and his circle.

Gorbachev's first moves to "reform" were appeals for better work discipline and, that hardy perennial of Soviet life, an anti-alcohol

Robert Conquest is a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution. His most recent book is *The Harvest of Sorrow; the Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine.*

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campaign. These themes have not been abandoned, but they were soon overshadowed by a more or less coherent program of structural reform. The economy was to be improved by first, a large-scale cutting down of the middle-level bureaucracy, and second, the payment of workers according to their efficiency.

These changes, to which was later added the idea of improving the quality of output by a new inspectorate, do not in any way change the essentials of the system. As Gorbachev himself stressed, central planning was to stay and market solutions remained anathema. But to make huge cuts in the bureaucracy means to antagonize a large and powerful social class. And to pay workers by results means diverting much of the wage fund away from the far more numerous bad workers—and even, as was also proposed, accepting unemployment; this too threatens grave social unrest. Moreover, the pay incentives to the better worker are unimpressive in the absence of consumer goods.

Thus, the proposed reforms would cause social and political trouble straightaway, while any favorable results would take at least a few years (as Gorbachev himself put it) before they eventuate, if they ever do.

This is a formula for dislocation and struggle, which is what we are already seeing. On the political side proper, the stagnation and corruption of Brezhnev's last years left what were, in effect, three tendencies: first, the men of the old machine, aging but still powerful; second, a group taking the view that the Soviet Union can be got going again merely, or largely, by replacing the incompetent old drunks with their young and energetic selves; third, those who felt that the economy was in so dire a state that major structural reforms were necessary.

These rough categories persist, and a complex political struggle has continued. We cannot readily identify the contestants at Politburo level; probably some of its members do not themselves know which line will best serve their personal ambitions. But at any rate, the plenum of the Central Committee officially charged with decisions on personnel was postponed three times, once at the very last moment. When it met in January the result was virtually a stalemate, followed by the announcement that a special Party Conference would go into the matter next year.

A central fact is thus that Gorbachev is not established in power. He is frontrunner for a variegated group which wants various degrees of change. Unlike every Soviet leader so far, he has almost no established clients, no *khvost*, or "tail," as the Russians say. In Khrushchev's Politburo there were several important figures from his old Ukrainian *apparat*. In Brezhnev's, several had been his underlings in Dnepropetrovsk and Moldavia. Not a single Politburo member in 1987 has such links with the general secretary. Gorbachev is, in this sense, the weakest party leader ever to have held the top post in the USSR.

Gorbachev's original agenda was simply one of economic restructuring. A limited "liberalization" in the cultural sphere, under careful party control, was to follow. However, the political opposition was so strong that he was able to put through almost nothing in the way of economic change. And in the latter half of 1986 a new element began to appear—*glasnost*. With ever increasing momentum, the media started to reveal hitherto unpublicized facts about the Soviet past and the Soviet present. Politically, this is interpretable as an effort by Gorbachev to use another constituency, after being blocked in the attempt to win the struggle by conventional means, which is to say unable to mobilize adequate forces inside the power apparatus. The propaganda and media *apparatchiks*, overlapping into the creative intelligentsia in general, were given their head. (Meanwhile, of course, it is clear that in one of its aspects *glasnost* is also a means of improving the Soviet image in the West. Indeed its most striking examples occur in small-circulation foreign language periodicals, much reported abroad, scarcely known at home.)

This use of forces outside the *apparat* is not a new tactic. Stalin in the 1930s used pressure "from below" to help get rid of the old *apparatchiks*. After a *Let a Hundred Flowers*

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Bloom interlude, Mao Tse-tung used Red Guards from outside the power machine to break it up. Both had, of course, far greater resources and grip than Gorbachev has today. Furthermore, the Soviet intelligentsia is in itself only a power constituency in a marginal sense.

Meanwhile, as in Khrushchev's time, the intellectuals are certainly going further than even the "reformist" party leadership would wish, a latitude implicit in the whole operation. The *apparatchiks* proper stood for a good deal of unpalatable talk and publication from Khrushchev—and from Solzhenitsyn! It was only when moves were made against their own power that they counterattacked.

WHAT, then, are the prospects? Gorbachev and his allies have to defeat the entrenched interests of the ruling class and its political representatives. Perhaps this is possible, but it is certainly no light task. Moreover he has to press the reform program in the face of not merely political, but also social dislocation on a large scale. Gorbachev himself has said "for two or three years it will be very difficult," and "there will be difficulties. There will even be mistakes." And even if he succeeds in both these enterprises, it remains the case that the country's economy can, in effect, only be brought up to date by truly radical reforms. And Gorbachev stands for radical reforms *within* the system—that is, reforms which are not really radical. At best they could perhaps prevent early collapse.

A complete consolidation of power by Gorbachev would indeed leave him free to innovate more freely yet. There is no sign that he sees the necessity, but he might be driven into it, as *(mutatis mutandis)* in Poland—which may remind us of the problem Eastern Europe presents to a restructuring regime in Moscow. It will be difficult to maintain strict control of fact and opinion in the satellite media while relaxing it in Moscow. But every relaxation in Prague or Budapest automatically tends to release the forces of local nationalism and the desire for independence. Indeed, this applies to some extent to the minority nations within the USSR: and in the past months Gorbachev has spoken sharply in Riga against Latvian "nationalist" propaganda, and in Tashkent against the Islamic revival.

The Soviet Union is clearly in a transitional period; Gorbachev has all the characteristics of a transitional ruler. That is, he can see the poor condition of the Soviet order, and envisage a much improved version, but he cannot face the only feasible methods of attaining it.

The Soviet Union is thus in something like the state of France around 1780. Then, as now, the system had lost the support of the thinking classes. Even many in the ruling elite saw that things could not go on as they were. Attempts were made by reforming statesmen—Turgot, Necker—to restructure. But the inertia of established interest was too great. The parallel is not exact, and the final result may be different (if only because no one with Louis XVI's character is likely to become general secretary.)

On the face of it the probability of a complete Gorbachev victory cannot be rated very high. On the whole, the intelligentsia which supports him seems rather pessimistic about the outcome—though they are enjoying, and making the most of, the comparative freedom to tell truths now open to them, perhaps impermanently. A reasonably likely scenario might be a form of stalemate, with Gorbachev able to carry out part of his program, but blocked in any attempt to go further, and accepting the situation.

But all sorts of possibilities are still not to be excluded. For instance, there could be a Gorbachev victory, followed by large-scale but inadequate reform, leading to a period of intense social crisis; or the defeat of reform and a period of inertia also leading in the longer run to crisis; perhaps a Stalinist restoration; a military, or military-dominated regime; a collapse of the whole system. None of these can be called impossible, particularly if we think in terms of the turn of the century rather than tomorrow.

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The answers to the sort of questions we asked earlier thus seem to be that perhaps Gorbachev can win full power, but he has yet to do so. That the "reforms" he postulates will for the time being at least exacerbate the political and social crisis. That if they eventually succeed they will improve the economy, but only to a limited degree. That "democratization" will be largely cosmetic. In fact, that within the system, and even within the conceptions of its leading "reformers," no real solution to the crisis is possible. *But*—that in the process, forces may be released which could, after all (as so often in history) transform or destroy this brutal and primitive polity.

Should a stronger Soviet Union emerge which remained profoundly hostile in principle to all other political life-forms both internal and external, this would obviously not be in the West's interest. From the point of view of the West, we should not rejoice or give credence until the Helsinki provisions for the free movement of people and ideas operate in the USSR: the minimum condition for a cooperative world order. As Friedrich Engels commented of an earlier time, "As soon as Russia has an internal development, and with that, internal party struggles, the attainment of a constitutional form under which these party struggles may be fought without violent convulsions . . . the traditional Russian policy of conquest is a thing of the past"—a formulation which shows how far they yet have to go.

In fact what both Westerners and Soviet dissidents who welcome current reforms usually miss is the absence of legal and institutional guarantees. If the Soviet order is to evolve into, not yet a democracy but at least a limited autocracy, the crucial step is that it must to some degree or other become a *Rechtsstaat*.

At the time of the Khrushchev interlude, the Italian left-wing socialist Pietro Nenni, an old ally of the communists, wrote privately to the Kremlin leadership that the Soviet error was "the absence of any system of judicial guarantees," adding that "only a full and complete restoration of democracy and liberty" could prevent a reversion to despotism. When Khrushchev fell, Nenni commented that the "good will" of leading personalities was "powerless against the vices of a system."

Only with such institutionalization could we really speak of liberalization, let alone democratization: and this must be our touchstone. For the time being the party has loosened the reins. But it has not yet shown the slightest sign of conceding any of the essentials of its power, or of abating any of its hostility in principle to all other orders.

Archie Brown

THAT THERE is a greater intellectual ferment in the Soviet Union now than at any time since the days of Nikita Khrushchev can hardly be doubted. The change in Soviet cultural life as compared with the dull days of Brezhnev is palpable. Political and economic reforms have been proposed, but not yet implemented. What does it amount to?

A greater variety of views found their way into officially published books and articles in the Brezhnev years than was generally recognized in the West, but political points were made circumspectly and, not infrequently, in Aesopian language. So far as cultural life was concerned, policy was more restrictive than it had been between the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956 and the fall of Khruschev in October 1964. (The transitional year of 1965 still saw many interesting publications, but by the time of the 23rd Party Congress in 1966 things were changing for the worse.)

Archie Brown is a fellow of St. Antony's College, Oxford.

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Now, however, materials get into print that could not have been published even in the first half of the 1960s and that had no chance at all of passing the censor in the twenty years thereafter. The links between culture and politics in the Soviet Union are, for good or ill, extremely close, and so the political significance of either a cultural clampdown or an opening-up in literature and the arts must be underlined. Among many long-dead and formerly taboo writers now being published after years of neglect is Nikolai Gumilev, an especially sensitive case since he was shot by the Bolsheviks in 1921. Boris Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago* is scheduled for its first-ever Soviet publication in the widely-read journal *Novyi mir*, in 1988. This work, of course, was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1958, but that led at the time only to an officially sponsored hounding of its author. The first Soviet publication of the novel will represent, therefore, something of a symbolic turning-point. When I made that observation at the beginning of this year to one of the most distinguished of British scholars—and a leading authority on Russian literature and thought—he was doubtful, and said: "I'll believe things are changing in the Soviet Union when they publish Akhmatova's *Requiem*." (This work by one of the greatest twentieth-century poets, Anna Akhmatova, who died in Leningrad in 1966, concerns her son's imprisonment in the 1930s and evokes the horror of the Stalin years.) Within a few weeks of the conversation, *Requiem* was published in full for the first time in Moscow in an edition of 175,000 copies (in *Oktyabr'*, No. 3, 1987, pp. 130–135).

It is the creative writers—not only those published posthumously, but living ones, too—who have been the first to open up again some of the darkest pages of Soviet history. The historians themselves have been slower off the mark, but it is likely that over the next few years at least as frank an appraisal of the Stalin years as was offered under Khrushchev will again be made and, furthermore, that Khrushchev himself (who received scarcely a mention during Brezhnev's eighteen-year reign) will become the subject of scrutiny, with his merits and achievements being weighed on the scales alongside his limitations and defects.

If Soviet society was ever totally inert, this is certainly not the case now. The "balance of influence" among different opinion groupings within the intelligentsia has been changed by the coming to office of Mikhail Gorbachev and by some of the new blood he has brought into the top leadership team. Such policy changes as have taken place, and as are still being argued over, can only be dismissed as cosmetic by those who fail to appreciate that a political struggle is taking place within the Soviet Union. The struggle is not confined to any one social group or institution. It is occurring, not least, within the ranks of the intelligentsia, for though some of the most capable individuals are pushing for further change, there are also many—and not least those of limited talent—who were more comfortable before the Gorbachev *perestroika* (reconstruction) got underway. Not every member of the Union of Writers relishes competing for a place in the literary journals with Bulgakov, Nabokov, or Pasternak.

Within the major political structures—the party at all levels as well as the ministries and state committees—the division is also apparent. The fact that the January 1987 Central Committee plenum, at which Gorbachev made his most strikingly reformist speech thus far, was postponed on three occasions, testifies to some reluctance on the part of those in the highest party echelons to embark on this next phase of reconstruction. (The postponements were confirmed by Gorbachev in his speech to the Congress of Soviet Trade Unions this February. See *Pravda*, February 26, 1987, p. 1.) Gorbachev has been particularly successful at bringing like-minded people into the Secretariat of the Central Committee and leading positions in the various departments which make up the Central Committee apparatus, but this process still has some way to go in the Politburo

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itself and still further to go at lower levels. Many of those who staff the party's economic organs are used to working closely with the Soviet ministries and are not enamored of a projected economic reform which will reduce the power of the latter and, in its wake, the role of some of the party institutions.

The State Planning Committee is at the heart of resistance to reform, and in this it is doubtless backed by a majority of those who work within the branch industrial ministries. To the extent that a market element is introduced into the Soviet economy, so that it becomes more self-regulating, the need for the present swollen bureaucracy is reduced. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the officials who man the economic bureaucracy constitute one of the major obstacles in the path of economic reform. This has been suggested by Gorbachev on more than one public occasion and, particularly frankly, in an off-the-record meeting with Soviet writers: " 'Take Gosplan' (the State Planning Committee), Gorbachev said, 'For them no authority exists, no General Secretaries, nor the Central Committee. They do as they please.' " ("Mr. Gorbachev Meets the Writers," *Detente*, No. 8, Winter 1987, pp. 11–12.) Gorbachev added, however, that he had been told that now "in Gosplan, during teabreaks, there's a feeling that this time they will not be successful in grinding down the party leadership and beating it to pulp, that this time some changes will have to be introduced." Such remarks are somewhat at variance with the widespread Western view of an all-powerful party leadership. That leadership does indeed wield great power in relation to the individual within Soviet society, but overcoming the passive resistance of vast bureaucracies is an altogether tougher task.

IN GORBACHEV the Soviet Union has an unusually able and determined leader who is, in my view, committed to significant economic and political reform. How far he wishes to go cannot simply be inferred from what he has said so far. He has, after all, already gone significantly further in his pronouncements (for example, on the subject of competitive elections for party secretaries and for deputies to soviets) in 1987 than he did in 1985. As general secretary, he is (unlike Brezhnev) leading from the front, but he does not make Khrushchev's mistake of leading from so far ahead of, or at such a tangent from, his colleagues that he threatens his position as party leader. That is not to say that Gorbachev is at no more risk than Brezhnev ever was. To take on entrenched vested interests in a way Brezhnev studiously avoided means that the general secretary unavoidably makes enemies. But Gorbachev has doubtless learned from Khrushchev's experience, and he is likely to be conscious of how far he can safely go at any particular time. His policies, moreover, are more consistent and carefully thought through than Khrushchev's were.

While what will happen in the Soviet Union is far from depending upon the general secretary alone, the powers of that office are such that it is worth paying some attention to Gorbachev's values and outlook. It should go without saying that he is devoted to the further development of the Soviet Union as a *socialist* system. But since the term "socialist" has covered—in the eyes of its implementers—a wide variety of political experience and economic arrangements (from Stalin's terror and totalitarian regime to the "Prague Spring," from Hoxha's Albania to Kadar's Hungary), such a truism does not advance us very far.

There is a sense in which the ends Gorbachev has in view for the Soviet economy are quite similar to those of his four post-Stalin predecessors as general secretary. But the means he is prepared to contemplate for getting there are very different, and the means adopted have the potential to modify the economic and political system. Like his predecessors, Gorbachev hopes eventually to close the economic—and, in particular, the technological—gap between the Soviet Union and the most advanced capitalist countries. He likewise seeks an improvement in the range and quality of consumer goods,

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foodstuffs, and housing available to the Soviet citizen. This he sees as something desirable not only in itself, but as a necessary component of the incentive system designed to generate higher rates of economic growth. Higher growth rates, together with a vast upsurge in the generation and diffusion of new technology, are needed if Gorbachev is to succeed in his aim of making the Soviet Union an economic as well as a military superpower. Needless to say, one of his commitments is to retain also that military superpower status, though he would willingly settle for a rough military parity at lower levels of expenditure and weaponry and in conditions of reduced international tension.

So far as the means are concerned Gorbachev is an innovator in the Soviet context in at least three important respects. First, he is, in my view, prepared to make significant concessions to the market. It is true that he does not (so far) make use of the term, "market," but he speaks of the need to develop "commodity-money relations," which is a euphemism for it. Moreover, one of his closest political allies, Vsevolod Murakhovsky, the chairman of the State Committee for the Agro-Industrial Complex (a subordinate who may well say what Gorbachev thinks) and Abel Aganbegyan, one of his key economic advisers, have not hesitated to use the expression "socialist market." Even marketizing Soviet economic reformers emphasize, however, that they favor a mixture of central strategic economic decision-making and market relations, for they are concerned to avoid the exacerbation of national tensions which might follow from leaving the differential rates of investment and growth between one part of the Soviet Union and another entirely to the mercy of market forces.

Second, Gorbachev is to some extent in tune with the turn against statism so evident in the Western world in recent years. This is apparent in the encouragement given to new-style cooperatives in agriculture and service industry as well as to family-based private enterprise. While these exist so far only on a small scale, they could grow into something more significant. They may help to plug at least some of the extremely numerous gaps in the Soviet supply system; more important in a way, they indicate that Gorbachev is neither hidebound by ideology nor afraid of those who might accuse him of insufficient fidelity to received doctrine. The latter factor has inhibited in the past some of those who wished to accord more scope to cooperative and individual enterprise.

Third, Gorbachev is pursuing a policy of greater devolution of responsibility to, and within, the workplace. The principle of financial autonomy of enterprises is being extended, and in agriculture, for example, the excessively large state and collective farms are being broken down into units which allow small groups of farmers (not infrequently a family-based group) to cultivate the same land from year to year and to conclude a contract with their parent farm enabling them to sell their above-plan produce on the market. Genuine elections for foremen and team leaders within the factory and farm—even (within limits) for factory managers—are intended to foster a sense of participation and enthusiasm on the part of workers and are as much a political as an economic reform.

THE ECONOMIC reform is, however, still in its early stages, and many aspects of it are already, as Gorbachev himself has noted, meeting resistance. The greatest danger for Gorbachev and the reform wing of the Soviet leadership is that the resistance to change, at present especially potent within Gosplan and the industrial ministries, might in time be actively joined by workers. To the extent that subsidies are removed and uneconomic factories closed, the experience of price rises and (at a minimum) forced job mobility may create a seedbed of discontent which conservative communists could exploit. Much will depend upon Gorbachev's political ability to fill enough key positions with people who share his view that there is no alternative to the present course. It will depend, too, on his

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capacity to persuade workers that it is worth accepting change now for the sake of material rewards that will come only later. An economic reform will take several years to implement and longer still (except in agriculture) to produce significant improvements in popular living standards.

It is partly for that reason, but also for their own sake, that Gorbachev is pursuing political reforms as well. Elections by secret ballot for party secretaryships can, on the one hand, speed up the process of turnover of officials and, on the other—to the extent that they are genuinely competitive elections—alter the character of the party. The party consists of only 10 percent of the working population, but it would be wrong to see it as cut off from society as a whole. Any movement towards inner-party democratization would be significant for the whole country—more so than the projected competitive elections for deputies to soviets. The latter will be for positions of much less power and they will also be confined to party-approved candidates. Even that experience, however (taken in conjunction with elections at the workplace) might give people a taste for political choice which could lead to demands "from below" for further change in due course.

Whether Gorbachev has a clear-cut view of exactly how far the process of "democratization" should go is doubtful. What is evident is that he favors a greater measure of participatory democracy than has existed in the Soviet Union hitherto but not of pluralist democracy. It should go without saying that for any general secretary of the Soviet Communist party "the leading role of the party" is sacrosanct. Yet that, like most Soviet concepts (including, as already noted, "socialism" itself), is open to more than one interpretation. For Gorbachev and party reformers, it is wrong that the concept has in practice so often become synonymous with the authoritarian rule of the party apparatus. It would appear that they wish it to embrace a gradual process of institutionalization of pressure group activity and a broadening of the limits within which political debate takes place. Both these trends are already underway.

That limits are intended nevertheless to remain is another way of saying that uninhibited political pluralism is not on the agenda of even the reform wing of the party leadership. The changes which are beginning to take place now could, of course, stimulate in time demands for a more thoroughgoing pluralization of the political system. Such a medium-term or longer-term unintended consequence of reform is certainly not to be ruled out. It would be fair to say, though, that this process is much less likely to develop quickly among the Russian majority of the Soviet population than it might within East-Central Europe (especially if the possible Soviet reaction could be removed from that particular equation). Even Soviet reformers will, however, in most cases, continue to take the view that only the hegemony of the party can hold together such a vast multinational state as the USSR.

Those in the West who argue that nothing short of an early Soviet transition to pluralist democracy of a Western type should be counted as significant change are being remarkably obtuse. Not only is this a criterion which they do not apply to numerous other authoritarian systems; it is one which ignores the problem of changing Russian and Soviet political culture, a process which, insofar as it takes place at all, will develop over decades. Reform and evolutionary change represent a much better prospect for the Soviet system and society than their destabilization. Indeed, it would be difficult to think of any policy more irresponsible and reckless for the West to adopt than that of the conscious destabilization of a nuclear superpower. The British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, who has never been noted for her admiration of the Soviet system, has recently come away from Moscow reinforced in her view that in the development and deepening of Gorbachev's policies of "reconstruction," "openness," and "democratization" lie the best hopes for East-West relations as well as for the people of the Soviet Union. On this I think she is right.

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Adam Ulam

DESCRIBING the woman of his dreams, a French poet desired her to be "never quite the same, nor yet completely different" at any given point. Little as there is of the poetic about the Kremlin's politics, Verlaine's verse would be quite an apt summary of the evolution of the Communist party's leadership and policies during the last forty years or so. Stalin's despotism was succeeded by collective leadership; governance through terror gave way to milder ways of political repression and obeisance to "socialist legality." And then the Brezhnev era marked the end of de-Stalinization and the Soviet system congealed into an oligarcho-bureaucratic mold. Yet for all those in many ways far-reaching changes and reforms, the basic features of the regime remained unshaken: formal adherence to Marxism-Leninism (much as its actual meaning and imperatives continued to be constantly reinterpreted), the Communist party's monopoly of power, the absolute rule of a small elite centered in the Politburo.

How has that pattern of constant change and yet essential continuity been affected by Gorbachev and his campaign for *glasnost*, "openness," and *perestroika*, "restructuring?" It would be churlish to deny that the dynamic and youthful (certainly in comparison with his immediate predecessors) general secretary has in the two years of his tenure managed to alter drastically the *tone* of Soviet politics. It is as if in an old decaying building the new tenant has thrown the windows open to let in fresh air, proceeded to remove the heavy and outmoded furniture and promised to renew the edifice in accordance with the most up-to-date standards. But does Gorbachev also propose to tamper with the foundations of the Soviet edifice, and if so, would he be capable of changing those basic features of the system which we have just listed? "Probably not," must be our current answer to the first question, and "most unlikely" to the second one.

As with all innovations attempted by the successive leaders of the Soviet Union (except for Chernenko, whose age and infirmity barred him from new initiatives), the element of reform in what Gorbachev has been advocating cannot be completely separated from considerations touching on his personal power. Take his urging that various party and industrial officials no longer be nominated from above, as in reality they have been for a long time, but selected through procedures approaching real elections—seemingly a great concession by the supreme authorities and a major step toward democratization of Soviet society. Yet, let us keep in mind that up to now Gorbachev has not proposed to extend this plan to the very highest party body; new members of the Politburo would presumably continue to be elected by that small elite, with the Central Committee serving as a rubber stamp. In the second place, we may be sure that if there are to be several candidates competing for the job of, say, first secretary of the Tula region, all of them would have to be found acceptable by the Politburo. And it is also likely that whoever makes it would be more on his toes and more mindful of the general secretary's wishes than were those party oligarchs of the Brezhnev times, who once appointed could, short of something quite unusual or a heinous dereliction, expect to keep their jobs indefinitely. Apart from anything else, Gorbachev expects to obtain by *glasnost* what Stalin sought through terror: effective control of the party and state bureaucracy, which in a modern and complex society is difficult to achieve even for the most absolute dictator, let alone a leader laboring under a variety of constraints.

A similar mixture of motivations has undoubtedly inspired the Kremlin's new conciliatory policy towards the scientific and artistic intelligentsia and more relaxed atti-

Adam Ulam is Gurney Professor of History and Political Science at Harvard.

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tude about dissenters. Unlike their elderly and unimaginative predecessors, Gorbachev and those close to him have come to realize how counterproductive were those drastic measures against moderate critics of the regime, such as Sakharov, or that enforcement of dull uniformity in the fields of art and social science that led some of Russia's leading intellects to become external or internal exiles. The relaxation of those controls has served to improve his and the party's image among the Soviet intelligentsia, again a political plus for him personally as well as for the regime. And, of course, such "liberalism" is expected to, and already has, paid dividends abroad.

Gorbachev can be under no illusions as to the costs and risks inherent in his policies. Those intellectuals who today hail them might well in a year or two condemn them as but palliatives falling short of what is required by real intellectual and artistic freedom. More important from the point of view of his own political future, his colleagues might indeed conclude that his efforts, while failing to inject new dynamism into the Soviet economy and society, have at the same time threatened the foundations of the authoritarian system. Against such dangers, Gorbachev and his partisans evidently believe that their system has a built-in set of brakes: they can define and delimit the extent of liberalization and of the loosening of economic centralization—what the party gives today, it can take away tomorrow; as of now, they have not committed themselves to going as far, whether on the economic or intellectual side of reform, as have their Chinese colleagues. For an outside observer, such confidence may appear excessive: the post-Stalin regimes have not been able to match the old tyrant's absolute mastery of society and hence his ability to vary drastically the course of his policies without incurring danger to the system or his personal power. The Brezhnev regime put an end to official de-Stalinization as preached by Khrushchev, but it was unable to eradicate dissent. Khrushchev's policies left another unintended legacy to his successors: intermittent eruptions of political turbulence in the communist states of Eastern Europe. And so should Gorbachev himself, or whoever might oust him, seek to put an end to *perestroika*, it is unlikely they would be able to turn the clock back exactly to where it was at the time of Brezhnev's death.

FOR ALL the caveats, there are thus cogent reasons for the West to watch with sympathy the Kremlin's current efforts to liberalize and modernize its society. Yet it would be mistaken or at least premature to assume that what we see as progress in Soviet domestic policies must automatically lead to a more constructive role in international affairs. True, the emphasis on internal improvements urges greater caution and avoidance of overcommitments abroad. True, Gorbachev himself has been more outspoken than any of his predecessors in asserting the "unwinnability" of a nuclear war, and in urging the need of better relations with the West and China. But in foreign affairs, even more than in domestic ones, the Soviet government's actions have hitherto lagged behind its rhetoric. The West ought to welcome the new and more constructive language of Soviet diplomacy, at the same time that it continues to scrutinize carefully its concrete initiatives.

For many, especially in this country, the key to better relations with the Soviet Union, and to world stability in general, lies in nuclear arms control. As on similar occasions in the past, there have been voices in the West urging that the more positive attitude by the Soviet Union, and perhaps even the future of Gorbachev's attempt to liberalize Soviet society depend very greatly on the U.S. being more forthcoming vis-a-vis the Kremlin's desiderata. Such views greatly oversimplify the problem of establishing a more satisfactory *modus vivendi* between East and West. Without being self-righteous or minimizing American sins of commission and especially omission, it is still not unreasonable to argue that most of the trouble and tension in post World War II international affairs has been

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caused, whether directly or indirectly, by Moscow's policies. In analyzing the current Soviet policymakers' statements, one perceives an oblique realization that the current disarray in world affairs is beginning to be viewed by the Kremlin as excessive and counterproductive to the interests of the USSR. Gorbachev has been eloquent in his condemnation of international terrorism. Yet the Soviet government continues its close relationship with Col. Qaddafi's Libya. There have been strong indications of Moscow becoming weary of the struggle in Afghanistan, and open avowals of its seeking a "political solution" for that unfortunate country. Yet there have been no intimations of any timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. In brief, the growing awareness of the inherent disutility and danger of old policies is not matched by readiness to break decisively with the past and to embark on a new tack.

It is tempting to attribute these inconsistencies to the as yet unresolved struggle within the party elite between the general secretary and his partisans and the remnants of the old guard. Indeed, in some of his statements, notably in his talk with the presidium of the Soviet Writers' Union last summer, Gorbachev himself has hinted at the persistence of opposition to his program. But while there can be little doubt that many of the older generation of bureaucrats find themselves disturbed and threatened by the "restructuring," the main difficulty encountered by the new leaders, both in domestic politics and in their search for a fresh approach to foreign policy, lies elsewhere—in their own doubts and hesitations whether and to what extent the transformations they have in mind are compatible with the premises of the Soviet system. Hence those rather enigmatic hints by Gorbachev that *perestroika* (and what precisely is to be restructured has never been clearly defined) is a process that may take decades, and his hardly more meaningful intimation that ultimately this process is to make Soviet society more, rather than less, socialist.

Well, perhaps it is unfair to demand that communist politicians be more precise in defining what they mean by their slogans than were our own when they first used such tantalizing terms as the "New Deal" or the "New Frontier." But whatever their purpose and eventual fate, "openness" and "restructuring" demonstrate the awareness of the current leadership that the task of modernization and imparting new dynamism to their society cannot succeed without enlarging the as yet small area of freedom and individual initiative. We must not delude ourselves into believing that we could assist Gorbachev & Co. in that task by showering them with credits, technology transfers, or abandoning SDI. But we should certainly not draw back from dialogue and negotiations with the Soviet rulers. But perhaps even more than before, it behooves the West to stand upon its principles, weed out its own garden, and thus demonstrate that democracy, social cohesion, and viable foreign policies can go together. To paraphrase what Marx said about the emancipation of the working class, the eventual democratization of Soviet society can only be achieved by the Soviet people themselves.

Alec Nove

GORBACHEV'S reform agenda was preset by what had gone wrong under his predecessors. During the long reign of Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet system showed signs of degeneration: stability (welcomed after the erratic behavior of Khrushchev) turned into immobility and finally into decay. There were alarming signs of stagnation and petrification. Its quantitative reflection was a decline in growth rates, but it is

Alec Nove is professor emeritus and formerly head of the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies, University of Glasgow.

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clear from the tone and content of Gorbachev's speeches that this was but part of a deeper-lying disease, which could be designated as a "crisis of the system." By this is not meant economic collapse such as occurred in Poland or in Romania, but rather a crisis of confidence, a sort of creeping demoralization at all levels. It found expression, as Gorbachev has told us, in increasing drunkenness, crime, drug-taking, and corruption. Corruption took the form not only of senior party officials (especially in some republics) blatantly feathering their own nests, but extended right through society, and was linked with a growing gap between supply and demand: low-paid shop assistants could supplement their meager income through bribes.

Inefficiency and waste in the economy became less and less tolerable in the face of growing consciousness of scarcity of human and material resources. This found expression in many speeches and articles on the necessity to pass from extensive to intensive growth. Brezhnev had said this too. However, inertia proved stronger than the forces of change. Technical progress remained slow, vast sums were "frozen" in a grossly excessive number of uncompleted investment projects. It was becoming increasingly clear that the centralized planning inherited from the Stalin era, and still unchanged in its fundamentals, was incapable of coping with the task of efficiently operating a modern industrial economy.

Stalin's brutal and despotic methods did inject a crude dynamism into a system that lacked built-in defenses against routine and inertia, as it also lacked any direct feedback between the user and the producer. The Stalin system was created so as to impose a few key priorities. The privileges it granted to high officialdom were accompanied by a high risk of drastic punishment. But under Brezhnev the *nomenklatura* no longer trembled and in many cases ceased also to obey (hence the many complaints about *vedomstvennost* and *mestnichestvo*, departmentalism and localism). Priorities multiplied, and came to include agriculture, housing, consumer goods and services. With growth came much greater complexity, a vast increase in the number of planning and allocation decisions which rendered increasingly difficult the task of coordination. A bureaucratic jungle stood in the way of managerial enterprise, of innovation, of the satisfaction of user demand, of the fulfillment of the leadership's own policies.

Gorbachev's aim is to correct all these deficiencies, to modernize the structure of the economy and of society, to achieve greater efficiency, to reduce waste, to ensure production for the needs of the customer and not for plan-fulfillment or growth statistics (although he also wants plans to be fulfilled and growth to accelerate, a potential source of contradiction). He is listening to those economists who urge decentralization based upon commercial principles, contract, an enhanced role for profit, the replacement of bureaucratic material allocation by "trade in means of production." The words "market socialism" remain unacceptable, but a "socialist market" is widely and publicly advocated. However, Soviet economists have come up with a wide range of contradictory proposals, and strong language from Gorbachev about "radical" or even "revolutionary" change has yet to translate itself into a coherent economic reform package. There is, however, no doubt as to the commitment to radical reform.

And not only economic reform. Gorbachev has clearly been listening to Tatiana Zaslavskaya's plea to give top attention to the human factor. (Apart from the unpublished memorandum leaked to the West two years ago, her views have been published in the Novosibirsk *EKO*, in Moscow newspapers, and most recently in *Kommunist*, and she has been quoted approvingly by Ligachev.) It is accepted, indeed stressed, that success depends on everyone, from the highest to the lowest, learning to work in new ways. But this will not happen without social-political reform. Workers and peasants must have a sense of belonging, of participating. The bureaucratic-hierarchical system

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and its secretiveness must be drastically overhauled. Gorbachev has tried to make clear that it is not just a matter of replacing the old party and economic bosses with cadres loyal to him; the whole behavior pattern of the bosses has been put into question. Hence *glasnost*. Hence much talk of *demokratizatsiya*, of possibly having real elections. Who, a few short years ago, would have believed that *Izvestia* would print on page one a letter pointing out that Soviet so-called secret ballots were a farce, and asking for real choice between several candidates? Or that the press would report the Alma-Ata riots? Gorbachev is evidently seeking support among the creative intelligentsia: hence releases of many dissidents, and the appearance of plays, films, and novels previously blocked by censorship.

All this raises in very sharp form the role of the party, in particular of the full-time party officials. One of the plays now running in Moscow refers to these local bosses as "little tsars" *(tsarki)*, capable of anything to retain their privileges and their power (see *Novyi mir*, No. 9, 1986, p. 246). Party officials are being told not to interfere in management, to allow the local Soviets to take independent decisions, to stop interfering with the supposedly independent judiciary. Yet these party officials will apparently still be held accountable if and when things go wrong. Instructions to refrain from "petty tutelage" have been given repeatedly in past decades. Indeed one is reminded that many of the economic reform proposals are not new: thus "trade in means of production" was part of the aims of the 1965 (or "Kosygin") reform. Similarly, it has been long advocated that management of factories and farms should have far greater autonomy, that central planning be confined to strategy, technical policy, macro magnitudes. The trouble has been, to adapt a Scottish saying, "many a micro makes a macro"; the pursuit of central objectives has hitherto taken the form of detailed plan-instructions at the micro level, for fear of what might happen to the macro magnitudes if controls were relaxed. One is reminded of a saying attributed to Chen Yun: "Managers should have a bigger cage so that they can spread their wings; but we must keep them in a cage; otherwise they could fly away." As in China, so in the Soviet Union one must ask: Can a caged management be expected to show enterprise and carry responsibility?

There are still many uncertainties as to the full scope of the intended new economic mechanism, and on the role within it of plan, market, profit, prices. Just as we do not yet know how much meaning will attach to elections within the party, soviets, and trade unions, or how all this can be reconciled with the party's dominant role in cadre selection under the *nomenklatura* system. It has often been argued in the West that radical economic reform is impossible because it would weaken the party's power position. But the problem is that the exercise of power in the old way has become ineffective, and continued toleration of inefficiencies and corruption threatens the power position of the party at home and abroad. Also what is primarily at issue is the role of the full-time party *apparatchik*, the transfer of authority to party members engaged in management, the state machine, local government, the media.

Glasnost is undoubtedly important and represents a marked improvement on the earlier practice of secrecy and concealment. Yet about 120 years ago, in the reign of that other major reformer, Tsar Alexander II, Chernyshevski wrote: "*Glasnost* is a bureaucratic expression, a substitute for freedom of speech" (I owe the quotation to Dr. J. D. White, of Glasgow University). It can mean that party and government should act more openly, explain and publish more. It does not of itself imply that unofficial voices will be heard. In fact, they are being heard today, but what assurance is there about tomorrow? The same can be said of the entire reform campaign. Echoing a phrase in Gorbachev's speech to the trade unions (*Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* No. 10, 1987), "the main question which worries everyone" is "how to ensure that the *perestroika* is irreversible."

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WHAT are the chances of success? In assessing the impact of economic reform, it is essential to bear in mind that what has been done so far is only the beginning; reform committees are still in session. What we have, apart from somewhat general declarations of intent, are: a decree on light industry, linking production plans more closely to contracts with the trade network; the extension of small-group, family and individual contract in agriculture, and a limited legalization of individual private enterprise (but without the right to employ anyone for profit); new rules which allow a long list of Soviet enterprises to make trade deals with foreign countries, plus provision for joint ventures with socialist countries and capitalist firms; a new "draft law of the enterprise," which incorporates a number of earlier decisions about so-called *polnyi khozraschyot*—full commercial principles, real financial responsibility, a hard budget constraint, greater autonomy, defined right to profit retention after payment of tax; this is to be linked with a new policy on wages, with increased differentials to be based on skills, performance, and enterprise profitability. A government "acceptance commission" is to impose higher quality standards and reject defective goods. It is repeatedly stated that the observance of contracts, incorporating customer requirements, must replace the fulfillment of gross-output plans as the main guideline in enterprise performance.

While there are certainly some positive features in the above list of measures, they do not constitute a reform package, and no one pretends that they do. Key elements of any effective reform must be freedom to choose one's supplier (i.e., "trade in means of production") and a reform of the price system. If the bulk of inputs are allocated by the planners, it follows that they will be issuing binding orders determining the output of the input-providers, and the "directive planning" system will survive. Conversely, trade in means of production implies competition between suppliers, with the product mix largely determined through commercial negotiation. It is official policy to give enterprise management considerable powers to invest in modernization and re-equipment. But these powers will be meaningless unless they can obtain the needed capital goods from their suppliers, who must in turn be free to supply them. And none of this can work without a fundamental reform of the price mechanism, to ensure that the economical satisfaction of customer needs is profitable. Gorbachev and his advisers know all this, but the still prevailing shortages constitute a serious obstacle to the relaxation of existing controls.

Growth acceleration may itself exacerbate shortages. Also, in the words of L. Abalkin (*Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* No. 7, 1987, p. 10) "The problem of radically improving quality cannot be solved if we continue to stress increases in the volume of output."

There is some speculation in the West about opposition to reforms within the Politburo. Of course this is possible, but in my view the biggest "enemy" has been well-defined by the Soviet publicist Alexander Bovin. It is "homegrown bureaucratic soviet socialist conservatism." There is a powerful combination of inertia, habit, vested interest, and reluctance to accept responsibility. As Gorbachev himself has said, while nobody is openly against *perestroika*, there is a sort of passive resistance to change manifesting itself at all levels. Reform decrees are not observed, or their application is diluted. Thus, despite the decree on light industry, which ordered a substantial reduction in the number of plan-indicators imposed on enterprises, so that the product mix could be determined by negotiation with customers, the ministry has in fact doubled the number of such imposed plan-indicators (S. Sorkin, *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, No. 10, 1987, p. 8). A second example concerns a decree under which farms are entitled to payment for over-quota deliveries of grain at higher prices. The procurement organs simply refused to pay, offering feed concentrates instead, and the farm had no effective redress. The effectiveness of contract brigades and links in agriculture, a desirable form of labor incentive to which Gorbachev

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is publicly committed, is being undermined by the repeated failure of farm management to observe contractual obligations, as a result of which the brigades and links frequently fall apart, as Nikonov (the party secretary in charge of agriculture) told a meeting called by the Central Committee (*Pravda*, January 25, 1987). An article by V. Skvortsova *(Selskaya Zhizn)* is wholly devoted to this truly vital issue of the observance of contracts. Quoting many examples of non-observance, she asks the question, "Whose fault?" She answers: "For many years the conflicts of departmental interests, exacerbated by shortages of many resources, created a situation in which it was not contract which determined the rights and duties of the partners (to an agreement), but either an order 'from above' or some special relationships between the respective managements . . . Times have changed, but the habit of looking at contractual agreements as a non-obligatory empty formality has survived." Gorbachev has a degree in law, and well understands the importance of contract in the new economic mechanism. However, two generations of arbitrariness have left their mark. One cannot get a million officials to keep their promises just by issuing a decree to that effect.

It is necessary to stress how inherently complex are the problems of transition from centralized planning to a new alternative. This would be so even if this new alternative already existed in the form of a consistent and agreed model, and even if all concerned were doing their best to implement the desired change. One must return again to the human factor. Soviet citizens at all levels have learned how to live with and within the system. There is an unofficial network, partly legal, which enables people to circumvent restrictive rules and to secure various advantages. Workers have become accustomed to total job security, to being paid regardless of effort. They are also accustomed to highly subsidized prices of necessities and to very low rents. Yet the reform, if it is to be effective, requires that poor performance be penalized, that surplus labor be moved to other jobs, that prices should reflect supply and demand. One of the most significant obstacles to radical reform is that this is a conservative society, at all levels. Reform will be imposed from above, or it will not happen. But it cannot be effectively implemented without support from below. Gorbachev is busily engaged in the formidable task of trying to square this particular circle. Meanwhile, local officialdom will seek "to turn the hurricane (of reform) into a storm in a teacup," to cite *Novyi mir* (No. 9, 1986, p. 254). It is too soon to say whether they will succeed or fail.

WITH WHAT consequences? It seems to me that a relapse into economic conservatism would be associated with a harder-line foreign policy, plus a greater degree of cultural and economic isolationism, and pressures on Comecon to integrate and conform. It is not that opposition to economic reform must necessarily be associated with such policies. Conversely, one could conceive of radical economic reformers who favor a hard line in foreign affairs. Nonetheless, one does see an association, in Gorbachev and his closest advisers, between economic and political reform at home and the pursuit of some sort of detente abroad. Aware of the immensity of the task of putting the domestic house in order, they clearly wish to concentrate their attention and their resources upon it.

There may indeed be some unintended consequences, about which one can only speculate. The reform process cannot be painless; there could be confusion and disarray in the transition from one systemic logic to another. Care would have to be taken to avoid wage cuts and redundancies which could stir worker discontent. Gorbachev himself has warned of the possible consequences of a rising tide of national consciousness, and this in the context of *glasnost* and *demokratizatsiya*. Then what of the effects of Soviet reforms in Eastern Europe, for example on the old hardline "conservatives" still in power in Czechoslovakia?

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Finally, what of Western policy and attitudes? Some remain obstinately trapped within an "evil empire" syndrome, incurably afflicted by what Stephen Cohen has called "sovietophobia." For them, the Soviet Union is an expansionist monster in its very essence unless and until there is a fundamental change in the system; but since fundamental change is held to be impossible, any change that has actually occurred cannot be fundamental because it has occurred. Gorbachev must then be seen as another Brezhnev, except that he is articulate, wears smarter suits, and is much better at public relations. I regard this view as totally mistaken. By this I do not mean that Gorbachev should be seen as virtuous, or that the USSR has ceased to be an adversarial great power. But we are not in a zero-sum game, and Gorbachev is evidently willing to pay a price in order to concentrate his attention on internal affairs. Some committed ideologists have asserted that Soviet economic weakness is dangerous, because it might encourage the use of military power, and that economic success is dangerous, because they will then be stronger and so able to do more mischief. Heads I win, tails you lose. A new generation is in power, and not only the style is new. The forces of conservatism, the repressive apparatus, are still there and could make a comeback. It is not in our interest that they should, save on the assumption that "the worse the better."

This is the seventieth anniversary of the October revolution, and inevitably speeches and articles will stress continuity, as this is important for the ideological legitimacy of the regime. Yet why, seventy years after, with a generation in power for whom even Stalin is a childhood memory, should we *assume* that they accord high priority to external expansionism, that ideology compels them to irreconcilable enmity, to take risks in the nuclear age? The success or failure of Gorbachev's reform program will be determined very largely by internal forces and circumstances. There is not much we can do to help or hinder. But we should not hinder. Gorbachev is the best general secretary we have got or are likely to have. He faces tough opposition at home. It will not be helpful if we rebuff his overtures and take a bleakly negative line on trade, cultural contacts, and arms control. Alongside MAD, I would suggest MAID, Mutually Advantageous Inter-Dependence. At least this represents a positive vision.

Hannes Adomeit

TWO YEARS after his accession to power, it is no longer possible to maintain that Gorbachev is simply embarking on cosmetic changes. He is indeed, as even his critics acknowledge, aiming at a fundamental transformation of the society and the economy of the Soviet Union. This is shown by his diagnosis of the problems facing the country, the broad search he has encouraged for remedial action, and the measures he has adopted so far.

Hannes Adomeit is senior staff member at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Ebenhausen, West Germany, and author of *Soviet Risk Taking and Crisis Behavior*.

Does this concern us? Do we, or should we, care?

Obviously, the likely direction and consequences of the processes that Gorbachev has set in motion are difficult to predict. Yet there can be no doubt that change has not been, and will not be, limited to domestic politics. Soviet foreign policy has already been affected. And since the Soviet Union is not an isolationist regional actor but an outward looking superpower, our interests in world affairs are directly involved. We should thus not only make a serious effort to understand the nature of the changes occurring in the Soviet Union but also look for ways to influence them in ways favorable to us.

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Gorbachev has diagnosed the Soviet Union's troubles in much detail since his accession to power in March 1985, most forcefully and uncompromisingly at the Central Committee meeting at the end of January 1987. Stagnation, in his view, pervades all aspects of Soviet life. Dogmatism is rampant. The concepts which are still being discussed and applied have essentially remained the same since the 1930s and 1940s.

In cultural affairs, creativity has been stifled. Writers, painters, musicians, and film-makers have been under the tutelage of narrow-minded, petty bureaucrats and have been driven abroad or underground. Society has become rotten due to lack of initiative at all levels, shirking of responsibility, bureaucratization, corruption, alcoholism, and the lowering of standards in teaching, medical care, and other services.

Similarly, according to Gorbachev, the economy has fallen into serious disrepair. Growth rates have been falling; the quality of labor and its output have declined. Incompetence, inefficiency, inertia, corruption, fraud, waste, lack of initiative, and resistance to innovation have become characteristic of economic processes. There has been an abysmal failure to achieve the necessary and often-demanded transition from mobilization to modernization, from quantitative to qualitative growth, and from extensive to intensive development. Science and technology are too far removed from the production process. As a result, the USSR has fallen behind its capitalist competitors, particularly in high technology.

Gorbachev has also pointed out grave deficiencies in the political realm. In talks with a group of writers last June, for instance, he alluded to the disadvantages inherent in a system without opposition parties.[1] He has criticized arbitrariness and abuse of power by party and state officials. And he has hinted at the fact that much of the participation by Soviet citizens in the political process is superficial and ritualistic.

Faced with such a plethora of ills, it is not surprising that the Soviet party leader has called for a "sharp turn" *(povorot)* in the course of events, a "fundamental restructuring" *(perestroika)* of the society and economy, even a "revolution" *(revolyutsiya)*. These terms may be exaggerated for effect. Yet, they are more than empty rhetoric. Substantive changes have already occurred and will most likely continue, since they form part of an overall strategy.

The main idea behind this strategy is not to do away with one-party rule, to introduce a Western-style liberal democracy, to restore the private mode of production, or to reinstate the market economy. At least for the time being, as the second in command in the Soviet leadership, Yegor Ligachev, has proclaimed, there will be "no sidestepping to a market economy and private enterprise." The law on individual labor, which came into effect on May 1, underlines that the sidestepping has indeed been marginal. He has also warned that Western observers were wrong to assume that the Soviet system would "be put on rails leading to political pluralism." The idea behind Gorbachev's *perestroika* is rather to make the existing system more flexible, more adaptable to change, and more efficient, but also more open and, most likely, more human.

In fact, Gorbachev has put great faith in the "human factor." He apparently realizes that the Tsarist legacy and Stalinist totalitarianism combined to produce an essentially apathetic populace; that they stifled a sense of personal responsibility; and that they fostered a cynical attitude to authority and a mentality of "them" (above) against "us" (below). His blueprint for change, therefore, is to embark on a new round in the creation of "socialist man." He is aiming less at a political

[1]The meeting with members from the Union of Writers reportedly took place on June 19, 1986. An incomplete transcript of Gorbachev's remarks in Russian is available at the samizdat archives of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (Munich); an English translation in *Detente* (Birmingham), No. 8, Winter 1987, pp. 11–12.

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than a cultural revolution. (Its Maoist counterpart is quite misleading, however, and detracts from the original meaning of the term.)

Such a revolution, if successful, would be of considerable importance for economic performance. For the weeding out of corruption, the firing of incompetent party and state officials, the setting of new standards of honesty, the authorization of criticism within the confines of the system, and more openness *(glasnost)* can serve to instill a new work ethic. Sobriety can help lower the number of work-related accidents, reduce absenteeism, and raise productivity. A scientific-technological and managerial elite that is better informed and more closely attuned to international developments will probably make better use of science and technology in the production process.

The logic of Gorbachev's strategy also makes it necessary, at least in some measure, to extend the cultural revolution to the political realm. Hence, he has also advocated more *glasnost* and criticism within the party. There is also to be a measure of "democratization," with two or more candidates to present themselves for election at lower and middle levels of the party, in the labor unions, and to the parliaments (soviets).

DESPITE the appearance of internal consistency, Gorbachev's design is riddled with internal contradictions and faces severe obstacles. First, as Gorbachev reiterated at the important Central Committee plenary meeting in January, "democratization" in the party should leave untouched the principle of "democratic centralism." In other words, one-party rule, the outlawing of "factionalism" (a principle existing since the 10th Congress of the Communist party held in 1921), and central direction of party affairs are to be reconciled with initiative "from below." A difficult balancing act, it would seem.

Second, the command economy is to remain intact. There has been very little economic reorganization, and no major laws are in sight at present that would bring it about. So where is the initiative and innovation that Gorbachev has demanded to come from? Most likely not from the managers who are still inadequately rewarded for taking economic risks. Even less so from the workers. They are supposed to work harder and better. If products under a new system of quality control do not pass inspection, workers will not get paid or will at least get smaller bonuses. At the same time, the supply of housing, durable consumer goods, and foodstuffs has remained as limited as ever. It is not surprising, therefore, that riots against the controls are said by the government to have occurred last December at the big Kamaz truck plant.

Gorbachev is aware of these problems. At the beginning of March, he acknowledged that until now "we have done very little for the satisfaction of the needs of the Soviet people." He is also on record as having stated that, "the most difficult time for us will be this year and the following two."

Third, Gorbachev must contend with dissatisfaction, procrastination, and latent opposition from within the party and state establishment. He has to convince and, if necessary, to convict through the courts, bureaucrats who refuse to mend their ways, party ideologues who resent the erosion of fundamental tenets of Marxist-Leninism, and the military who may be concerned about potential cuts in defense expenditures and the lowering of their social status.

Yet despite all internal contradictions and opposition, it is unlikely that Gorbachev will suffer Khrushchev's fate and suddenly be removed from office by his colleagues in the Politburo. Not only has he managed to exchange almost every member of the Brezhnev Politburo for one of his own supporters; he also derives strong support from the fact that there is no alternative to fundamental change. Rapid modernization of the economy and society are indeed required if the Soviet Union is to retain its status as a world power. As Gorbachev has pointed out, "Only an intensive, highly-developed economy can

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safeguard the positions of our country in the international arena and will allow it to enter the next millenium as a great and prospering state."

But the Soviet leader is also conscious of a converse relationship. Whereas domestic transformations are to improve the underpinning for the Soviet Union's global power position, Soviet foreign policy is to enhance the prospects for successful domestic change. To that extent, the essence of change in the Soviet Union can be considered as the interplay between *perestroika* and *peredyshka*, i.e., between the efforts at fundamentally "restructuring" the Soviet economy and society, and the need for a "breathing spell" in international relations.

This relationship was stated early on by Gorbachev, in his interview with *Time* magazine in September 1985. It was repeated by him at the international peace forum in Moscow in February 1987 where he said: "Our international policy is determined more than ever before by our domestic policy, by our interest in concentrating on creative work for the perfection of our country. For that very reason, we need a more stable peace, predictability, and a constructive direction of international relations."

There are good reasons for Gorbachev to look for a respite. As in domestic politics, problems in international affairs had accumulated at the end of Brezhnev's rule, and his successors, Andropov and Chernenko, were either unwilling or incapable of tackling them. Some hard lessons had to be learned.

By 1984, the Soviet leadership had maneuvered itself into considerable international isolation. The effectiveness of various instruments of policy toward the West had decreased. The strength of the "peace movement" had waned. In Western Europe, the Soviet leadership saw itself faced with governments of varying composition—conservative in West Germany and Britain, socialist in France and Italy—yet all of them supporting the stationing of U.S. missiles in Europe, improvement of conventional defense, and the strengthening of Atlantic ties. It had proved impossible to separate the United States from Western Europe and Japan; the "objective forces" which bind together the three main "power centers of imperialism" had turned out to be stronger than those which pull them apart.

In the United States, defense outlays had sharply risen in President Carter's last year in office and through President Reagan's first term. New challenges for the late 1980s were being issued to the Warsaw Pact, one in the form of the development of more sophisticated conventional weapons, the other in the shape of the strategic defense initiative (SDI). Thus, the conjunction of ongoing U.S. strategic modernization programs, the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons, and the resulting capability of Nato to strike at Soviet territory from Western Europe put Moscow in the position of having to respond to Western initiatives (rather than the other way around as in the 1970s). Moreover, the USSR had to do so in an area in which it could compete less easily and effectively: in high technology.

Similarly, in the Third World, the success of Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola and Ethiopia had been less than complete; continued Soviet support and Cuban military involvement in these two countries were required to prevent deteriorating conditions from leading to a collapse. The North Vietnamese victory and the subsequent Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia also proved to be politically and economically costly for Moscow. And the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan did not, as the political and military leadership under Brezhnev may originally have calculated, lead to a rapid decrease in guerrilla activity. It remained, as Gorbachev mentioned at the 27th Party Congress, an "open wound."

At the same time as the commitments to Third World allies and clients were rising, economic growth was declining to little over 2 percent annually, or perhaps even less. As a result, despite the slowdown in the growth of defense spending after 1975 to about the same rate as economic growth (2 percent), the share

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of GNP allocated to defense had increased from 12 to 14 percent in the early 1970s to 17 percent in the early 1980s.[2] If the various costs for maintaining the Soviet "empire" are added to it, perhaps 20 percent of the Soviet GNP and one-third of additional national output have been, and may still be, devoted to maintaining the country's status as a superpower.

Evidently, something had to be done. It was necessary, as Gorbachev and his supporters realized, to reduce the political and economic "costs of empire," contain the negative repercussions of Soviet globalism on relations with the United States and other countries, lessen the risk of counterintervention initiated by the Reagan administration, reduce the pace of the arms competition (notably in the nuclear sphere), and concentrate on domestic reconstruction.

THESE CHANGES of approach, however, do not mean that Gorbachev will put strategic parity with the United States at risk, and voluntarily dismantle Moscow's global power position. Apart from anything else, he would not be allowed to do so by his colleagues in the Politburo and the Central Committee. The changes also do not indicate that the Soviet leadership is now ready, in line with the "new political thinking" it has demanded, to convert swords into plowshares. "Objectively," the military instrument remains a powerful device with which the Kremlin hopes to influence world events.

What the changes do reflect, however, is the will of the Kremlin leaders to make the global power position of the Soviet Union more secure and "cost effective," and the competition with the United States less risky. This may also imply that the influence that Moscow exerts in world affairs is to be based less on military power, as it has been in the past decades, and more on political, economic, ideological, and cultural instruments. Such a development would contain favorable prospects for us: Any shift in the East-West competition away from the military sphere to other conflict "arenas," let alone to cooperation, would obviously make international relations more secure.

Furthermore, it is of considerable importance that, for the first time since Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign (with ups and downs between 1956 and 1961), and in a manner reminiscent of such earlier episodes as the New Economic Policy (1921–1929) and the thaw under Malenkov after Stalin's death (1953–1955), shifts away from orthodoxy at home are coinciding with efforts at a certain relaxation abroad.

Of course, all these experiments in combined internal and external change remained short-lived (as did Brezhnev's approach of detente without internal change). Yet optimism for a break in this pattern is warranted by the fact that the problems of today are either quite different from those of the past or, if similar, are more pronounced, their solution having been postponed for so long. In full recognition of this fact, Gorbachev is credibly reported to have stated, in his June 1986 remarks to the Union of Writers, that his "first principle" of action is "not to evade urgent problems." Society is ready for fundamental change. And if he and his supporters "were not to make the process [of change] irreversible, then who will? If not now, then when?"

These remarks also reveal the essence of the interrelationship between *perestroika* and *peredyshka:* a process that is open-ended and that may, in fact almost certainly will, lead to many consequences not intended by Gorbachev. Thus, it would be apolitical to assume that what is happening in the Soviet Union today is merely the proclamation of an "armistice" and the "regrouping" of forces;

[2] *The Soviet Economy Under a New Leader,* a paper prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency for submission to the Subcommittee on Economic Resources, Competitiveness, and Security Economics of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, March 19, 1986.

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that the clever Politburo already has the end of the breathing spell firmly in sight; and that, at the end of the respite, everything will be the same as before. Reversal of the process would only be possible at tremendous cost. Conversely, continuation of the process may ultimately lead to the fulfillment of George Kennan's vision and hope that the Soviet Union will cease to be a cause and become a country.

Peter Reddaway

AS *glasnost* gradually enters the English lexicon to take its place alongside vodka, the knout, sputniks, and other Russian forerunners, it is timely to assess the current meaning, scope, and prospects of the phenomenon that it encapsulates in the Soviet Union, and also its possible implications for American foreign policy. In addition, how much will its fate be tied to the personal political fortunes of Gorbachev?

Glasnost can be defined as openness in public life. Thus it is used mainly in reference to the mass media and culture. Lenin used the word in this sense when in power, and since the mid-1960s Soviet dissidents have campaigned vigorously for it, using arguments very similar to those now deployed by the Kremlin (and usually, till recently, landing in jail for their efforts).

Since the word was taken up by Gorbachev and his supporters in 1985, it has become a key slogan and a powerful political instrument. Its purposes when employed as an instrument are multiple. Depending on the context, the aim may be one or more of the following: (a) to reduce corruption by publicly disgracing officials who have committed abuses; (b) to make a power play by portraying certain individuals or institutions in a bad light; (c) to generate, through debate, urgently needed, well-thought-out ideas for the reform of social, political, or economic policy; (d) to mobilize people on the side of such reform ideas; (e) to enrich cultural life by diversifying and enlivening it; (f) to increase the credibility of Soviet media (and thereby, among other things, reduce the attractiveness of Western broadcasts to the USSR); or (g) to encourage the West to think that the USSR is becoming pluralistic and democratic, and thereby to facilitate the conduct of Soviet foreign policy.

How exactly does *glasnost* fit into the Gorbachev leadership's overall strategy? The name of this strategy is *perestroika*, or "reconstruction." Translated into the language of American presidential slogans, it comes out not as the New Deal or the New Frontier, but as "New Ways." *Perestroika* will, Gorbachev says, take years to achieve. It is essential for the patriotic reason that, without it, the Soviet Union will stagnate, will fail to compete in the world, and will be vulnerable. The two main instruments for achieving it are *glasnost* and "democratization." *Glasnost* was introduced first, creating the freer atmosphere in which, since January 1987, the drive for democratization has been launched in earnest. This drive was organized when Gorbachev became convinced, after a year in power, that strong leadership by determined men at the top would never be enough to get the country moving again.

In his concluding speech to the Central Committee on January 28, Gorbachev spoke about *glasnost* like this: "The Communist Party firmly holds that the people should know everything. *Glasnost*, criticism and self-criticism, monitoring by the masses—these are the guarantees of the healthy development of Soviet society." The people "must know everything and consciously make judgments about everything." *Glasnost* and democracy "are needed for us to move forward,

Peter Reddaway is director of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

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for accomplishing huge tasks. Without active participation by the people we will not accomplish those tasks." While Gorbachev is, I believe, sincere in making these statements, they are not invalidated, in his mind, by the continued existence of severe limitations on the scope of *glasnost*. Indeed, he alluded to the central limitation in the same speech, when he said: "The press must promote *glasnost*, and keep our people informed. But it must do this responsibly—we express this wish. It must not get side-tracked by sensations, by a search for 'cooked evidence.' We need the press as an active participant in *perestroika*."

In other words, the press will continue to be primarily an instrument of the political leadership. This is confirmed by the record to date; the frankest, most sensational materials to appear in the media have consistently coincided, both in topic and timing, with particular policy campaigns conducted by the Kremlin, and have had the clear aim of reinforcing these campaigns. In addition, there is no indication that any of the mass media might in the future be removed from official control and ownership.

It is also important to note that while the *glasnost* policies of the Gorbachev leadership are more systematic and deliberate than the equivalent ones of the Khrushchev leadership twenty-five years ago, they are essentially identical. With regard to certain matters, Gorbachev has surpassed Khrushchev in scope and radicality; but regarding others, notably the key issue of de-Stalinization, he has so far lagged behind. The fact that it was not difficult for Khrushchev's successors to reverse those aspects of his media policies which they disliked means that the same will almost certainly be true of Gorbachev's successors (however soon or otherwise they succeed him).

LET US now look at how far *glasnost* has gone in selected areas of policy. As indicated, Gorbachev has been circumspect on the Stalin question and other sensitive historical issues. In the last few months, however, he has made some indirect criticisms of Stalin, and anti-Stalinist notes have been heard in the media with increasing frequency. Bukharin and Khrushchev are gradually being rehabilitated, the latter being criticized in the process for failing to break with such aspects of Stalinism as Lysenkoism and exploitation of the peasantry. De-Stalinization is clearly back on the agenda, and progress on this crucial issue, which is highly relevant to serious and frank debate on most current topics, seems likely.

In current domestic politics, *glasnost* continues to be manipulated by the Kremlin to assist it in ousting a long string of Brezhnev appointees. In a selective way, the anti-corruption campaign is targeted on such individuals and the results are publicized in the press. Beyond this, Gorbachev is now using *glasnost* to gather support for radical ideas he would like to implement despite opposition from conservatives, namely introduction of the elective principle into the choosing of factory managers, and also giving this same principle more teeth in party and soviet elections. By contrast, the campaign to reduce or eliminate the extensive material privileges enjoyed by the *nomenklatura*, or ruling class, has faded away over the past year in the face of strong *nomenklatura* opposition. Notable in this connection, however, has been a greater readiness today than in Khrushchev's time to refer explicitly to various forms of opposition to current policies.

In discussions of foreign policy matters, *glasnost* has had less success. Real Soviet motivations and negotiating positions are still too secret to be debated in public. Interesting developments have, however, occurred. Articles by anti-Soviet foreigners, e.g., Richard Pipes, have been published in full (and of course criticized). And hints of an apparent desire by some elements in the leadership (probably including Gorbachev) to withdraw from Afghanistan have been more clearly expressed of late than they were before. Anti-American propaganda has been somewhat curtailed but can still be vicious. A recent documentary on prime-time television, for example, was devoted to vilifying

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various American leaders. These included President Reagan, who was clearly, if indirectly, compared to Hitler.

Domestic social and economic matters have shown *glasnost* at its most impressive. Here the Kremlin has printed assessments of the current state of affairs which have been franker than anything published since the 1920s, and also far-reaching proposals for change. Last October, for example, Gorbachev's up-and-coming associate Alexander Yakovlev, who is now both a candidate member of the Politburo and a secretary of the Central Committee, said at a high-level conference: "Today a sizable stratum of perfectly literate, perfectly educated people has come into existence, who reject cultural activities which are even the least bit serious. They don't read anything except detective stories, they go to the cinema only to see sensationalist movies, and of all the musical forms, they like only hard rock. Their cultural aspirations are aggressive and narrow."

Thus, in addition to an economic debate and frank discussion of long taboo subjects like suicide, drug use, and rising crime rates, the media are also engaged in airing views on how to regenerate moral and cultural values and how to give people a healthy pride in their national heritage.

Naturally enough, these issues are being addressed not just by social scientists, but also—as Gorbachev has quickly mobilized all sections of the "creative intelligentsia"—by writers, moviemakers, and playwrights. The much increased cultural freedom has also led to decisions to publish long-suppressed works by writers such as Pasternak, Gumilev, Dudintsev, and Bek. Notably, though, the fierce ongoing struggle in the Kremlin between the liberal Gorbachev trend and the conservatives is reflected in the equally ferocious conflicts of cultural life. Among the literary-political publications, for example, those controlled by conservatives (e.g., *Zvezda*, *Molodaya gvardiya*, *Moskva*, *Literaturnaya Rossiya*) do battle with those edited by liberals (e.g., *Druzhba narodov*, *Znamya*, *Neva*, *Novyi mir*, *Yunost*).

Another development linked to socio-economic concerns is the much greater candor of the media regarding major accidents and natural disasters. While *glasnost* conspicuously failed the test in the immediate aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster, this very failure appears to have spurred the sharp improvements that have occurred in this area since last spring.

Clearly, an important index of the level of *glasnost* in the Soviet Union at any particular time is the degree of official tolerance for the exercise by citizens of freedom of expression and freedom of association. These, of course, are key freedoms aspired to by many types of dissidents. Gorbachev conveyed his general approach to such matters at the January plenum: "If someone tries to use our extensive *glasnost* and the democratic process for his own selfish and anti-social purposes, for the purpose of blackening everything, will we really—with such a powerful Party, with such a patriotic people devoted to the ideas of socialism and to its Motherland—not be able to cope with the situation?" As this and other parts of his speech make clear, he professes what one would expect a semi-populist communist to profess: with the exception of a few malicious troublemakers, the people are sufficiently supportive of the party that agreement on tricky points can be reached through discussion and argument within the existing one-party system.

Like Khrushchev, therefore, Gorbachev is trying to recruit the "creative intelligentsia" to his ranks by, among other things, releasing from prison those people (about a hundred to date) whose dissent and courage are widely admired in that social group, and by refraining from new arrests of intellectuals. In doing all this, he also gains important points in the West. His particularly notable concessions to Dr. Sakharov, especially in phoning him in Gorky prior to his release, went as far as the *Literary Gazette* conducting an interview with him. But the limits of Gorbachev's policy are suggested by the subsequent failure of the interview to appear.

Other limits are indicated by the non-

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release, so far, of some 300 religious prisoners, and by the refusal, to date, to allow a significant amount of emigration by Jews, Volga Germans, and Armenians, more than half a million of whom would like to leave. Also, lest the surprising decision to publicize the Kazakh riots of last December be regarded as typical, it should be stressed that deviant acts are not normally benefiting from *glasnost*.

Although the Gorbachev leadership appears to be hostile to any notion of free emigration (probably because it would undermine the sense of social cohesion and unity it is trying to build up), it is noteworthy that the desire to generate pride in Soviet culture is so strong that it is leading to more freedom to travel, and more *glasnost*, in one unprecedented respect. Recent defectors like the theater director Lyubimov and the dancer Baryshnikov are being invited to return home—not, as tradition would dictate, to serve fifteen years in the Gulag, but to perform as world-famous stars.

FOR THE PRESENT, at least, *glasnost*'s prospects seem good. Most of the controlling positions are now in the hands of people who favor it, such as the above mentioned Yakovlev, the head of the State Publishing Committee, Nenashev, the minister of culture, Zakharov, and the editor of the paper *Moscow News*, Egor Yakovlev, who is clearly licensed to lead the field in pushing back the frontiers of censorship. This team may even succeed in due course in storming a citadel that has long exasperated Gorbachev, namely the unreconstructed, *glasnost*-free local press, protected as it is in many parts of the country by Brezhnevites who are still hanging on to their jobs.

A further barrier to greater *glasnost*—the jamming of foreign radio broadcasts—has already started to crumble. In December the Russian service of the BBC was relieved of this jamming, and it would not be surprising if this move were soon extended to the Voice of America and other stations. [Editor's note: the jamming of Voice of America did cease on May 23; however the jamming of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty has been increased.]

In the longer term, however, I would not be sanguine about *glasnost*'s prospects. If Gorbachev is trying to square the circle by embarking on the democratization of the Soviet system, as he shows every sign of doing, then, in my view, he is unlikely to remain in power for many more years. Sooner or later, the *nomenklatura* will surely remove him. And in that case *glasnost* would be bound to suffer in the inevitable conservative reaction. For while it would probably not be reduced to the status quo ante, it is ultimately, we must remember, a commodity which can be doled out in greater or lesser quantity by the Kremlin. It is not an institution, let alone one with any autonomy.

What implications are there in all this, if any, for American foreign policy? The present seems to be an unusually promising time for doing business with the Soviet Union. Gorbachev is stepping out on a highly risky domestic path and needs tangible foreign policy breakthroughs to strengthen his position. He will bargain extremely hard, but he will also, in my view, be ready to make real concessions to get a deal. In these circumstances, deals may well be feasible in all the four main areas—arms control, bilateral relations, regional issues, and human rights. Issues which should be pursued include an end to the jamming of American broadcasts, concessions regarding the treatment of dissidents and emigration, and the expansion of cultural, academic, and citizens' exchanges. If and when Gorbachev departs, the U.S. is likely to find it harder to obtain concessions in both these and other areas.

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Alain Besançon & Françoise Thom

IF WE wish to understand what is now taking place in the USSR, we cannot simply ask: "Is the USSR really changing?" Instead, we must raise a more fundamental question: "What happened during the Brezhnev era to make such a spectacular reaction seem essential?" For the first time Soviet leaders are stating that the future of socialism is at stake. In other words, they feel that the very foundation of their power is threatened. It is commonly agreed that the Gorbachev shake-up has been caused by an economic crisis. Economic crisis, however, is a constant in communist regimes, and by itself it most certainly is not sufficient to provoke an outbreak of *glasnost*. After all, it has long been known that shortages and famine are no threat to Bolshevik power. If today's economic disaster has provoked so much alarm among the new team of leaders, there must be something novel about it, something considered dangerous to the regime.

The reports of the 27th Congress and the measures taken by the Gorbachev team cast light on these "negative phenomena." First, there is the deterioration of what the Soviets call the "human factor." Seventy years of Bolshevism have left in their wake a passive, disillusioned, cynical, and lazy population, frequently sick and alcoholic. How can a technological revolution be carried out with this completely indifferent labor force? Gorbachev's first task is thus to put the Soviet people back to work, and to do this they must be convinced that this time "it's for real"—things have changed, they will no longer be cheated, there will be equality before the law, judges will be incorruptible, criticism will be encouraged, effort rewarded, etc. Such are the domestic aims of *glasnost*.

Alain Besançon is director of studies at the Ecole des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris, and a columnist for *L'Express*. Françoise Thom works for La Fondation de Défense Nationale, Paris.

The second "negative phenomenon" confronted by the regime is the spectacular growth of the underground economy, which is accompanied by the corruption of officials—another leitmotif of Gorbachev's pronouncements—and by the greater independence of the republics in their dealings with Moscow. Because this is a crucial problem, the official press does not like to mention it openly, and thus it tends to escape the attention of Western observers. Still, if the rampant de facto re-privatization of the economy throughout the long reign of Brezhnev is not taken into account, it is impossible to understand the reaction of Gorbachev. The bulk of the measures adopted during the past two years can only be explained by the determination to liquidate the underground economy, and the mortal danger that it poses for Leninism—namely the transformation of the revolutionary party into an oligarchy. These measures are *glasnost*, which is a form of grass-roots supervision (a typically communist form of surveillance, by informing on others); reactivation of the courts; a law against unearned income (whose effect was to empty the marketplace of goods and paralyze transports in 1986); and the rotation of cadres (so as to prevent them from putting down roots and seeing their own economic interest as being linked to the economic interests of those they rule over). The result of *gosagroprom* (State Committee for the Agro-Industrial Complex), another invention of the Gorbachev era, has been to complete the process of proletarianizing the countryside which began with collectivization. It is interesting to note that private sector agricultural production dropped in 1986 by 11 percent (notably for meat).

The fact that public discourse is reminiscent of Lenin's "NEP," and that liberalism is spreading in the newspapers should not fool us. If Gorbachev is judged by his deeds, it will be noticed that his policy consists of an all-out attack on civil society: what counts for

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him is to regain control of the economy, the population, the outlying regions of the state, and the party machinery. Considered as a whole, the measures adopted so far are based on this logic. The methods are Stalin's: intimidate the cadres (200,000 of them were prosecuted in 1986); incite the population against them; intimidate the ordinary citizens (the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* of December 3, 1986, informs us that 800,000 illegal merchants have been arrested or have deserted their jobs for fear of prosecution); replace and replenish the apparatus; and conduct massive purges. The Gorbachev team, however, has understood that when one's ambition is to undertake a technological revolution, there are drawbacks to the Stalinist model. As can be gathered from the press, they have learned the lessons of Lysenkoism. They thus reserve discipline for ordinary people while maintaining a bit of breathing space for the intelligentsia, a small patch of liberty in the midst of widespread enslavement, similar to the *charachki* described by Solzhenitsyn in *The Second Circle*. This system has the advantage of being useful for international propaganda.

"WILL Gorbachev succeed?" is an ambiguous question. If it means, will the Soviet people become free and prosperous citizens, as some Westerners naively believe, let us be blunt: that is not his goal. If the point is to regain control of the apparatus, Gorbachev stands a serious chance of succeeding. But this attempt to destroy the underground economy and to revitalize the state sector is destined to fail: the more he fights against "illegal income," the less the Soviets will work and the greater will be the deterioration of the "human factor." The Soviets have no desire to devote greater effort to the official economy. They prefer to go about their black market business. This is the essential obstacle to *perestroika*, *Pravda* informs us (January 20, 1987). Stalin's advantage was to be able to draw from an almost inexhaustible reserve of manpower; Gorbachev does not have this resource.

As always, the favored solution is Western aid and external expansion. The obvious objective of the Soviets' policy is to lay their hands on Europe (starting with Germany) and on a rapidly developing Asia. There are several encouraging factors from Moscow's point of view: the rise of American isolationism, German neutralism, the American tendency to replace geopolitical thinking with technological constructions. A major theme of Soviet disinformation is that superpower competition will henceforth take place in outer space. The Soviets thus prepare Americans for acquiescence in the loss of Europe.

Some hurdles nevertheless remain: the memory of detente and the ensuing let-down is still vivid in the West, which explains Gorbachev's extraordinary effort to promote a "new thinking" and to convince us that it exists in the USSR. By urging the people to adopt the "new thinking," Gorbachev is inviting them (in effect) to forget seventy years of painfully acquired experience of Bolshevism and to start from square one. This tactic has been somewhat successful, but disinformation nonetheless has its limits. Western countries, furthermore, are no longer eager to invest in the East. This is not out of any political motive: in purely economic terms, past experiences have not been encouraging.

If Gorbachev's undertaking succeeds, the West will have to deal with a revitalized communist power, extremely active abroad, highly aggressive, and armed with an excellent understanding of the inner workings of our societies. A spectacular renewal of subversive activities, aimed both at public opinion and institutions, can be anticipated (the analyses in the Soviet press today point clearly in that direction).

There are two possible sorts of secondary effects from Gorbachevism: we could witness an unleashing of terror from below, accompanied by a freezing-up of the economic machinery. This is not very likely. A more plausible outcome is that the Gorbachev program will bog down and the USSR will be quietly "re-Brezhnevized." The offensive against the cadres may have destabilizing

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effects: elites, even communist ones, can never be liquidated at no cost. We should not forget that the authoritarian framework of the party replaces representative institutions in the Soviet Union. There is a latent anarchism in Soviet society, an organized gangsterism, which can flare up unexpectedly. The rotation of the cadres could unleash civil or national unrest, which lurks just beneath the surface. Awareness of this danger will provide another push down the slope towards "re-Brezhnevization."

The West misunderstands the Gorbachev reaction for several reasons:

- The discrepancy between Soviet words and Soviet actions is greater now than perhaps ever before. The regime no longer has only model *kolkhozy* (collective farms) and Potemkin factories to show off to foreigners. It has understood the importance of showcase events. It now manufactures happenings with which to inundate our media day after day. We have the impression of important change in the Soviet Union; we are under the impression that we know something about this country, when in fact we know as little about it as ever, less even than in the past. We know about the Soviet regime what they want us to know about it, and nothing else.
- Westerners imagine that Gorbachev only pretends to believe in Leninism. In fact, everything in his speeches points to his having no other doctrine. Pragmatism for a communist government, far from involving the relinquishing of ideology, means returning to Leninist sources in order to solve the problems of power. Westerners continue to believe, in effect, that the logic of the Bolshevik regime, like that of our democracies, is one of public good. In fact, power is the sole rationale of Leninism.
- Westerners can never get used to the idea of a uniform, atomized, and voiceless society. They project onto Soviet "society" structures analogous to our own, a political life implicitly similar to the one in democracies. Soviet propaganda encourages this tendency: it must invent a fictitious differentiation in the social body. The Soviets need a supply of scapegoats to single out (rigid bureaucrats, ministries) and a fictitious entity with which to conduct a discussion (the intelligentsia). Most of the time our analysis only reproduces the mythology exuded in the official Soviet line.

HOW should we deal with Gorbachev's USSR? Above all, Western governments must have a clear vision of what Gorbachev is doing and they must be persuaded that as the Soviets have achieved a better understanding of the workings of democracy they have become that much more dangerous. The obvious weaknesses of the Soviet system should not make us lower our guard: we must remember that a Soviet Union exhausted by war annexed Central Europe between 1945 and 1947. Our governments must learn that the Soviets are depending ever more firmly on the manipulation of public opinion in the West and that they seek not only to use the left but to create solid lobbies on the right. Western leaders must educate public opinion, open people's eyes to the danger of joining forces with the enemy. Western governments have to understand that the battle for public opinion is not won in advance, especially now that the Soviets have embraced the slogan of "interdependence." This buzz-word, with its implicit argument that all the world's problems have become global in scope, allows them to claim to speak on behalf of all humanity.

Another point should be emphasized: the Western camp must remain united and resist the Soviet sirens who sing of "national interest." Faced with the totalitarian enterprise, the national interest of a democracy, properly understood, is that of the alliance to which it belongs. A separate agreement with the enemy, even one apparently advantageous for a given country, is dangerous if it means a breach in the alliance.

It is advisable to hold to several simple principles when dealing with the USSR:

- Reduce political contacts to a minimum, avoiding as much as possible summit meetings where we have everything to lose and nothing to gain. Any negotiations should

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be conducted with the greatest possible discretion, instead of turning them into a stage show with the Soviets in the role of producer.

- Economic contacts should not be encouraged. Businesses wishing to trade with the East should assume all the risks, whereas today, for example in France, Germany, and Italy, these risks are assumed by the government.

- Avoid cultural exchanges, which create opportunities for the Soviets to infiltrate our "think tanks" and our decision-making centers, to expand their influence, and to cover their espionage activities.

- Demand reciprocity in diplomatic relations; i.e., re-establish a balance in diplomatic representation and demand equal treatment of delegations.

- Instead of stressing human rights, which leads to the assumption that the Soviets respect the idea of rights, emphasize civil rights and the rights of individuals.

In this way, the West will approach an objective it has lost sight of since its de jure recognition of the USSR: putting an end to the fiction of the legitimacy of that regime.

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Swords without Shields

Albert Wohlstetter

ANTAGONISTS have usually found it handy to have both offenses and defenses—means of striking blows and ways of parrying them.

Knights carried swords into battle, not only shields and suits of armor. Tanks deploy armor as well as armor-piercing guns. Fighter aircraft use guns or air-to-air missiles and shielded cockpits and self-sealing fuel tanks. And countries that at some uncertain future date just might consider starting a war to revise the status quo generally have wanted some shield against the remnants of their victim's offensive force which might survive their own initial attack.

So also for countries preparing to resist aggression. They generally want the capability both to counterattack and to protect themselves against their adversary's initial and continuing assaults; and they want such protection to extend both to their military means for attacking and defending and (however imperfectly) to some important elements of their civil society and political order.

The exact mixture of offense and defense will vary with the political and military objectives and circumstances of the two sides and with the changing state of the arts of offense and defense. But the need for both seems to apply at any state of the art—even to combat with bare hands. Boxers with a roundhouse punch and a glass jaw may never get to use their punch; and those prepared to absorb a great deal of punishment but not to dish it out may end up only absorbing punishment. Neither a pure offense nor a pure defense is an unmixed blessing.

Albert Wohlstetter is director of research at PAN Heuristics. This article is based on a chapter in the forthcoming *Swords and Shields: NATO, the USSR, and New Choices for Long-Range Offense and Defense*, edited by the author, to be published by Lexington Books.

Offense, Defense, and Arms Control

DISARMAMENT negotiators for the democracies between the two world wars were interested in staving off another war and therefore found it natural to seek agreements to limit offensive weapons in particular and even to eliminate them. Some weapons, such as short-range antiaircraft guns, have as their only purpose stopping a weapon carrier already on its way to target. A country that had only weapons effective against other weapons already launched against it could hardly start a war. And if no country had anything but such weapons, the reasoning went, no country could start a war.

The actual weapons available between the wars, however, did not fall so neatly into categories of pure defense and pure offense. For instance, the victim of an assault might use strike aircraft to launch a counterassault, or the aggressor might use defensive weapons to blunt the victim's counterassault. And some countries engaged in arms negotiations also contemplated using arms to extend their borders. Disarmament negotiators bogged down in a welter of ambiguities and confu-

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sion on the subject of such qualitative disarmament. Winston Churchill, as might be expected, made the essential point with devastating wit:

> The Foreign Secretary told us that it was difficult to divide weapons into offensive and defensive categories. It certainly is, because almost every conceivable weapon may be used in defence or offence; either by an aggressor or by the innocent victim of his assault. To make it more difficult for the invader, heavy guns, tanks, and poison gas are to be relegated to the evil category of offensive weapons. The invasion of France by Germany in 1914 reached its climax without the employment of any of these weapons. The heavy gun is to be described as "an offensive weapon." It is all right in a fortress; there it is virtuous and pacific in its character; but bring it out into the field—and, of course, if it were needed, it would be brought out into the field—and it immediately becomes naughty, peccant, militaristic, and has to be placed under the ban of civilisation. Take the tank. The Germans, having invaded France, entrenched themselves; and in a couple of years they shot down 1,500,000 French and British soldiers who were trying to free the soil of France. The tank was invented to overcome the fire of the machine-guns with which the Germans were maintaining themselves in France, and it saved a lot of lives in clearing the soil of the invader. Now, apparently, the machine-gun, which was the German weapon for holding on to thirteen provinces of France, is to be the virtuous, defensive machine-gun, and the tank, which was the means by which these Allied lives were saved, is to be placed under the censure and obloquy of all just and righteous men.[1]

He added prophetically that the governments at Geneva would be better off trying to ban weapons that tended to kill and wound not only combatants but also men, women, and children far removed from areas of conflict.

Churchill challenged not only the clarity of the distinction between offense and defense and its applicability to actual weapons but the political assumption implicit in the British negotiating stance: that the Third Reich (or indeed its immediate predecessor) threatened the French Third Republic no more than the reverse and was no more likely to start a war to change the status quo. Hitler spoke, with greater eloquence than most remember, about the unfairness of the arms arrangements in the Versailles Treaty and about his own desire for peace as well as justice. As Alan Bullock's excellent book details, Hitler struck a responsive chord among the British public and the British political elite, both left and right.[2] But Churchill was much less susceptible even to plausible arguments for equality in arms that relied on the implied belief that reducing French superiority in military force would lessen the probability of war in the 1930s:

> I should very much regret to see any approximation in military strength between Germany and France. Those who speak of that as though it were right, or even a question of fair dealing, altogether underrate the gravity of the European situation. I would say to those who would like to see Germany and France on an equal footing in armaments: "Do you wish for war?" For my part, I earnestly hope that no such approximation will take place during my lifetime or that of my children. To say that is not in the least to imply any want of regard or admiration for the great qualities of the German people, but I am sure that the thesis that they should be placed in an equal military position with France is one which, if it ever emerged in fact, would bring us within practical distance of almost measureless calamity.[3]

Democratic leaders and their publics, rather more than the dictators with whom they negotiate, tend to worry about fairness, about their own power exceeding that of potential adversaries, and about provoking adversary fears of being attacked. Since World War II, political elites among the democracies have often thought of reassuring potential adversaries, including the Soviets, by arguing that their military forces are purely defensive or by proposing programs for making them purely defensive and incapable of launching an attack. In Article IX of

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their constitution, the Japanese formally gave up the right to use any military force. As reality impinged, they modified the meaning of the doctrine, coming to interpret it as allowing military force that could repel attack on Japan but not military force that they could use to attack others. They call their defense department the Self-Defense Agency to make explicit its purely defensive character. For many years they severely limited the range of their fighters to make it clear that they could not attack the Asian mainland; they even constrained navigation and guidance to make sure that even if fighters could reach their targets, they couldn't find them.

Japan adopted its constitution, with the help of that famous pacifist General MacArthur, at a time when its neighbors wanted a good deal of reassurance that they would never again have to worry about an expanding Japan. Now, forty-five years after Pearl Harbor, the dangers of Japanese aggression look rather remote. The Soviets, above all, have little to worry about in that respect. But even U.S. allies in Nato, some of whom for over a century have been only the objects of aggression and have hardly even a far-fetched motive or significant capacity for attacking the Soviet Union, feel it necessary to reassure the Soviets that they are not going to attack them.

The Norwegians keep 800 kilometers by road away from their short Arctic border with the Soviet Union when exercising with allied military forces, and even when training their own national troops announce all maneuvers involving 10,000 or more—far below the Helsinki threshold of 25,000—in order to reassure the Soviets that they are unlikely to pounce on them; and they recently refused the United States permission to use F-111s in a joint exercise on the defense of Norway, for fear of provoking the Soviets. Nato leaders in general are at pains to reassure Soviet leaders and their own publics that Nato is a purely defensive alliance. The Supreme Allied Commander of Nato, General Bernard Rogers, made clear in November 1984 that even in the event of a massive Soviet invasion, Nato would attack Soviet follow-on second-echelon forces but would not move large Nato forces across the border (as U.S. and British forces moved into Germany near the end of World War II). He added that, at most, if it were necessary to restore the "integrity of Nato territory," it was "conceivable" that Nato might, for that limited and temporary purpose, operate a "few kilometers" across the border. That was enough to cause a storm. The conservative West German defense minister, a notably sober and thoughtful man, immediately responded that "there are *no* plans for Nato ground forces to advance onto Warsaw Pact territory over the GDR border in the event of hostilities"; the attacker would be deterred by the risk that his country could be destroyed—that is, by the bombing of targets in his cities.[4]

More recently, proposals whose main purpose is to reduce the "Nato threat" to the Soviets have been cropping up among various less sober factions in Nato countries. Some would, like the Japanese, try to get rid of aircraft capable of bombarding the other side. They would equip their F-16s with air-to-air but not air-to-surface missiles. Tanks would have to go, too, since they could be used offensively as well as defensively. Anders Böserup, a Danish foreign policy analyst, would weaken further the already feeble Danish defense in this way. The Danish Social Democrats in July 1986 formally adopted the idea. They propose to withdraw one of their three brigades in Germany to Denmark, restrict the Danish Navy to surveillance and mine sweeping, and retain coastal missiles to defend against attacking ships. Further, they call for reinforcements sent to Denmark by its Nato allies to operate only well inside Denmark and to abandon the forward defense strategy—again, so as not to frighten the panicky Soviets.[5] If a sober West German defense minister envisages stopping the German combined arms counterattack at the border, the Danish Social Democrats would not go even that far. They want to operate against invaders only well within Danish territory.

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The official policy of the West German Social Democratic party, adopted in May 1984, is to dispense with tanks and fighter bombers and to reorganize the Bundeswehr to give it a "structural inability to attack."[6] Pushed by men like Andreas von Bülow, a former junior defense minister in the Schmidt government, old ideas that flowered at the end of the 1950s about defense by a people's militia flourish once more. They call for resisting Soviet attack, but in a way more like the guerrilla resistance offered by the Yugoslav partisans.

The British Labour party now officially calls for a non-nuclear military force. They would abandon British strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and would call also for the removal of all U.S. nuclear forces in England. It is now frequently remarked that such Europeans do not think that there is much of a Soviet nuclear threat to Western Europe but do think that there is a *U.S.* threat—or at least a threat brought about because of the U.S. presence there, especially the U.S. nuclear presence.

Pure Defense and Pure Offense

ODDLY ENOUGH (to complete this round robin) the basic premise of the most vocal American critics of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—those who believe in a nuclear offense without defense—is a belief not unlike that of the advocates of non-nuclear defense without offense: that U.S. nuclear forces threaten the Soviet Union and that the United States needs to have the Soviets deter it. And that, these critics believe, entails assuring U.S. destruction if the United States attacks the Soviet Union. A defense of the United States would get in the way. So these American supporters of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and a pure offense bear an uncanny resemblance to the European supporters of a pure defense.

Explaining this strange convergence takes a little elaboration. When the enthusiasm for mutual destruction seized one faction of U.S. scientists and engineers at the end of the 1950s, they centered their efforts first on banishing any attempt at the passive defense of populations, that is, civil defense. But the targets of their political offensive soon came to encompass any active defense that might shoot down enemy bombers or missiles on their way to the United States, any effort to direct a counterattack at missiles and aircraft on the ground or at other military targets rather than cities, and any improvements in the accuracy of U.S. offense that made it capable of destroying military targets with reduced collateral harm to civilians.

In the mid-1960s, the views of this faction among scientists and engineers in U.S. universities became the declaratory policy of the U.S. government. The efforts of some of the principal negotiators on the U.S. side at the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)—particularly the attempts they made to relate offense and defense in the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and the SALT I agreement on offensive forces—were inspired by such views. John Newhouse, in a now-standard account of these negotiations, summed up the model of stability of "Washington's assured destruction school of strategy." (He was a member of the school, but had a certain saving sense of its Orwellian absurdity.) He said its "favorite apothegm" was that "offense is defense, defense is offense. Killing people is good, killing weapons is bad."[7]

The U.S. scientists and engineers who adopted this Orwellian view near the end of the 1950s were turning the tradition of arms control that had grown up between the wars (and, indeed, the view they themselves had passionately urged for the preceding decade) precisely on its head. While the 1930s views had all the disabilities that Churchill listed, and more, they are no better upside down. Indeed, they are much worse. This upside-down view of offense and defense, and of virtuously aiming bombs at civilians and avoiding military targets, raises insoluble military and strategic problems for the alliance. It also reduces many of its proponents to

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simple incoherence. Two examples come to mind: One concerns the possibility of using for offensive purposes satellite-based lasers intended for defense against missiles on their way to target. The other concerns chemical warfare.

Some physicists have opposed a ballistic missile defense of U.S. territory essentially on the grounds that any defense is bad because it could prevent the Soviets from deterring an unprovoked U.S. attack; but they have been unable to resist suggesting that satellite-based lasers are bad also because they could be used offensively—specifically to burn cities. SDI is bad, then, because it is not an offense. And because it is. There are many technical and strategic problems and some absurdities in this suggestion. If either the United States or the Soviet Union wanted merely to burn cities, there are more efficient and much cheaper ways to do it than to use lasers on satellites that are optimized for disabling missiles in their boost or midcourse phases high up in space. But the principal absurdity is the implicit assumption that U.S. or Soviet leaders would take the burning of cities as their sole or main objective, and would do so even if this were to bring about drastic climatic changes affecting both sides.

The second example deals with chemical weapons. When it comes to such weapons, members of the U.S. Congress revert to the older view that offense is bad and defense is good. The Congress is for protective clothing, etc., but has resisted replacing our deteriorating and dangerous unitary chemical weapons with binaries. However, here too neither pure defense nor pure offense works well. If the U.S. has no effective chemical offense, but only protective clothing and the like, an adversary capable of using chemicals offensively at great distance from his own troops can force U.S. combatants to put on enormously cumbersome gear either in anticipation of such an attack, whether it comes or not, or during the course of a war when there are indications that an adversary has already been using such weapons. U.S. operations would be degraded drastically. We might get off an order of magnitude fewer sorties from our air bases, for example, while an adversary who is not threatened by our retaliating effectively with chemical weapons could carry on his operations unimpeded. Such an adversary is much less likely to be deterred, since he can gain a great advantage. Chemical warfare illustrates particularly well the need for a mixture of offense and defense.

But there is worse. The upside-down view of offense and defense with its associated rhetoric ties democratic governments in a hopeless tangle of moral issues. It does not pacify the pacifist extremes of domestic opinion. It incites them. It makes for endless confusion about the difference between the declaratory and the operational policy of allied governments, between what they say they will do and what they would actually do in the event of any of several plausible Soviet attacks. Avoiding a capacity for anything but purely suicidal offense in response to attack leads naturally to the idea (or wish) for "deterrence only" or "pure deterrence" (what the French call "*dissuasion pure*")—the hope that the U.S. can threaten the purely suicidal use of nuclear weapons in response to a Soviet nuclear attack and at the same time explicitly insist that nuclear weapons have no use at all except to deter. Which is to say out loud that whatever U.S. leaders threaten, they would not actually respond to an attack. Which means, of course, that they can hardly deter.

It is a symptom of the strategic disorder in the West that policy decisions critical for the alliance's defense are so largely shaped by the desire to quiet domestic dissent, no matter how irrational, and to avoid potential disagreements among the allies, even at the expense of surrendering critically needed measures for alliance defense. Arms control in particular has become a means for "managing"—that is, trying to appease— the utopian, apocalyptic, antinuclear movements. At the same time, the apocalyptic image of war spread by proponents of agreements designed to assure mutual destruction assures new waves of passionate opposition.

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MAD vs. Nuclear Guarantees to Allies

ROBERT McNAMARA, the former U.S. secretary of defense, has been most forceful in recent years in drawing out some of the consequences of the upside-down view of offense and defense involved in the MAD theory. He was the key figure in progressively altering, and perhaps the major figure in propagating, a quite fateful change in the original second-strike theory of deterrence. This theory originated in the early 1950s in the context of the use of long- or intermediate-range nuclear forces to deter or defeat a Soviet invasion of Western Europe.[8] It stressed that in order to deter a Soviet attack on a U.S. ally, the United States would need to preserve a capability to respond even if the Soviet attack were prefaced by, or enlarged to include, an attempt to destroy the nuclear forces that the United States would need to respond to the invasion. A strategic force could not deter an attack that it could not survive. It had to be able to strike second.

The theory stressed not only the ability to respond but the likelihood of the response. To deter Soviet political leaders from using nuclear weapons in the most plausible and dangerous circumstances, the United States had to give them reason to expect it to respond and to do so in ways that would, in prospect, make the Soviet use of nuclear weapons seem riskier than the alternatives, even when these alternatives—like unexpected disaster in a conventional invasion—might seem very dangerous. It stressed, therefore, the importance of preparing a posture that would make the decision by the United States to respond to an attack one that would serve its own interests and, in particular, one that would be less risky for the United States than not responding.

With the MAD theory of deterrence, McNamara adopted that part of the second-strike theory which dealt with the necessity for a capability that would survive Soviet attack, but he ignored the part that stressed the necessity for having a force that responsible political and military leaders would actually be willing to use. MAD held that what matters for deterrence is having the capacity to inflict "unacceptable damage," even if it would be suicidal to use that capacity to respond. McNamara centered his attention on the amount of damage the United States could do and not at all on the *likelihood* that it would actually bring on that damage. The risk to the Soviets is the product of two factors: the amount of harm the United States is capable of doing, and the probability that the nation would use that capability to do harm. McNamara ignored the probability factor. He defined "deterrence" as the *capability* in any circumstance to inflict unacceptable damage, measuring the latter as the ability to kill 20 percent of the people and destroy half the manufacturing value added of the USSR—which, he said, would mean its end "as a functioning society."[9]

The theory of deterrence, as McNamara defined it, raises many questions, but it is for the most part transparently incoherent, and fatally so, in taking *mutual* deterrence as a U.S. goal. It follows directly from this that the United States wanted the Soviets to be able to destroy it as a functioning society even if the United States struck first. But that implied in turn that by responding to a nuclear attack, the United States would be committing suicide. (If it responded to a Soviet nuclear attack confined to West Germany or another ally, it could not survive even though it had used an undamaged force; and if it struck second with a force that had already been partially destroyed by a Soviet attack, it would be even less able to blunt retaliation and survive.) That in turn tended to erode the credibility of any U.S. response and so to undermine the ability of the United States to deter any Soviet attack confined to an ally; or any attack at all confined enough to leave the United States the prospect of survival if it did not respond.

Flawed Models of Stability

THE mathematical models of strategic stability that abound in the literature today proceed from MAD theory

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and focus on the binary relation between the United States and the Soviet Union. While they have many artificialities and implicit absurdities (they are quite unrelated to Soviet thinking, for example), these models have impressed some West Europeans by their supposed demonstration that active defense or precise offense is destabilizing. The key defect they *should* notice is that such models make impossible any coherent justification for alliance relationships, or any stable multilateral world that includes some non-nuclear as well as nuclear countries—that is to say, the real world.

A perfectly stable unconditional mutual deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union would mean that the United States could not respond to, and therefore could not deter, a Soviet nuclear attack on any allied country, including the thirteen countries in Nato that have no nuclear weapons of their own. Nor could a perfectly stable, unconditional mutual deterrence between either of the two other Nato nuclear powers, Britain or France, and the Soviet Union serve to deter Soviet attack on any of their allies. The relevant conception of stability, then, cannot be captured in the binary relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, nor even by a set of stable deterrent relations between any pair of the five nuclear powers. The many-country relation among nuclear and non-nuclear powers is not as simple as that. It is rather more like the "many body" problem in physics.

The French strategic force, as originally conceived, was a small force directed at destroying Moscow's population in response to an attack that French leaders assumed would destroy France. The response would be a "dying sting." The French explicitly regarded their *force de frappe* as useful only as a last-ditch deterrent to an attack on France, not as a deterrent to an attack on any of its allies. The father of the French force, General Pierre-Marie Gallois, asserted that any such suicidal retaliation was not credible as a response to an attack that struck an ally and, by assumption, had not touched France. More recently, during negotiations with the Soviets on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), the French and the Americans advanced a similar argument about the French strategic force as the basis for not including it in the matching of Nato INF with Soviet INF. Moreover, the British made the same argument (with American support) for not including the British independent deterrent: it has nothing to do with Nato; it is a last-ditch deterrent to an attack on the United Kingdom.

Now one may question the value of making threats to commit suicide in defending even one's own country from an enemy attack—if the enemy attack is selective enough to leave one's country a choice and a stake in survival, that is, an opportunity to avoid suicide. The French (and now the British too) are obviously on solid ground when they recognize that a Soviet attack directed solely at an ally would leave them such a choice, and that in such a circumstance no responsible political leader would choose national suicide. But the thirteen countries in Nato which have no nuclear weapons clearly depend for deterring a Soviet nuclear attack on a credible nuclear response from a country that does have them. They depend on the United States, and the possibility that the U.S. can use nuclear weapons without committing suicide. In fact, Britain and France, as well as the rest of European Nato, rely on the U.S. nuclear guarantee even against overwhelming conventional attack and not merely against selective Soviet nuclear attack.

It is extraordinary, therefore, that so many of the political elite in France and England have in the recent past recommended that the United States adopt a policy of making its use of nuclear weapons suicidal. During the debate at the end of the 1960s and in the early 1970s, the British and the French opposed the development of ballistic missile defenses in the United States and supported the severe constraints imposed by the ABM treaty on even a modest active defense of U.S. silos for the reason that the U.S. might greatly extend that defense of its silos to cover

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population centers in the United States and the Soviets might then emulate the U.S. by defending Moscow—which in turn might make British and French independent strike forces less persuasive threats against the population of Moscow.

The French and the British adopted a policy of inviting Soviet destruction of their own cities by threatening Soviet population in part because they felt their strategic nuclear forces were too small to be useful against military targets in the Soviet Union and in part because they counted on the Soviet leaders making a comprehensive and indiscriminate attack if they attacked at all. More recently, however, they have begun greatly to expand their own nuclear forces—perhaps to nearly 1,000 warheads each. Moreover, they have come to recognize that recent improvements in Soviet weaponry will put the Soviets increasingly in a position to make a direct attack on military targets in France or Britain with precise long-range non-nuclear weapons or extremely accurate low-yield nuclear weapons. Such an attack would clearly give France and Britain an option for survival rather than suicide. The French therefore have been moving toward an explicit policy of developing a precise nuclear force capable of destroying key Soviet military forces and of responding to selective attack in non-suicidal ways.

In the last two years especially, Nato powers (including West Germany, France, and England) have come to recognize the growth of a Soviet capability for using conventionally armed ballistic missiles effectively against military targets in Western Europe. A robust defense against a combined arms invasion, then, will have to cope with that threat. Moreover, this appears to be feasible and in many respects easier than the job of defending U.S. territory against ICBMs. Europeans are therefore seriously contemplating an expansion of their active defense to include protection not only against manned and unmanned aircraft but also against ballistic missiles. It would be absurd then for Europeans to continue to oppose parallel efforts by the United States to defend military forces within its continental borders in the hope that, if the United States eschewed ballistic defense, French and British suicidal threats against Moscow might look a little more credible as a last resort for separating their fate from Nato's. That would not be a triumph for arms control.

Much of arms control theory during the past twenty years has come to be based explicitly or implicitly on the doctrine of MAD. The interpretation of the ABM treaty that would prevent the United States from developing and doing enough testing of ballistic missile defense subsystems and battle management to form the basis for a decision on whether to deploy such a defense is most prominently supported by those who define "strategic stability" in terms of a hypothetical suicide pact between the United States and the Soviet Union. They assign to the distinction between "first-strike weapons" and "second-strike weapons" a role analogous to the one that arms negotiators of the 1930s gave to the distinction between "offense" and "defense." Unfortunately, weapons fall even less neatly into the categories "first-strike" and "second-strike" than into "offense" and "defense."

Terms like "second-strike" and "first-strike" apply to military forces as whole connected systems (including vehicles, sensors, communications, and political-military commands) in their interaction with adversary military forces as a whole. They designate system properties, not attributes of individual weapons. More obviously, many European and U.S. negotiators in the 1970s and 1980s seem to have forgotten that for excellent reasons the United States promises to respond to a Soviet nuclear attack even if it is directed solely at an ally, and promises to do so with a force that has not itself been attacked. Viewed only in the narrow context of the binary relation between the United States and the Soviet Union, that would be a first strike. However, it would not start a war, only join one that had been started by the Soviets. In the wider context of the

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original second-strike theory, and in the real world of many states, some nuclear and some non-nuclear, the prospect that the United States would respond to a Soviet nuclear attack on West Germany or Turkey or Norway or the like with such a "first strike" is a necessary condition for stability.

False and Genuine Issues

THE FOREGOING analysis suggests what the proponents of pure offense have in common with the proponents of pure defense. Like the latter, they implicitly base their view on the theory that the West, or at least the United States, is quite likely to initiate an unprovoked attack on the Soviet Union, unless it is assured of total nuclear destruction should it do so. This defies common sense. The United States could have launched a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union for many years without suffering nuclear destruction. It could have done so during the long period when the Soviets had no nuclear weapons at all and even during the more extended period when their nuclear forces were small and vulnerable to attack. (The small Soviet bomber force was unprotected and in a low state of readiness. Its few land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles were unprotected by silos before 1965. Its missile-launching submarines were mainly in port, and, when out of port, noisy and easily tracked, as has recently been revealed in connection with the Walker spy ring.) In spite of dark hints by the conspiratorial left in the West, preventive war has never been seriously considered by responsible U.S. leaders. They never considered it in a period of great Soviet vulnerability, when the Soviets were actively expanding their political control in Eurasia and imposing their will over dissident, newly acquired parts of their empire in Central Europe that had been associated with the West for centuries. Moreover, the Soviet leaders could hardly have been panicked by the prospect, or they would not have left themselves so open to attack while they were making these aggressive moves. The idea that Nato or the U.S. nuclear force was poised to pounce on the Soviet Union was clearly absurd for the twenty years when the Soviets had either no nuclear force or only a quite vulnerable one.

It is even more absurd today, with the enormous protected power that the Soviets have acquired to do the United States harm. The notion that Nato or any of the major powers in Nato would be likely to initiate a preventive nuclear war against the Warsaw Pact or the Soviet Union, if only it could be done without committing total suicide, is a fantasy treated solemnly in mathematical models of strategic stability and in the rhetoric of Western politicians under the unconscious influence of such models. It should not be taken seriously. Nato will have difficulty enough making the decision to respond to a selective nuclear attack or overwhelming conventional assault, not to speak of initiating an attack that did not answer an actual invasion.

No responsible political leader in Nato will make a decision to counterattack if he believes that would ensure the complete destruction of his nation. Responsible Nato leaders who fear attack, then, should put themselves in a position to respond in ways that give their adversary some stake in keeping destruction under control.

We should be clear. This issue is not, as supporters of MAD pretend, between those who predict that a large-scale exchange of nuclear weapons could take place with perfect discrimination (a war "without a smudge" as Stanley Hoffmann calls it)[10] and those who claim that any significant use of nuclear weapons will lead to exhausting the stockpiles of all the powers and the end of civilization on both sides—and possibly even the human species. No substantial conflict, nuclear or non-nuclear, is likely to be neat and perfectly controlled. Even if we could completely confine the destruction—which we cannot—to military targets, the slaughter of soldiers would be disaster enough. There will always be a substantial chance that violence would climb disastrously beyond any expected bounds.

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The genuine issue lies between those who would try to improve the ability to be effective against military targets, to confine the destruction as much as possible to military targets rather than to civil society, and to keep destruction under gross control, on the one hand, and, on the other, those who, while they profess merely to be predicting the loss of control, actually attempt to arrange it. Both sorts of strategy take deterrence as primary. One holds that the West can deter Soviet attack most effectively by improving its ability and will to respond in a non-suicidal way if deterrence fails. The other view rests its hopes for deterring on ensuring that if deterrence fails, any response the West could make to an attack would lead uncontrollably to the apocalypse.

Even the staunchest supporters of MAD doctrine, those who believe that any militarily significant use of nuclear weapons will inevitably lead to the destruction of civil society in both the East and West, quail at saying clearly that they would actually launch attacks at innocent bystanders if deterrence fails. They either imply that they would not respond at all, or—inconsistently recognizing that it is possible to exercise control and selectivity—they say that if deterrence fails, one must do everything possible to avoid killing innocent bystanders on both sides.[11] Such an obligation, however, does not begin when deterrence fails, and not only for moral reasons: in order to make the prospect of responding credible and deterrence therefore feasible, the West needs in time of peace to improve the means of controlling destruction and preserving civil society.

Revolution in Control

THE CONTINUING industrial revolution in microelectronics and photonics is greatly increasing the feasibility of control and drastically altering the technologies of offense and defense for both the Soviets and the West. Large improvements in sensing, data processing, and control make more feasible than ever before the precise use of small nuclear weapons designed to confine effects mainly to the military targets they destroy and of non-nuclear weapons to accomplish many missions previously achievable only with nuclear weapons or with huge, indiscriminate non-nuclear raids like the ones that destroyed Hamburg, Dresden, and Tokyo. Moreover, essentially the same information technologies will make available an active defense that uses precise non-nuclear means to intercept substantial numbers of enemy nuclear warheads on their way to military targets located near cities—and this can form an important part of the defense of key military forces. It can also offer a measure of protection of population from collateral damage from plausible Soviet attacks. The instruments for keeping destruction under control in the course of a conflict are also becoming more effective and easier to protect, because small packages of less expensive but reliable sensors and increasingly powerful data processors and communications can be easily multiplied and moved or otherwise made less vulnerable to attack. There is also a useful interaction among capabilities for active defense, discriminating offense, and the capacity to keep them under control and direct them. (On the other hand, reckless proposals that the United States should, instead of defending its ICBMs, launch them at Soviet cities on the basis of electromagnetic indications that an enemy attack may be on the way illustrate the unfortunate way in which a doctrinaire attempt to avoid defense can worsen both the prospects for discrimination in offense and any attempt to maintain control.)[12]

The Nato countries, in accordance with their long tradition of innovation in science and technology and the agility native to open societies, can exploit the opportunities that these developments present. The Soviet Union, with a culture much less congenial to innovation, is doing everything it can to exploit them, and not in the interest of the West. These technological developments will reinforce not only the Soviet capacity for active defense of its military forces but also its ability to conduct a strategy of selective at-

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tack, for example, against West Germany and the Low Countries, or against a weakly armed but critical flank of Nato, or in an area like the Persian Gulf on which the countries of Nato have come critically to depend. Such a selective strategy of attack, designed to split the Western alliance, could greatly reduce the damage to the civil society of the country invaded and leave the civil society of the other countries in Nato essentially untouched, giving Western leaders a maximum stake in exercising prudence. It is the most controllable and least risky strategy for the Soviets, especially if Nato has no appropriate response. Yet the threat of such a Soviet attack or its actual execution could endanger the autonomy of all those members of the Nato alliance that are not directly attacked.

Nato has been preoccupied with extreme contingencies and hypothetical Soviet attacks so enormous and so unselectively destructive that the suicide of the West in response would be redundant. Such extreme circumstances would make a policy of responding in a "dying sting" at least faintly plausible. (Responding would do the West no good, but neither would it do it much extra harm.) Nato strategy has drifted increasingly toward dependence on an apocalyptic threat to initiate an indiscriminate attack that it does not expect to be able to control. Worse, much of alliance policy on research, development, and deployment has deliberately avoided making Nato *capable* of exercising discrimination and control. Nato's strategy for negotiating and construing bilateral agreements with the Soviets is based on the same premise. Although it has been designed in the hope that any use of nuclear weapons would result in the total destruction of the Soviets as well as the West, it has succeeded only in hampering improvements in Nato's own ability to control destruction.

Myths that Slow Technology

IN SPITE of all the stereotypes about a spiraling quantitative arms race generated by an ever-accelerating qualitative race, which in turn is driven by U.S. technology, the fact is that if we consider deployment as distinct from research and development, U.S. military innovation has slowed. Continuing references to a quantitative strategic arms race, standard throughout the 1960s and 1970s, ignored the facts.[13] Supporters of MAD kept talking about the quantitative spiral while the budget for strategic forces was decreasing exponentially at 8 percent a year. It is not as widely understood that the statements about an ever-accelerating qualitative race are also fantasies that sell well in Congress and in the press but have nothing to do with what has actually been happening.

The recent Presidential Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (the Packard Commission) found that in the last twenty-five years the length of time to deploy a major weapon system has increased.[14] Polaris, the first U.S. submarine-launched ballistic missile, took two or three years to become operational. The first Minuteman took about the same. The time to deploy has stretched to ten or fifteen years for major weapons systems. What the Packard Commission did not stress is that the deployment of some key innovations that cut across weapons systems and service lines, and in particular some of those affecting precision, active defense, communications, and control, have stretched out even longer, in some cases interminably.

The Defense Department was once far in advance of the commercial world in data processing and in communications, in getting innovations into the field and in research. Today many important inventions are fielded in commercial products long before they are deployed by the military. This has much to do with the inertia of large military organizations, service parochialism, and the increasingly cumbersome process of getting Congress to authorize and to appropriate funds. But the inertia and parochialism are not new. A major reason for the stretch-out is the lack of a clear national commitment to field these technologies, attributable, in large part, to the spread of MAD ideology and its accompanying hostility toward improving precision

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and discrimination of offense, toward fielding active defenses of military systems for fear that such defenses might be extended to protect populations, and toward improvement in the U.S. capacity to maintain control throughout a conflict for fear that this might be provocative. Theorists of a qualitative race have for a long time called for renewed efforts to "slow down the rate of weapons innovation" and "hence to reduce the frequency of introduction of ever more complex and threatening weapons"[15] and have advocated the "adoption of a generalized set of restraints that would slow the whole development and deployment process."[16] They have tried to accomplish this especially by limiting tests.[17] One way or another they seem to have been remarkably successful.

A few examples, some familiar and some less familiar, will illustrate this point.

First, the Carter administration canceled the program to deploy neutron weapons in Europe, though European Nato members had agreed reluctantly to accept them and despite the fact that they would reduce the blast effects and hence the collateral damage done by Nato to its own civil society in stopping a massive Soviet armored invasion.

Second, high-level figures on both sides of the Atlantic agreed in 1979 to cancel earth-penetrating warheads for the Pershing II, though such warheads had gone through full-scale engineering and development and would have made it more feasible to destroy hard and semihard fixed military targets with effects substantially confined to these military targets.

Third, AIRS, the advanced inertial guidance system used in the ICBMs that the United States is now in the process of deploying, was delayed in its development by the opposition of supporters of MAD policy in the U.S. Senate even though, and indeed because, it greatly improved the precision of inertial systems and so made them capable of destroying military targets with smaller collateral effects. Such a system uses information available only in the boost phase. The opposition did not stop its development. It did slow it.

Fourth, and more important, MAD supporters succeeded in actually stopping a half-dozen programs for research and development of mid-course and terminally guided ballistic missiles, even though such guidance can make feasible the destruction of very hard military targets with warheads of very low yields and confined collateral effects and even though such ICBMs could be much smaller, cheaper, and more easily moved and otherwise protected than any now programmed (such as the Midgetman) using only inertial guidance.

Fifth, MAD dogma reinforced the inertia characteristic of large organizations by slowing the development of long-range cruise missiles accurate enough even in adverse weather to permit the use of non-nuclear warheads to destroy a variety of quite hard military targets. One might think that replacing nuclear with non-nuclear warheads would appeal even to proponents of MAD. However, any missile with guidance good enough to destroy a distant military target with a non-nuclear warhead, weighing, say, 1000 pounds, could destroy an even more distant military target with an even higher probability if it carried a lightweight nuclear warhead weighing a fifth as much or less. Proponents of MAD have opposed these dual-capable missiles because of their dual capability.

Sixth, supporters of MAD have opposed any major effort by the United States to improve the protection of its wartime command and control on the ground that this would be a provocation of the Soviet Union.[18] Meanwhile, the Soviets have spent many tens of billions of dollars over many years to elaborate a formidably effective, mutually reinforcing network of measures for protecting political and military command and control that includes deception, concealment, mobility in the air, on the ground, and below ground, dispersal, deep underground structures, and active defense. They have designed their system to survive a nuclear war, not just for peacetime use. Yet no one has said that their program is provocative.

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Finally, the delay of a revolutionary advance in an area that is key in the crucial problem of control illustrates the factors at work. In 1961, Paul Baran proposed a method of high-speed adaptive digital switching for voice and data communication that would make it possible to use the surviving links of the extremely vulnerable hierarchical land lines with their few critical nodes in a distributed net with thousands of nodes, none more critical than any other, and to use surviving links in satellites, radio, and other media as well.[19] Called packet switching, this method would have helped solve an important command and control problem, by making it possible for messages to bypass any parts of the network that were destroyed and find their way automatically to their destination. As Lawrence Roberts wrote in his account of "The Evolution of Packet Switching":

> This study [Baran's] was conducted for the Air Force and it proposed a fully distributed packet switching system to provide for all military communications, data and voice. The Study also included a totally digital microwave system and integrated encryption capability. The Air Force's primary goal was to produce a totally survivable system that contained no critical central components. Not only was this goal achieved by Rand's proposed packet switching system, but even the economics projected were superior, for both voice and data transmissions. Unfortunately, the Air Force took no follow-up action, and the report sat largely ignored for many years until packet switching was rediscovered and applied by others.[20]

An application of packet switching was later developed by the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA), not for the command and control problem but as a generally applicable method for widely separated computer users to share data bases. It became the dominant commercial technology for data transmission for private networks long before it received any application to the problem that generated it. Only now—over twenty-five years later—is it being deployed for the Ground Wave Emergency Net (GWEN) for low data rate transmissions in the military; it is planned to form the basis of the Defense Data Network in the 1990s. Its application to voice transmission started being used commercially in 1986, and it will be key in the basic architecture for the AT&T system in the 1990s. But so far it is not planned for any substantial use in voice transmission for military communications, though the military application is in many important respects easier.

These long delays have something to do with bureaucratic inertia and the particular difficulties incurred because command and control programs tend to be joint rather than for an individual service. However, the inertia is reinforced by the neglect of command and control by the highest levels of government, encouraged by doctrines that threaten mutual destruction and count on losing control, if not at the start of a nuclear war then soon after.

ARMS AGREEMENTS have similarly slowed innovation. The SALT I offense agreement and ABM treaty—frequently referred to as the "jewels in the crown" of arms control—were supposed to relate limits on U.S. defense to restraints on Soviet offense. They were also based on the perverse dogma that the superpowers should have weapons capable only of destroying population and none that could destroy the other side's weapons on the ground or on their way to target. The ABM treaty severely restricted not only the defense of cities but even, contrary to the dogma, the defense of ICBM silos and national command and control. Moreover, some key U.S. negotiators wanted the ABM treaty to proscribe even the future development and testing (not only the deployment) of improved small, mobile sensors and mobile interceptors and any improved means of protecting ICBM silos, command centers, and other key military forces. Although the dogma summarized by John Newhouse would seem to make protecting weapons good and only protecting

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people bad, these negotiators were concerned that even if a silo defense could not protect people, it might become part of a thick defense of the entire population of the country at some future date—a vast additional enterprise taking many years, which one might think could be dealt with separately if it were plainly wicked. The SALT I offense agreement professed to replace active defense of U.S. ICBM silos with a Soviet commitment not to deploy any additional missiles with warheads capable of destroying them. This was supposed to be accomplished by prohibiting any increase in the number of silos for "heavy missiles." But the Soviets squeezed many more warheads than U.S. negotiators thought possible (though they had been plainly warned) into both heavy and light missiles and drastically improved the precision of their warheads. As a result the number of warheads capable of destroying ICBM silos that they eventually acquired was nearly three and possibly six times greater than the U.S. negotiators had expected.

The ABM treaty was explicitly directed at constraining defenses against "strategic" ballistic missiles. It was never intended to prevent a defense against the sort of "tactical" ballistic missiles that threaten Europe or that might be deployed on Soviet ships as a weapon to be used against carriers or other ships at sea. In the early 1970s, the Soviets tested the SS-NX-13, an anti-shipping ballistic missile which used its second stage for midcourse corrections, homing on electromagnetic emissions from a carrier task force's defense radars. It was similar in size to the Soviet SS-N-6 ballistic missile. Carrying a substantial nuclear warhead with an accuracy of about 1,000 feet—more than accurate enough to make the payload lethal[21]—and with its few-hundred mile range, the SS-NX-13 could be launched from well outside the surveillance coverage of a carrier task force. The U.S. Navy proposed a defense against this development, whose major components were the Aegis radar and a nuclear version of its air defense "Standard Missile," the SM-2. While the treaty clearly did not envisage stopping defense against a ballistic missile threat to the fleet at sea, some in the Department of Defense bureaucracy argued that such a defense could always be moved into U.S. ports or deployed on land and so would become a defense against strategic ICBMs. The development therefore was stopped. Fortunately, it appears that the SS-NX-13 never reached operational status.

Some of the current arguments against developing a ballistic-missile defense for Europe are essentially the same as those against the SM-2 and Aegis. They display a serious difficulty characteristic of the kind of arms control arrangements that have dominated the debate in the West for the last two decades. Every military system can be used more or less effectively to achieve more than one objective, and any military objective can be achieved in more than one way. Proponents of agreements based on MAD tend to argue against any new U.S. system, even one clearly dedicated to a permitted purpose, on the ground that it could, if only with great difficulty and over many years, be diverted or used for some forbidden purpose. On the other hand, when the Soviets actually develop or deploy a system that clearly is dedicated to a forbidden purpose, they tend to argue that the Soviets could have in mind a more benign permitted purpose. A radar that is obviously designed to aid in battle management for the defense against ICBMs can always be explained away as serving the function of tracking space vehicles, even if it is poorly placed for that purpose.

Bureaucracies develop a vested interest in the continuation of any status quo, and in the West this includes conforming to the status quo of an arms agreement even if an adversary does not. Supporters of MAD sometimes explicitly assume that it is beneficial for "arms control" when such bureaucratic inertia leads Western governments to lose sight of their original goal in the agreement of securing Soviet restraint and leads them to continue to comply with the agreement while the Soviets make massive preparations to violate it and do so.[22] That happened during the

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moratorium on nuclear testing from 1958 to 1961, which ended with a surprise Soviet 60-megaton bang and an unprecedentedly elaborate and carefully prepared sequence of Soviet tests. The Soviet bureaucracy, which is not always inert, had responded efficiently to the political leadership, and the Soviet leaders had political and military goals that were quite incompatible with those the British and Americans had in mind.

Implausible Threats

IN DECIDING whether or not to develop or deploy new technologies for offense and defense—and not only in preparing arms agreements—Western leaders and Western publics ought to consider more soberly than they do Soviet leaders' political and military objectives and their likely course of behavior in a variety of realistic contingencies. Decisions on developing and deploying new technologies should take into account how any innovation will protect Western interests in such contingencies. Frequently, however, the debate appears to be about details of the technical feasibility and performance of some proposed new system. And close examination reveals that the technical arguments in opposition are often crucially affected by preposterous assumptions about the possible circumstances and objectives of a Soviet attack in which we might need the proposed new military system.

For example, the debate about the proposed Safeguard ballistic missile defense of Minutemen silos appeared to the Congress and the news media to be about innumerable calculations on the performance of radars and high-acceleration interceptor missiles and about whether Soviet missiles in prospect for the end of the 1970s and 1980s would have accurate enough Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) to endanger the Minuteman silos even if there were no silo defense. The Congress and the public do not in general feel qualified to evaluate such calculations. They tend to accept the authority of one faction or another of the technologists, for the calculations are of the sort normally performed by professional operations researchers, system analysts, and system engineers.

In fact, the arguments against introducing an active defense for silos had numerous technical flaws. Those who said that Minuteman silos would need no defense made mistakes in algebra, in arithmetic, and even in reading points off graphs.[23] But the serious defects in the debate were more fundamental: the genuine issues were hardly debated. Some proponents of Safeguard believed—correctly as it turned out—that Minuteman was likely to become vulnerable by the end of the 1970s, that an active defense would be a useful supplement to the passive defense of ICBMs, and that an active ballistic missile defense, even if it started off imperfectly, could be improved as the technology developed, permitting the use of smaller, more mobile radars and sensing and guidance that would make possible the use of non-nuclear interceptors. Above all, they felt, this was an important line of development and one useful in the long run. (Polaris was deployed at the end of the 1950s long before it was perfected, and it was continually improved. It is doubtful that any complex new system would ever be deployed if the United States insisted on meeting all the possible countermeasures that can be conjured up by those who oppose it in principle. In fact, part of the reason for the slowdown in U.S. deployment of major weapons systems has been the unrealistic demands for performance imposed by those who take a Luddite view of military innovation in general.)

Opponents of Safeguard were against it primarily because they thought an active ballistic missile defense of silos might in the future be made part of a much larger, thick system to defend populations, and they were in principle against the defense of population because they subscribed to the MAD doctrine. Some key opponents suggested that rather than defend ICBMs, we should launch them automatically at Soviet cities on the basis of electromagnetic indications that an

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attack might be on its way. And although they talked much about the defects of an initial ABM defense based on a few fixed large radars, they attempted in the ABM treaty to prevent research and development that would lead to small, mobile radars of the kind they had said were necessary. The discussion of the treaty and the unilateral decision on defense paid inadequate attention to Soviet political and military objectives in seeking a treaty or the realistic circumstances in which the Soviets might be tempted to launch a nuclear attack.

THE contemporary debate on ballistic missile defense centered on the SDI is as badly informed as the debate in 1969 on Safeguard. Once again, it seems to be about the intricate details of technological and systems analytic issues—the number of space-based chemical laser platforms needed to destroy Soviet ICBMs in their boost phase and the like. And again the media headlines offer sweeping judgments by apparently authoritative experts who claim they have shown that any useful ballistic missile defense is essentially infeasible—astronomically costly and easily overcome by the Soviets.

There are indeed large technological uncertainties that need to be resolved before deciding on deploying or not deploying an active ballistic missile defense as part of the U.S. and alliance mixture of forces. These, however, are unlikely to be resolved except as the result of an extensive research, development, and testing program of the sort proposed by the SDI Office. In fact, to inform that decision is precisely the purpose of such a program.

The arguments that have been raised against a program of research, development, testing, and evaluation hardly address the real issues. They pretend more knowledge than anyone has at this stage about the technological alternatives. They avoid in particular any serious consideration of the variety of circumstances in which the Soviets might use ballistic missiles against the Western alliance, the kinds of attack they are likely to make, the political and military objectives likely to govern such an attack, and the objectives appropriate for the U.S. and its allies in defending against such an ICBM attack. The systems analytic arguments embodied in early reports on the subject have gained an authority they do not deserve from the famous names mustered to sign the reports and the sheer mass of signatures.

Take the question about the number of space-based laser platforms needed by the defense in the boost phase and its cost implications. The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) in March 1984 issued a report signed by Hans Bethe, Richard Garwin, Kurt Gottfried, Henry Kendall, Carl Sagan, and many others well known in scientific disciplines only distantly related to the key issues. They include some signers who at various times have worked on some of the technologies associated with national defense. The UCS report said that "we need 2,400 such laser weapons in orbit altogether" and that the cost would therefore be prohibitive compared to the cost of offsetting counter-measures in the boost phase.[24] By the time the report was ready for distribution, however, the press release suggested a little caution. It claimed only that "over 1,000 such satellites" would be essential.[25] But that, it developed, was not nearly cautious enough. In the controversy that ensued, Gregory Canavan and his colleagues at Los Alamos were able to demonstrate some obvious blunders in the calculations.[26] By October 1984, Bethe, Garwin, Gottfried, and Kendall, key UCS signers of the report, had reduced the original number by a factor of eight, to 300,[27] and the UCS had put out a new report, *The Fallacy of Star Wars*, with the number 300. Later revisions in correspondence with Canavan brought the number down to about 100.[28]

All models simplify, but the models used by the UCS not only make excessively simplifying assumptions about the missile launch configuration, the laser-to-booster assignment, and the motion of the lasers and platforms during the battle; they also ignore the adverse effects on the Soviet offense brought

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about by some Soviet tactics they would propose to defeat our defense in the boost phase. These tactics would expose Soviet ICBMs to greater troubles in later phases of flight. (For example, launching all boosters simultaneously spreads out the re-entry vehicles on their arrival in the terminal phase and so makes them more vulnerable to terminal defenses.) The models ignore the fact that orbiting satellites not in position to attack ICBMs in the boost phase may be able to intercept submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in midcourse. That alters the relevant ratios of cost of defense to cost of offense.

The UCS models also assume strategies for the basing of the Soviet ICBMs that concentrate them all at a point, making obsolete a huge Soviet investment in existing silos that are now strung out along a 5,000-mile arc following the Trans-Siberian Railroad in Asia as well as along the main transportation net in the European Soviet Union. Aside from that, such concentration of all the Soviet ICBMs at a point would expose them to Western offense in ways that the Soviets would not welcome if they contemplated making a ballistic missile attack during the course of a conventional invasion in the Eurasian periphery (an important example of a useful synergy between offense and defense). Brian Chow and Jon Arenberg have developed a linear programming model that uses more realistic satellite constellations and can handle any distribution of Soviet ballistic missile launch points, including the plausible launch points for SLBMs. Their preliminary results suggest that the UCS number of 300 satellites is too high by a factor of three to five.[29]

Perhaps the most fundamental defect of calculations like those of the UCS resides in the implicit assumptions about the nature of the Soviet attack and the political-military objectives the Soviets might seek by attacking. In brief, they assume that the Soviets would open a war with an attack directed at destroying innocent bystanders rather than trying to further some concrete political-military purpose such as to remove obstacles to their invasion of West Europe. If killing harmless civilians is all they have in mind in a surprise attack, they might be satisfied if only a small percentage of their weapons were to get through. These would kill a great many bystanders. But such a military objective would be absurd. It is very different from the sorts of military objectives that might interest the Politburo.

The March 1984 UCS report carries absurdities about Soviet attack to the furthest point in suggesting that the Soviets might carry out such an attack even if they knew it could cause a "nuclear winter." A year or two earlier, some meteorologists and other natural scientists had come up with a new physical phenomenon. They claimed that any Soviet attack substantial enough to have a significant military effect would send so much smoke from burning cities into the troposphere, and loft even higher into the stratosphere so much fine submicron dust from nuclear weapons exploding near the surface of underground targets, that the heat and light from the sun would be blocked, and temperatures would fall disastrously throughout the Northern hemisphere.[30] The direct rebound from the Soviets' own weapons would then endanger life in the Soviet Union even if Nato did not respond. In that case, Nato leaders would not have to face the terrible decision. There would be no need for Nato to sting, for the Soviets would have stung themselves. If the scale of a Soviet first strike had to be large enough to cross the threshold of nuclear winter, they could, in the words of Stephen Schneider of the National Center for Atmospheric Research, "win for two weeks only, until the cloud of nuclear smoke or dust comes back over."[31]

But the newly discovered uncertain potential that huge nuclear attacks directed at cities may have for causing a nuclear winter does not fill the void in MAD doctrine. Instead it makes more clearly visible the preposterous assumptions about Soviet attacks and Western responses that are at the heart of the MAD doctrine. A close exami-

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nation of the scenarios that form the basis for nuclear winter calculations demonstrates this, quite apart from all the uncertainties about the physical phenomena connected with nuclear winter (such as the density of fuel in various locations, how much of it would burn and send particles of smoke and dust into the atmosphere, how the clouds of dust and smoke would be transported vertically and horizontally, and so forth). Such scenarios invariably resolve uncertainties as to how the Soviets might use nuclear weapons and how the West would and should respond by assuming that such decisions would be made without any regard for avoiding self-destruction. In fact, in these scenarios, the two sides appear to take part in an intricate collaboration to ensure that their nuclear weapons will have little relevant military effect but will do enormous collateral damage to civil society locally and globally. In the international study of nuclear winter and other environmental consequences of nuclear war sponsored by the Royal Swedish Academy, the two superpowers are presumed to explode fifteen nuclear weapons with a total yield of 10 megatons over each one of such cities as Hong Kong, Bombay, Calcutta, New Delhi, Madras, Dacca, Jakarta, Manila, and Sydney. That would generate a great deal of smoke, but it is not clear what it is supposed to do to further the objectives of either side in a military campaign.

It is true that political and military leaders and large bureaucratic organizations often act mindlessly. But theorists of bureaucracy tend not merely to describe the inertia of bureaucracy; many prescribe it. There is a naive cynicism in supposing that we can do nothing to avoid self-destructive courses of action. And it is worse than naive to suppose that the Soviets, if they attacked, would never use nuclear weapons except in a way that would lead to their own destruction. As for the West, such an image of the consequences of any nuclear response to a Soviet nuclear attack leads more naturally to capitulation than to rash acts. Indeed bureaucracies, though frequently irrational, are not always—nor often—irrationally daring.

In any case, such lurid views of a nuclear exchange shape the course of much policy discussion in ways that are not widely understood. The Soviets make their own contribution to Western debate by encouraging the notion that if they attack, they would destroy Western society even if in the process they destroyed themselves. This has been plentifully illustrated in the discussion of the SDI. Hans Bethe, Richard Garwin, Carl Sagan, and other UCS members in their 1984 report prophesied that if the United States were to attempt any "serious" protection of its cities, a "likely response" by the Soviet Union would be "to target its missiles so as to maximize damage to the U.S. population," even though that would "pose serious danger of triggering a climatic catastrophe (the nuclear winter phenomenon)."[32]

This preoccupation with the most catastrophic sort of attack is widespread in the West. Some of the technologists who advocate President Reagan's SDI have focused on attacks no less preposterous than those posited by the opponents. They have considered Soviet attacks involving as many as 30,000 strategic ballistic missile warheads (many times the present total) all directed at cities in an all-out, bolt-out-of-the-blue attack.[33] And they have concentrated on the far-fetched objective of intercepting all of the warheads in such an absurd attack.

Plausible Threats

MUCH MORE MODEST and achievable objectives are relevant to deterring the most plausible Soviet attacks, those that would be directed at removing military obstacles to an invasion they might make in the Eurasian periphery. The more likely Soviet attacks might use ballistic missiles to achieve a high confidence of destroying military obstacles (either in the United States or in Europe) to an invasion of Europe.

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Europeans understandably are most concerned about a defense against the growing ballistic missile threat against Western Europe, which they like to think of as an extension of existing defenses against manned and unmanned aircraft. Against such attacks, a more modest ballistic missile defense could form an effective component of a robust Nato posture that included an offense capable of responding selectively against military targets in the Warsaw Pact, including the Soviet Union. Such a defense of Western military facilities (which are always redundant in a way that population is not) could deprive the Soviets of the confidence that they could destroy a large enough proportion of the military obstacles that stand in their way. Such a defense could therefore help to deter Soviet attack.

The Soviets will have ballistic missiles capable of delivering conventional as well as nuclear warheads effectively. Ballistic missile attacks with non-nuclear warheads could be an important element of the initial wave in a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Such attacks would exploit the fact that key elements in Nato's conventional force posture for many political reasons are less effectively dispersed and protected than the Warsaw Pact forces. In order to obtain a robust conventional posture in West Europe, the United States should consider urgently the early deployment of ballistic missile defense there. Such a defense is not proscribed by the ABM treaty, which is directed at restricting the defense against strategic ballistic missiles. The Soviets, moreover, are in the process of developing, testing, and deploying such a defense. (Raymond Garthoff, a strong supporter of MAD and the ABM treaty, has said that the Soviets have already tested an antitactical ballistic missile against their Scaleboard, an offense missile of roughly the same range as the Pershing I.)[34]

Moreover, contrary to statements made by many British supporters of MAD at the time of the UCS report, the job of defending against ballistic missiles, such as the SS-22, SS-23, and SS-20, that threaten targets deep inside Western Europe is not much harder than the job of defending the United States against ICBMs. In important respects, it is easier. This runs counter to the common impression that because tactical ballistic missiles take less time to get from their launch point to target, they would be harder to intercept. However, such missiles re-enter the atmosphere at much slower speeds than ICBMs. They spend a larger proportion of their time on trajectory in the atmosphere, in the boost phase as well as after re-entry. They have more difficulty in deploying persuasive decoys for several reasons. Because these missiles are launched from much closer by, even sensors on an airborne as distinct from a space platform should be able to track them from the boost phase on. In fact the airborne optical system, which could supplement the Airborne Warning and Control Aircraft (AWACs) recently deployed in Nato, would be a particularly promising and early component of a layered preferential defense of theater targets.

For that very reason, we may expect that those who are committed to MAD are likely to oppose the airborne optical system in particular and ballistic missile defense in general in the European theater. Political leaders, fearful of rocking the boat, may do the same.

That would be too bad. Even if ground-launched ballistic missles are banned by treaty from Western Europe, Europeans will need a defense against ballistic missiles. No one familiar with the realities should ignore the fact that the Soviets can use SLBMs and can hide hundreds of ground-based theater ballistic missiles. Against ballistic attacks so constrained, a theater ballistic missile defense could be particularly useful.

The Defense of Europe

THE PHRASE "extended deterrence," which became common in the strategic debate about twenty-five years ago, has always been misleading. It suggests that the original purpose of the U.S. strategic force was to deter an attack on U.S.

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cities and that the notion of extending its purpose to the defense of Europe was a later and quite doubtful stretching of the original idea. That is not so. The Soviets are not likely to attack the United States in the hope of occupying it. They might attack U.S. military forces in the United States or in Western Europe that stood in the way of their invading Europe (just as the Japanese attacked the U.S. fleet in Pearl Harbor because it stood in the way of their expanding to the south). Nato started with the idea that if the Soviet Union attacked Western Europe, the United States would respond against the Soviet Union with "strategic bombing promptly by all means possible with all types of weapons without exception."[35]

That was central in the Strategic Concept for the Integrated Defense of the North Atlantic Area, which was agreed to between the signing of the Nato treaty and its ratification. The phrase "all types of weapons without exception" was meant to include, most plainly, nuclear weapons. The Military Committee dropped the explicit mention of the atomic bomb, despite the desire of the Belgians, Italians, and Dutch to make it explicit, only because of the domestic political sensitivities of the Scandinavians.[36]

Nonetheless, all of Nato's founders had made it quite clear: they depended on the then-new U.S. technology of nuclear weapons as a principal way to deter or to respond to a Soviet attack on Western Europe. Specifically, they were relying on the U.S. strategic nuclear offensive force to compensate for the preponderance of Soviet conventional military force and for an intrinsic geographical disadvantage—the fact that Western Europe was much farther from its major ally than it was from its principal enemy.

Joe 1, the first Soviet nuclear explosion, also occurred between the signing of the Nato treaty and its ratification and even before the Military Committee developed the Nato Strategic Concept. The prospect that the Soviets would develop a large stock of nuclear weapons of their own, as Dean Acheson noted even then, in 1949, made a continuing heavy reliance on nuclear weapons to deter a Soviet conventional invasion questionable.[37] But it only underlined the importance of a U.S. nuclear guarantee embodied in the treaty. Credible promises of a nuclear response would be needed at the least, from then on, to deter Soviet *nuclear* attack against any Nato country that had no nuclear weapons. As the Soviet stockpile grew, the United States and Nato made it evident that the Strategic Concept applied also to deterring or answering a Soviet nuclear attack on one or more of the sovereign countries in Western Europe.

The U.S. strategic force, then, was intended from the outset to deter or defend against a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. It was intended to compensate for the Soviet advantage in the theater and the instability that that advantage could mean.

Discussions of stability among U.S. strategists and European political elites in the last two decades or so have frequently been trivial because they neglect this obvious fact. They contract or shrink the initial idea of deterrence to an artificial two-person game between the superpowers, or between the "Country A" and "Country B" fabled in academia. Country A typically exhausts its strategic stockpile trying, for no stated purpose, to destroy the strategic force of Country B—and incidentally may destroy a large part of Country B's civil society. Country B automatically, without any need for an act of decision by its leaders, retaliates by destroying Country A's cities. Because such models assume that the decision to retaliate would be automatic, some British writers have described this sort of deterrent as "passive." Herman Kahn called it a "Type 1" as distinct from a "Type 2" deterrent. A Type 2 deterrent is not supposed to be automatic, nor does it have to be immediate. For Type 2 deterrence, Kahn said, "There is no need to promise to destroy the enemy within fifteen minutes. It is perfectly all right to promise to destroy him somewhat later."[38]

In such discussions, a deterrent force of either type is generally assumed to promise

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revenge against an adversary's cities. But that, as Kahn said, suggests that U.S. leaders "might be deterred from attacking the Soviet heartland even to avenge a Soviet attack on Europe." As well they might if it meant the United States too would be destroyed. But since even a "Type 1" deterrent in reality requires decisions actually to respond, U.S. leaders should be deterred by the prospect of committing national suicide even in reply to an attack on U.S. territory that left civil society largely intact.

All such models of deterrence are quite sterile. They bear almost no relation to the circumstances in which either the Soviet Union or the United States might plausibly use nuclear weapons—for example, as an outgrowth of a conventional invasion to expand Soviet control over Europe—and no relation to the objectives that either side might reasonably have in using nuclear weapons in such circumstances. In the real world, the Soviet Union might be tempted to use nuclear weapons to overcome military obstacles in the course of a conventional invasion through the North German plain and through the Low Countries, or, more likely, on a flank of Western Europe or in the Persian Gulf. And they might be deterred by the prospect that the Western leaders—without destroying the Soviet Union or the West—could responsibly decide to reply in kind and defeat such an attack.

Moreover, the Nato Strategic Concept, like the Nato treaty, was intended to deter Soviet attack and thus prevent a war. However, in the event of a Soviet attack it was understood that the Strategic Air Command (SAC) would use its nuclear weapons. There was no flimflam about nuclear weapons serving *only* to deter nuclear war, never to fight it. "Deterrence Only"—the notion that the West should threaten the use of nuclear weapons but never actually use them if the threat did not work—received some official sanction as a *declaratory* policy in the United States rather recently (the 1970s), and then with substantial confusion. (It had already begun to dominate the views of political elites in Europe.) But when Robert McNamara, in the mid-1960s, introduced the idea of using threats of mutual assured destruction, he also made clear that if deterrence failed, he would actually use nuclear weapons. (He had not yet come explicitly to "Deterrence Only.") But he would use them against military forces, not cities.

McNamara used the confused MAD rhetoric, and rhetoric has an effect even on the rhetoricians. It is hard for our political leaders to keep single books straight; double books may be impossible. The suicidal rhetoric of MAD encouraged Western governments, and especially the U.S. government, to strip themselves of defenses and to neglect the powerful trends in the technologies of sensing, information, and control that have increasingly made active defense and discriminating offense feasible. Even more, it encouraged Western leaders to ignore the significance of the fact that the Soviets were vastly increasing their power to make a Western unrestrained response to a Soviet selective attack an unthinkable disaster for the West; and that, at the same time, the Soviets were building a capability to execute attacks that might achieve important political-military objectives and yet fall far short of causing the apocalypse. It would remain for the United States to bring on the apocalypse—or surrender. Concentrating always on the worst possible case, an attack that destroyed the civil society within the territorial bounds of each of the major countries in Nato, the West has tended to disarm itself for responding to the real dangers, and especially those outside the immediate boundaries of the three nuclear powers.

The phrase "Mutual Assured Destruction" deliberately obscures the fact that the victim of a nuclear attack is by no means sure to respond with nuclear weapons. (He might give up if that were the only hope for surviving.) And it obscures the fact that even if both sides used nuclear weapons, it is by no means certain that decision-makers on either side would let destruction get out of all control. Worse still, it obscures the choice the United

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States has (and ought to exercise) of improving its ability to reduce the harm done to civilians by nuclear attacks on military targets. The United States can reduce such unintended harm through increasing precision and discriminateness, and by improving and exercising control if the use of nuclear weapons is forced upon it.

Finally, those who adopted MAD as only a declaratory policy weakened both the deterrent and the possibility of discrimination. They seemed to hold out the threatening possibility of attacks directly on cities but at the same time promised in the event to try to avoid cities and confine attacks to military targets. They stressed the *capability* for destroying cities and therefore did not seriously pursue the technologies that would have made it easier to avoid destroying Soviet cities and more feasible to contain the harm done to cities in the West. They talked increasingly about the capability to respond by inflicting ruin and less about the credibility of that capability's actual use.

McNamara, for example, came to talk less and less persuasively about precision and damage limitation, while his followers actually opposed discriminateness and active defense. Till the end of his term as secretary of defense, his Annual Posture Statements continued to treat damage limitation as an objective of our strategic force second only to deterrence. But this was strictly inconsistent with the notion of assuring mutual destruction for mutual deterrence. Ultimately, after leaving office, he abandoned even the "thin" defense he had proposed of U.S. territory and population, useful against ballistic missiles of the sort likely to be acquired by Third World countries. Then he and his followers unexpectedly opposed the point defense of our offensive force. The United States more than any other major or middle power in the East or the West gave up active defense of military forces or civilian society, even against manned and unmanned aircraft.

When McNamara first adopted the theory of Mutual Assured Destruction, he had used it as an arbitrary budgetary device for measuring "how much is enough?" and indicated he did not seriously intend to use that capability to attack cities. He said he would actually use the strategic force against Soviet military forces that threatened the United States. But then he talked as if the United States would and should use the strategic force only against cities. Finally, he talked about the strategic force (and in fact any nuclear force) as if it should not be used at all. Almost inevitably, this has meant ending with a call for *no* use of nuclear weapons at all, first or second, early or late. That has not increased the credibility of the U.S. deterrent. In sum, a public doctrine and model of stability that became widespread in the mid-1960s ended by eroding the basis for deterring nuclear attack, and most obviously nuclear attack on an ally. This has been destabilizing.

Beyond National and Alliance Frontiers

THERE WILL always be an irreducible chance of an enormous disaster, but we should use a mixture of offensive and defensive measures to decrease rather than to increase this possibility in the event of war. The Soviets can be deterred by lesser threats than total destruction from doing what they may want to do against the West. The possibility of total destruction will hang over them as well as us. But that possibility is not large enough to preclude all potential uses of nuclear weapons by the Soviets. Most plainly, it will not remove the temptation for the Soviets to use nuclear weapons in places that are important for the West as well as the East, but remote from the major cities of all the nuclear powers and where the Soviets may have run into trouble in the course of a conventional incursion. To remove that temptation, we do not have to threaten universal ruin. We merely need to make it credible that the Soviets would risk more in using nuclear weapons than in not using them. But members of Nato do have to look beyond the narrow boundaries of their own homelands—sometimes, as in the case of

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the Persian Gulf, even beyond the boundaries of Nato.

The situation in Nato today in many respects resembles the one Colonel Charles de Gaulle tried unsuccessfully to warn the French General Staff about before World War II. The strategy of France (the General noted in his memoirs) corresponded to the moral weakness of the Third Republic. It was dominated by the concept of defending the fixed and continuous frontier of France. By proclaiming the French intention to keep its armies at the frontier, it was egging its enemy on to act against the weak areas isolated by that strategy: the Saar, the Rhineland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, the Baltic States, Poland, and, in the end, even the Netherlands and Belgium. If war came, the strategy was to fight as little as possible. In a way, it combined the worst of two strategies: it involved extending guarantees to weak states that were depending on France—and on which France ultimately depended—and, at the same time, following a course of action that indicated that the guarantees would not be fulfilled.

It is unfortunate that not only France and General de Gaulle, but the United States and the alliance as a whole, have so far ignored the Colonel's advice.

EVASIONS AND MUDDLE on the meaning of nuclear guarantees to allies without nuclear weapons of their own (and confusion on the need for effective, non-suicidal responses to attack on any ally or on oneself; and on the defects in any arms negotiation or arms policy that ignores or even opposes this need) have never been more apparent than in the current debate, here and in Western Europe, on the "zero option" for U.S. and Soviet forces. The disarray is palpable among Republicans and Democrats, liberals and neo-libs, conservatives and neocons: Senator Byrd, the Democratic majority leader, cautioned President Reagan to go slowly; Senator Nunn reminded us that the necessary build-up in conventional forces would cost more than any savings made by reducing nuclear missiles, while Jim Wright, the leader of the Democratic majority in the House, hailed the breakthrough as enabling large transfers of funds from defense to social programs; and Richard Perle appeared to join forces with Paul Warnke, President Carter's disarmament negotiator, and with Spurgeon Keeny, the president of the Arms Control Association.

Reducing U.S. and Soviet intermediate range nuclear missiles to zero had been implicit in the "two-track" decision Nato made in 1979. The second track meant that Nato would stop at any point and reverse the process (still incomplete today) of deploying the Pershing II ballistic missiles and the ground-launched cruise missiles, if the Soviets did likewise with their SS-20s. The limitation needed only to be "consistent with the principle of equality between the sides." Each, in short, could be equal to zero.

The 1979 communique said that such an arms control agreement on INF in Europe would "promote stability and detente in Europe in consonance with Nato's basic policy of deterrence, defense and detente as enunciated in the Harmel Report." The reference to that 1967 report is revealing. Its acceptance by Nato coincided with the formal adoption of MC 14/3, or "Flexible Response," an apparent move away from the strategy of massive retaliation towards the position adopted by the United States in the Acheson Report six years earlier. The Acheson Report ended the strategy of massive retaliation at the time because it recognized that while we *could* respond without restraint to conventional attack, it was increasingly incredible that we would. It emphasized the raising of the nuclear threshold, not its removal. In fact the emphasis on trying to defeat a substantial conventional attack at its own level and to use nuclear weapons if, and only if, conventional defenses were overwhelmed, fit well with the proposal by McNamara, in his Athens speech a year later, to use nuclear weapons only against military targets in order to accomplish some political-military purpose. It was more credible that we would use conventional force to repel a conventional invasion and, if our

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conventional forces were overwhelmed, that we would use nuclear weapons, if we could use them discriminately and for a military purpose. Mutual suicide was neither operational nor declaratory policy at that time.

When Nato adopted MC 14/3, however, it bent and twisted the American strategy of flexible response. It put less emphasis on Nato's will to use its capabilities by making this use less self-destructive and more on the capabilities themselves for increasing destruction. That is, it stressed threats to "escalate" by steps to the "ultimate deterrent" of a "general nuclear war"—which by 1967 both Europeans and Americans equated with suicide. Characteristically, as the alliance moved towards depending on apocalyptic nuclear bluff for its defense, and towards a stress on *capabilities* for inflicting nuclear destruction rather than on the *credibility* of policies involving the use of nuclear weapons when necessary, it also placed on arms control the main burden of pacifying the pacifist left's hopes and apocalyptic fears. But the fact that the establishment and anti-establishment had the same vision of nuclear war as the end of the world made certain that an establishment policy of threatening nuclear destruction would never pacify the left. When governments are not serious about war, they tend towards arms agreements that are not serious either. (Serious arms agreements with a deeply hostile country would not replace, but only offer a certain amount of help to an intrinsically robust system developed by serious unilateral effort.)[39] The seeds of the 1979 two-track decision and of the zero option today were planted in 1967.

The Harmel Report said: "The way to peace and stability in Europe rests in particular on the use of the Alliance constructively in the interest of detente. The participation of the USSR and the USA will be necessary to achieve a settlement of the political problems in Europe." The USSR and the U.S. were equally to be partners in the arms control process—as they were, apparently, equally threats. The report even invoked the United Nations with respect to the defense problems of Nato's Southeastern flank and of "out-of-area" conflicts, like those in the southern and eastern littoral of the Mediterranean and in the Persian Gulf, where in particular American policy seemed to Europeans to threaten their interest and where the Europeans preferred to separate themselves from the U.S.

Arms control was to be the senior partner to defense in finding peace and stability in Europe. In fact Helmut Schmidt and other Europeans had two motives in calling for the United States to place intermediate range missiles in Europe. The first motive had something to do with political-military policy: they wanted U.S. missiles in Europe that were able to reach the Soviet Union because they thought that would "couple" the U.S. more closely to the defense of Europe. The presence of such missiles would make it more likely that the U.S. would use strategic forces based in the United States to respond to an attack on the European center. Some normally thoughtful men even suggested that it would make a U.S. strategic response "automatic."

The second motive had to do with domestic politics, with pacifying antinuclear sentiment in Western Europe. For this purpose the American missiles were meant merely as a symbolic offset to the Soviet SS-20s, with none necessary if there were no SS-20s. That would be accomplished by the second track which demonstrated a politically appropriate spirit of conciliation. The second track, of course, would do nothing for the first purpose. To their domestic publics and to the Soviets, Europeans expressed their support for the zero option, made trips to Moscow assuring Brezhnev or Andropov or Gorbachev that President Reagan himself sincerely wanted the zero option. But the Europeans were not undividedly sincere themselves. In private—but only in private—they expressed forebodings about the zero option to the American government. This left all domestic political heat concentrated on the American government.

The German language, like the French, uses the same word to refer to both policy and politics. Clausewitz clearly meant that war

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was a continuation of *policy* by other means. On the other hand, arms control tends to become a continuation of domestic politics by other means.

Reykjavik and its aftermath suddenly seemed to the Europeans to make some form of agreement eliminating U.S. and Soviet intermediate range missiles from Europe inevitable and even imminent. Then, like the character in the fairy tale who found his greatest disaster came from being granted his wish, many West Europeans and some Americans reacted in panic. Would taking the American land-based intermediate range missiles out of Europe "decouple" the United States from Western Europe? If it did, could the French and British independent national strike forces—whose least vulnerable part is based at sea—replace the American guarantee?

President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Thatcher issued a statement indicating that they would resist any Soviet or American attempt to include the elimination of the French and British strike forces in the deal. But the argument for keeping them out is based on the fact that they are purely national forces having nothing to do with Nato. France and Britain threaten to use them only as a last resort, in response to an attack destroying France or Britain respectively. Moreover since they are relatively small nuclear forces today, directed solely at destroying concentrations of civilians in or around Moscow or the like, their use would be credible at most as a "dying sting" in the event that French and British civil societies had already been destroyed by the disarming attack. That, however, makes them peculiarly unfit to deter or respond to an attack on third parties—a nuclear attack, for example, on the Federal Republic or Norway or Turkey. The grounds advanced for removing them from U.S./Soviet negotiations on INF would remove them also from the defense of other European nations in Nato. The debate characteristically slides over the fact that Western Europe itself is not a nation and is unlikely to be in the relevant future. But, as we have seen, these independent national strike forces, as presently constituted, could only be used suicidally in response to an attack destroying France or Britain. They could not be used responsibly even in answer to precise selective attacks on military forces in France or Britain, as long as civil society was left essentially intact.

While it is quite arbitrary to restrict the range of American missiles based on land in Europe (in the 1960s we had intermediate range ballistic and cruise missiles in Europe), it is not the range or the basing on land of our missiles which assures, or makes likely, their use in response to a Soviet attack on Europe. Their use has much more to do with their ability to survive attack through various active and passive defensive measures, and especially with their ability to be used selectively for some political-military purpose—that is, in a non-suicidal way. Among the most deplorable confusions in the debate has been the casual assumption that any use we might make of nuclear weapons would amount to "national suicide"; and, to compound the confusion, that we might do that "automatically" simply because our missiles were based on land in Europe and might otherwise be overrun.

The excited discussion of the zero option has revealed little about the requirements imposed on one or another ally in order to guarantee the security of other allies. It reveals much about how the peculiar upside-down arms control process associated with the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction has become part of the problem which it pretends to solve. And it reveals a great deal about the persistent incoherence of the debate on strategy.

Notes

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3. Churchill, *op. cit.*, 72–73.
4. Federal Defense Minister Manfred Woerner, as reported on Hamburg DPA (Deutsche Press Agentur), 30 November 1984. Compare

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the article by State Secretary, Federal Defense Ministry, Lothar Ruehl, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 26 April 1984. "German defense policy within the North Atlantic alliance has always interpreted the English term of 'forward defense' as 'defense up ahead', to make it clear that his defense is not supposed to reach forward into foreign territory and that the battle must not be carried to the territory of the aggressor from the outset."

5. "Don't Hit Me, I Can't Hit Back," *The Economist*, 20 September 1986, 54.
6. See "Preventing War in the Atomic Age—Towards a New Strategy for NATO—Resolution adopted by the Social Democratic Party of Germany's Party Conference" (Essen, May 17–21, 1984).
7. John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), 176.
8. A.J. Wohlstetter, R.J. Lutz, and H.S. Rowen, *Selection of Strategic Base Systems*, March 1953, Rand Corporation R-244S; Wohlstetter, F.S. Hoffman, Lutz, and Rowen, *Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases*, April 1954, Rand R-266; Wohlstetter, Hoffman, and Rowen, "Protecting U.S. Power to Strike Back in the 1950s and 60s," September 1956, Rand R-290; Wohlstetter and Rowen, "Objectives of the United States Military Posture," May 1959, Rand RM2373.
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10. Stanley Hoffman, "Réponse á Albert Wohlstetter," in "Moralité et Efficacité de l'Arme Nucléaire," *Commentaire*, Spring, 1986. Tr. from the French "le mirage d'une guerre technologique, 'propre', sans bavures."
11. See Stanley Hoffman, *op. cit.*
12. During the ABM debate, Richard Garwin revived the idea of making the launching of ICBMs largely automatic on the basis of electromagnetic indications. See his letter to the *New York Times*, 22 October 1967. He has elaborated the idea many times since.
13. See Albert Wohlstetter, "Is There a Strategic Arms Race?," *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1974; "Rivals, But No 'Race'," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1974, and "Optimal Ways to Confuse Ourselves," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1975.
14. David Packard, "An Interim Report to the President," February 1986; "A Formula for Action," April 1986; "National Security Planning and Budgeting," June 1986; *A Quest for Excellence*, Final Report to the President, June 1986.
15. Herbert York, "Controlling the Qualitative Arms Race," *Scientific American* 222 (January 1970): 27.
16. Paul Doty, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Detente: Hearings in U.S. Relations with Communist Countries*, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 12 September 1974.
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18. For evidence for the statements in this paragraph, see Albert Wohlstetter, "Between an Unfree World and None: Increasing Our Choices," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1985.
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20. Lawrence G. Roberts, "The Evolution of Packet Switching," in *Satellites, Packets, and Distributed Telecommunications*, edited by Roy Daniel Rosner (Belmont: Lifetime Learning Publications, 1984), 111.
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25. UCS Press Release dated 21 March 1984.
26. Gregory Canavan, *Correspondence on the OTA*

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31. Ibid., 106.
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33. "The Strategic Defense Initiative: Defense Technologies Study," U.S. Department of Defense, April 1984, in Official Documents of *The Star Wars Controversy*, eds. Steven E. Miller and Steven Van Evera (Princeton University Press, 1986), 304.
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35. The phrase is quoted in "Memorandum by the Secretary of State [Acheson]," Dec. 20, 1949, in *Foreign Relations of the United States: Atomic Energy, 1949* 1: 612. The full text of the report accepted in Paris in 1949 on the "Strategic Concept for the Integrated Defense of the North Atlantic Area" is reproduced in *Foreign Relations of the United States: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1949, 4: 1ff.*
36. "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs [MacArthur]," Dec. 3, 1949, *Foreign Relations 4: 356–7.*
37. "Memorandum by the Secretary of State," *Foreign Relations* 1: 613. Dean Acheson's thoughtful memorandum, dictated shortly before the ratification of the Nato treaty, suggests both the long history of Western dependence on nuclear weapons and the early recognition by the founders of Nato that a continued predominant "reliance upon the atomic defensive shield" was likely to "prevent progress toward the substitutes." He asked, "Is it true that within 5–10 years the U.S.S.R. may be expected to have a stockpile of atomic weapons of sufficient size effectively to neutralize the present advantage which we possess and might this time be shortened if the U.S.S.R. developed a thermonuclear reaction? . . . If this is so, would we be better off addressing ourselves now to finding substitutes for the defensive shield our atomic weapons are now giving our allies?" If not in 1949, then perhaps in 1987 we should be ready to think about how to supplement the atomic shield to deter or repel a conventional invasion. Against a nuclear attack there is no substitute for a usable nuclear force.
38. Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton University Press, 1960), 141.
39. For the outlines of unilaterally enforced multilateral arrangements to help meet grave threats to satellites such as space mines, see Albert Wohlstetter and Brian Chow, "Arms Control that Could Work," *The Wall Street Journal*, 17 July 1985 and *Self-Defense Zones in Space*, PAN Heuristics Report, July 1986.

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How It Was

Oscar Handlin

DURING THE CENTURY between Waterloo and Sarajevo perhaps thirty-five million Europeans crossed the ocean to settle in the United States. The newcomers were mostly peasants displaced by the great changes in the economic and social structure of Europe in the nineteenth century. Of all these people, only a handful expressed any concern with the course of American diplomacy. The great mass of peasants and laborers, thoroughly alienated from the state in the places of their birth, expected nothing of it. Government was remote, alien, and generally hostile, associated with exactions of property and labor, with the lash, the gallows, and the jail. Most peasants lacked even identification with the national entity; they came from Kerry or Cork, from the Veneto or Apulia, from Laconia, Patras, or Crete, not from Ireland or Italy or Greece. By the same token, the *landsmannshaften* of East European Jews fell within local or regional lines. The salient communal relationship linked people not to a country but to a village, or at most to a province. Then, too, their very departure gave evidence that the lands of their birth had not been friendly to them. Much later, nostalgia would lend a rosy tint to their recollections of the old home; but in the first stages of settlement, they preferred to cut ties with disastrous transatlantic actuality and were eager to be identified with the New World that had received them. In any case, bread and shelter, not diplomacy, were their chief concerns.

Migration also brought to the United States artisans, craftsmen, and farmers, who were joined as time went on by engineers, physicians, and entrepreneurs. These people took a somewhat different stance. Whether they brought their trades with them or acquired them after they had settled, their focus was on the problems of getting ahead. To the extent that they participated in the life of the immigrant communities, their primary concerns were legitimizing their places in American society and forming local institutions—churches, benevolent and fraternal societies, and philanthropies. Neither concern would draw them actively into politics or into taking positions on foreign affairs.

But joining this stream of working men and their families were little groups of fugitives, generated by the failures of all the liberal revolutions in Europe. The collapse of the conspiracy of the Society of United Irishmen in 1798 brought a significant number of such fugitives to the Eastern coastal cities;

Oscar Handlin is a historian. His most recent book is *Liberty and Power*, the first volume of *The History of Liberty in America*.

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they were followed, in turn, by refugees from France, England, Ireland, and Germany, as the rebellions of 1830 and 1848 played themselves out. In 1837, an uprising closer to home brought disappointed Canadians south to exile in the United States. Still later, Hungarians appeared and, in time, Poles, Finns, and Russians. Toward the end of the century rebels who escaped from Cuba formed a junta in New York which ultimately led to the island's independence. By and large, these people, beginning with Tom Paine, Joseph Priestley, and Carl Schurz and going on to José Marti, were intellectuals, though a significant number of clergymen, more conservative in outlook, also came.

Only these politically oriented intellectuals and refugees took an interest in foreign policy and in the relationship of their new homes to the old. Divisions, as between the clergy and the secular revolutionaries, diluted their influence, although in time they slipped into leadership positions as journalists, politicians, and mediators between the immigrant and general society. The smallest sector of each immigrant community alone took an interest in politics or in foreign policy. As a result of the inverse relationship between the size of the group and the degree of its interest in these matters, there was only a slight pressure in the nineteenth century to influence American diplomacy.

The relationship tended to change with the second generation who had absorbed American attitudes toward political action. Furthermore, as they emerged from the most difficult stages of adjustment, they had more time to be concerned. They began to form larger organizations and to take an active part in politics, which became one means by which to express their identity both as Americans and as people affiliated with the lands of their parents' birth. Generally their influence was not particularistic, but fell within the more general patterns of popular attitudes toward diplomacy.

Thus, the struggle for Irish or Polish or Greek independence was not simply an Irish or a Polish or a Greek struggle; because freedom was involved, it was also an American struggle. Particular groups of Americans sustained and supported a country with which they had hereditary or traditional ties of some sort. But Irish-Americans or Polish-Americans participated in those efforts not as Irishmen or Poles, but as Americans. They acted in terms of standards that had universal currency among their fellow citizens—the spread of democracy through the world, the self-determination of nations, international action for peace, the desirability of aiding small people against great oppressors.

IN THE CONDUCT of American foreign policy, ideological imperatives were much more important than pressures from the immigrants. In the 1820s, the number of Greeks in the United States was infinitesimal; but overwhelming popular enthusiasm in favor of Greek freedom from the Turks sent Samuel Gridley Howe, just out of Harvard Medical School, to participate actively in the struggle. Nor was the number of Hungarians in the United States large enough to explain the supportive position taken by the United States in 1850. American interest in the success of the Hungarian revolution had moved the Austrian chargé, Chevalier J.G. Hülsemann, to protest. That in turn elicited vigorous statements from Secretaries of State Daniel Webster and William H. Marcy: the United States would always intervene on the side of freedom anywhere in the world—a point emphasized in 1852 when Louis Kossuth, the leader of the ill-fated Hungarian revolution, received a tumultuous welcome during his American tour.

Occasional diplomatic intervention on behalf of Jews also revealed the strength of the ideological commitment, for down to the 1880s their numbers were tiny and they did not form a political factor of any consequence. In 1840, outraged gatherings in the United States protested thirteen convictions on charges of ritual murder in Damascus, and called upon the American government to make its views known. Secretary of State John Forsyth explained that President Martin

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Van Buren had already, of his own accord, vigorously protested against the horrors. No doubt, the number of Syrian or Muslim voters in the United States was not consequential; but neither was the number of Jewish voters. The American government had acted spontaneously, as a matter of course, in accord with general public sentiment.

In time, political nationalism did develop among some immigrant groups, notably the Irish. Through much of the nineteenth century, Irish nationalism found validation in the general Anglophobia that pervaded American life. Impressment, the long struggle for freedom of the seas, the War of 1812, and the burning of Washington, D.C. kept vivid the Revolutionary memory of the brutal redcoats and the tyrant king. Later the clash of interests in Texas, conflicts over the northeast boundary and Oregon, misplaced sympathies during the Civil War, and a clash over Venezuela confirmed for Americans of many backgrounds the validity of Irish hostility toward Britain. There were plenty of votes for candidates who twisted the lion's tail. But when the Irish Republican Brotherhood went farther, organizing an Irish Republic and launching two futile invasions into Canada, the U.S. government tempered its rhetoric with prudence. While lavish in supportive phrases, successive administrations cautiously refrained from overstepping the lines of correct behavior and put a stop to invasion attempts.

Other nationalist movements operated within the same constraints. When the size of the Polish-American population increased toward the end of the nineteenth century, support mounted for Polish national independence. But internal divisions quickly asserted themselves, not only among immigrants of different origins—Russian, Prussian, and Austrian—but also among socialists and secularists, and among Jews, Catholics, and adherents of the schismatic Polish National Church. These confusing groupings puzzled the United States government toward the end of World War I when it began to consider the future of Poland; everyone accepted the principle of self-determination, but not everyone agreed on *who* would do the determining.

Internal divisions also accounted, in part at least, for the inability to mobilize the political strength of such groups as the Italians and the Germans. In 1914, German-Americans together with Irish-Americans amounted to about 15 percent of the population. The two groups vigorously but futilely opposed Britain and supported Germany after Sarajevo, but they lacked the means of making their numbers felt, until 1920 when the weight of their influence contributed to defeat of the League of Nations and the election of Warren G. Harding to the presidency.

After 1910, international conflicts and the rearrangement of European boundaries brought unanticipated success to some of the smaller nationalist movements. Fervor for the homeland induced 40,000 Greeks to return to fight in the Balkan wars of 1912–13. By then, too, Fan S. Noli, who came as a student to Harvard in 1906, had brought his countrymen together in the Pan-Albanian Federation of America, had established their national language and their church, of which he became bishop. He persuaded President Wilson to support the independence of Albania, and for a time went back to serve as its prime minister. So, too, on May 30, 1918, in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, after nationwide mass rallies, the American Czech and Slovak organizations arrived at an understanding that permitted the establishment of a new nation. In all these cases, nationalist pressures clarified the position of the United States government, although none of them involved active intervention.

One large and influential immigrant group defies analysis by reason of its invisibility. The British—including for purposes of this analysis the Scots, Welsh, and Ulsterites as well as the English—were the dominant element in the American population down to 1840, when the first great nineteenth century wave took form. Furthermore, they continued to arrive in substantial

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numbers. Other Americans did not commonly perceive them as immigrants in the same sense as they did the Irish or Italians. Carl Schurz and Oscar S. Straus were known as German and Jewish cabinet members. No one inquired about the birthplace of Franklin K. Lane.

Ambiguities in the sense of identity complicate the task of assessing the influence of these immigrants on international relations. James Gordon Bennett, publisher of the *New York Herald*, and E.L. Godkin, editor of the influential *Nation*, undoubtedly carried into their columns attitudes and values that stemmed from their Scottish and Anglo-Irish nativities; but how much and in what way remain questions yet to be answered.

Furthermore, a cultural and diplomatic rapprochement (following the Venezuela incident in 1895) altered the relation of the United States to Britain and of Americans to Englishmen. In some academic and literary circles, emphasis shifted from stress on the differences between the Old World and the New to emphasis on the common heritage of the "Anglo-Saxon" peoples, and therefore to the actual similarities in interests and beliefs that linked the United States and England.

The outbreak of war in 1914 magnified the importance of all issues of loyalty and identification. Yet the common criticism of "hyphenated Americans" and the strident demand for one hundred percent loyalty applied with unequal intensity to citizens of different origins, particularly when it came to the second generation. The easy identification of Irish- and German-Americans did not apply to those of British descent. Few noted that the father of Colonel Edward M. House was a native of England; and Woodrow Wilson was certainly not conscious that impressions gained from his English mother may have influenced his outlook, although a visit to her birthplace, Carlisle, once moved him deeply. Such ties may well have qualified American neutrality to the extent that they made an Allied defeat unthinkable.

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New Rules of the Game

Nathan Glazer

THE LENGTHY DEBATE over a new policy to control illegal immigration, which was recently completed with the passage of the Simpson-Rodino Act, was conducted almost entirely from the point of view of what was good for the United States. That is not a statement likely to astonish anyone, and the response might well be, in what other terms *could* it have been debated? As Aristide Zolberg has written:

> It has been universally acknowledged ever since the state system arose in its modern form that, under the law of nations, the right to regulate entry is a fundamental concomitant of sovereignty.

But increasingly other countries are beginning to respond to the fact that what we do on immigration affects them. Surprising as this may appear to Congress, indignant as this may make them, it is worth exploring how an area of policymaking that has been determined in the past almost entirely by domestic considerations will increasingly have to take into account considerations of foreign policy and the impact of immigration policy on our international relations. (Since it was formulated in 1953, refugee policy, in contrast to immigration policy, has been deeply affected by foreign policy concerns.)

Our new immigration act is entirely in the tradition of responding to domestic concerns, fears, and interests. Americans were worried about the scale of illegal or undocumented entries, even though many were not clear how this immigration affected their interests. The entire thrust of the immigration debate of the last ten years has been about how to respond to this illegal immigration. By the end of the 1970s, a consensus was formed that the best way to deal with the problem was to grant amnesty to some substantial portion of long-settled illegal immigrants, and combine this with measures that would make it hard for employers to hire illegal immigrants, thus placing a damper on further illegal immigration.

A variety of questions and concerns came into play for or against the adoption of such a double-edged policy. Just what was the impact of illegal immigration on American workers, particularly low-income and minority (black and Hispanic) workers? Were illegal immigrants subject to exploitation simply because of their illegal status, and did this contribute to a variety of social ills? Did the illegal immigrants impose costs on state, lo-

Nathan Glazer is professor of sociology and education at Harvard University and a visiting scholar at the Russell Sage Foundation.

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cal, and federal governments because of the need to provide them services? What was the impact on respect for law of this massive violation of the immigration laws almost as a matter of course? Crucial in affecting the fate of the proposed policy was its impact on the industries that employed the illegal immigrants, particularly agriculture, and the fear that to penalize employers for hiring them would lead employers to discriminate against all Hispanics in hiring. Another consideration was whether Americans would accept a national system of identification, which would make it easy for employers to check the legal status of potential employees, and for law enforcement authorities to determine whether they had broken the law.

In the end, these matters were all resolved, by making it easy for agricultural workers to become permanent residents, by incorporating a prohibition against discrimination on the grounds of citizenship, and by abandoning the effort to create a national identification system. Domestic political and economic considerations all: these dominated the discussion over the years. Just what such a bill would do to Mexico or El Salvador, Nicaragua or the Dominican Republic, played no role at all.

But other nations were concerned, particularly our giant neighbor to the south, the largest Spanish-speaking nation in the world, rapidly growing and undergoing a severe domestic economic crisis. Mexico is the major source of the huge volume of labor migration that flows back and forth across the southern border, a stream whose size may be judged by the fact that more than a million persons a year are seized and sent back over the border. It also provides more legal immigrants by far than any other country—more than 50,000 a year. Legal immigration was not at issue in the course of the years of discussion of immigration reform: the proposed legislation, and the final bill, made few changes affecting legal immigration, and the opportunity of 50,000 Mexicans a year, and with each year more, to enter the country as permanent residents will not be reduced. But the huge stream of undocumented workers—which takes pressure off a Mexican economy that can provide relatively few good jobs, and which provides a substantial and one may assume politically helpful stream of foreign exchange in remittances—was another matter.

While Congress debated immigration and considered how various domestic interests (economic, ideological, political) would be affected, Mexico protested that *its* interests were not being taken into account. As early as 1982, when a version of the (then) Simpson-Mazzoli bill had passed the U.S. Senate, and was being taken up in the House, the Mexican Senate, Michael Teitelbaum reports, expressed concern over "this grave matter that negatively affects our good neighbor relations," and "its alarm and concern over the repercussions which will impact both countries if the Simpson-Mazzoli legislation is passed." To the Mexican Senate, and to Mexican political leaders generally, undocumented Mexican immigration was "a transcendant matter [that] should not be considered from a unilateral perspective, but rather should be treated from a bilateral and multilateral perspective." It referred the matter to its own foreign relations committee, to the next meeting of the Mexican-United States inter-parliamentary conference, and to three international agencies.

As the immigration bill approached passage in 1986, after having failed a number of times, Mexico again indicated its concern. William Stockton reported in the *New York Times* that the Mexican government had

> sent a note of protest to the State Department and the Chamber of Deputies adopted a resolution [to the effect that] the United States was neither paying attention to nor respecting the sense of earlier agreements between the two countries. "Migration is an international problem and its solutions ought to be reached by the countries involved and not by unilateral decisions of a government," the resolution said.

Stockton reported further that Romeo Flores Cabalero, head of the committee on border matters in the Chamber of Deputies,

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"has been particularly critical of the law. He said illegal immigration from Mexico 'is not a police problem. Rather . . . it is a cultural, historical, and social problem' whose solutions must be found through joint efforts rather than through actions by the United States Congress."

Congress did not take much account of these concerns. One suspects the State Department took them more seriously, and we know that at one point in the checkered history of Simpson-Mazzoli, U.S. ambassador to Mexico John Gavin warned of its possible impact on Mexican-American relations. Congress is far more susceptible to domestic pressures, and, after all, what we do about our immigration policy might be thought to be no one's concern but our own. But is it only our concern, and will it continue to be seen as such by the countries—and there are now many—which provide a flow of legal and illegal immigration to the United States that is of some consequence to *their* internal equilibrium?

THE ACTIONS of the Mexican government and Congress are, I believe, no aberration, but a sign of things to come. American immigration policy in the course of our two hundred year history has been determined by many factors. These have included our need for workers and population, our ideological fear of the ideas immigrants might be bringing (beginning as early as Federalist fear of French revolutionaries, leading to the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798), racial prejudice (leading to the restriction of the Chinese in 1882, the Japanese in 1907, and culminating in the banning of all Asian immigration and the sharp reduction in immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe and Italians in 1924), and humanitarian concerns. Foreign policy considerations have dominated our policies on refugees since the end of World War II, but have rarely affected the shaping of our overall immigration policy. But just as the American economy becomes increasingly entangled with the world economy, so that we can no longer conduct our economic affairs in isolation from or indifference to other major economies, so too with the flow of people. The domestic influences that have dominated immigration policy in the past will have to be viewed in the light of that policy's impact on other countries. Conversely, we will have to be increasingly concerned with how other countries, because they wish us ill or wish some part of their population ill, may try to overwhelm our own immigration decisions with crises of their making to which we must respond and which we cannot shape. We have seen this in the case of the Cuban Marielitos and the Vietnamese boat people—and we must legitimately fear that we have not seen the end of mass expulsions in which we are targeted as the residual country of refuge. All this is new, and we have hardly considered how to respond to these developments.

Some relations between immigration and foreign policy are not new, and we have lived with them a long time: I have in mind the impact of immigrants and their descendants on foreign policy as it affects their homelands' interests. Charles Mathias has suggested that immigration is possibly "the single most important determinant of American foreign policy." That may be going too far. Senator Mathias was thinking, of course, of the strong influence of various ethnic groups in affecting American foreign policy, an influence that could be discerned a hundred years ago or more, as American politicians tried to appeal to or respond to the strong anti-British feelings of Irish Americans. In World War I and World War II, a host of ethnic groups, formed by our free immigration, entered into the political battle around American neutrality, their leaders staking out positions on the basis of whether neutrality or intervention hurt or aided their homelands or (as in the case of those wishing to achieve national independence for their native group) their hoped-for putative homelands.

We are ever more aware and accepting of these influences. It is a rare American political figure who would lash out against "hyphenated Americanism," as both Theodore

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Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson did in the run-up to World War I. We are also rather more sophisticated about such loyalties and identification, understanding that they will exist and will make themselves felt. Perhaps one reason we are more sophisticated is that the entire question of national interest is less clear-cut than it once was. It was Samuel Lubell who pointed out that one possible reason the South was the most interventionist section of the country in the prelude to World War II was because it was primarily English and Scottish in origin (leaving aside the blacks), and had been less affected than the Northeast and Midwest by massive Irish, German, and Italian immigration. But did this mean the South was defending the national interest, and the other sections were disloyal? Misguided, perhaps, and defending an evil and unwise policy, but if both sections were being influenced by ethnic origins, it was not easy to see where a sharply defined national interest independent of ethnic allegiances came into play.

These ethnic influences on foreign policy have, if anything, grown, as ethnic groups are less and less inhibited by fears of disloyalty and charges of "hyphenated Americanism" from engaging in open lobbying and pressures to advance the claims of homelands or countries (such as Israel) that have become symbolic homelands. Senator Mathias might well have had in mind the involvement of his own Greek community in exerting pressure on American policy toward Greece and Turkey.

The rapid creation in the past twenty years of large new ethnic groups as a consequence of our 1965 immigration act has increased the number of ethnic players in American foreign policy. For thirty-five years, the United States could lean toward Pakistan and against India without worrying about domestic pressures—there were no Pakistanis or Indians to pressure their Congressmen. That situation has changed. A half million Asian Indians are now on the scene in the United States, their numbers growing through immigration and natural increase at a rate of more than 20,000 a year. Their leaders will undoubtedly be heard from as we debate additional military aid to Pakistan; in fifteen years, they may be as influential in shaping American policy on issues affecting the military balance between India and Pakistan as a million Greeks have been in the policy debates affecting the military balance between Greece and Turkey.

All this is well known, but it is not likely that Congress will allow this common knowledge to affect our immigration policy. No one, at the time we expanded the categories of those who could enter in 1965, by eliminating the national-origins quotas which strongly favored Northern Europe, looked ahead to consider what the impact of the creation of many large ethnic groups, not previously present in any numbers on American soil, would be on foreign policy. Indeed, whatever prescience anyone might have possessed, they could not have made such an estimate. The best informed observers of the day expected that our immigration policy shift in 1965 would lead to an increase in Italian, Greek, and Jewish immigrants, not Asian and Latin American immigrants—for it was the European groups that had fought for the revision of the immigration act. No one expected that the effect of the new law, in combination with other unforeseeable events, would be to shift the weight of immigration from Europeans to Asians and Latin Americans; to create in the United States large new ethnic groups of Koreans, Asian Indians, Vietnamese, Dominicans, Colombians, and others; and to expand greatly the number of Chinese, Filipinos, Mexicans, Jamaicans, and others.

TWO OTHER kinds of relations between immigration policy and foreign policy have come to the fore since 1965, and will have to be taken into account. The first, which we have considered in relation to Mexico, is how our openness or restrictiveness to immigration affects other countries. The impact of mass emigration on home countries is not new, and has in the past been a subject of concern to many countries.

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The loss of skilled manpower, for the economy and the military, the depopulation of agricultural areas, and concern over how one's countrymen would be treated abroad have been factors that played a role at given times in all the countries that were the sources of the growth of the American population. In our need for labor, we sucked in millions, unconcerned as to what that might mean for Sweden or Norway, Bavaria or Sicily, Bohemia or Galicia. Just how the governments of those countries responded to a wave of emigration that at times approached depopulation would be an interesting question to examine; on the whole, it has been neglected. But it appears that with the decline of mercantilist ideologies, many countries were willing in the distant nineteenth century—when even passports were unnecessary—to allow their citizens and subjects to do what they wished. In many cases, they were considered the less valuable part of the population ("refuse" not only to Emma Lazarus but to their own governments), and while one sees here and there concern over the loss of agricultural laborers, there was little restraint. Often, those leaving were subject peoples in whom the ruling government displayed little interest. American Jews descended from Russian immigrants will recall tales of parents' or grandparents' illegal departure at night over the border into Germany on the way to the United States: men of military age could not leave legally, though the Tsarist regime was on the whole perfectly content to see the Jews leave. (One famous formulation by a minister of the policy of the Tsarist regime to the Jews looked to one-third to emigrate, one-third to convert, and one-third to be eliminated by other means.)

There are some countries that want to keep their people—Soviet Russia today is the major example. All countries want to see them respected abroad. Whatever their status in the home country, whatever the indignities they might be subjected to at home as agricultural or industrial workers, or members of an ethnic group looked down upon, once abroad their status is a subject of concern to their governments. Even their adoption of American citizenship may not, in the law of the home country, change their citizenship and their country of origin's claim to display interest in their condition. Mexico's interest in our immigration policy is not only in allowing the mass migration, or back-and-forth migration, of Mexicans into the United States to continue for domestic economic and political reasons, but also in how Mexicans are treated in this country. How could it maintain, as it does as a proud nation, a claim to equal status and sovereignty and allow differential treatment of its citizens or of Americans of Mexican origin in the United States?

Other countries, too, are sensitive to this. Perhaps the gravest impact of American immigration policy on foreign relations occurred when a xenophobic Congress in 1924 banned all immigration of Japanese. The Japanese government was not much concerned to encourage emigration: it controlled emigration, and saw the military if not economic value of its people. It was, however, extremely sensitive to slights; when anti-Japanese sentiment in California in the early 1900s threatened to lead to legislation restricting Japanese entry, it entered into a "gentleman's agreement" with Theodore Roosevelt by which it guaranteed to limit emigration sharply. This was not enough for the Californians and the new racist theorists of the 1920s, and Japanese—as well as Chinese, Indians, and others in the "barred zone" which included most of Asia—were banned from entering this country as immigrants. As Akire Iriye has pointed out, to the State Department this was a disaster:

> From the point of view of State Department officials, the Congressional action came at a most unfortunate moment, because it marred the developing friendship between the two countries. [One] warned that the Johnson bill . . . would "make difficult, if not impossible, that sympathetic and whole-hearted cooperation, in the area of the Pacific Ocean, which the results of the Washington conference have brought within the range of practical realiza-

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tion." Secretary [of State Charles Evans] Hughes . . . wrote to [Senator] Henry Cabot Lodge five days after passage of the bill in the house, "I am deeply concerned . . . an irreparable injury has been done, not to Japan but to ourselves. . . . It is a dangerous thing to plant a deep feeling of resentment in the Japanese people. . . . I dislike to think what the reaping will be after the sowing of this seed."

While hardly any American, Congressman or otherwise, took note of this perturbation, in Japan the banning of Japanese immigration had an enormous impact. Not many of the Japanese elite were concerned over emigration for themselves—they did not emigrate—nor were they concerned over the limitation of the economic prospects of poor farmers who were the chief source of emigrants; but they were outraged at the slight to Japanese honor. This crude act of racism mightily strengthened the nationalist xenophobes of Japan and weakened the nascent parliamentary and liberal regime. It was no unimportant factor in the tangled course of developments that led to war in the Pacific.

There is little chance of such a consequence today as a result of racism and xenophobia: Elements of racial preference have been struck from our immigration laws and strong domestic legislation bans discrimination. Indeed, even discrimination in favor of citizens will now be illegal under the new immigration act. But if the symbolic question of how one's nationals are treated in American immigration law is no longer a significant concern of foreign countries, practical concerns still loom large. As we have indicated, it is in Mexico, the source of the largest legal and illegal stream of immigration into the United States, that these concerns have been most sharply expressed. What do we owe to Mexico in regard to immigration? Some have argued—Gary Hart made this point some time ago—that our obligation can be expressed not in taking in large numbers of permanent or temporary workers, whose impact on our low-income and minority workers may be serious (this is disputed, but is not to be dismissed), but by assisting Mexico's economic development to the point where Mexicans have opportunities that induce them to stay home. But this is a solution more in rhetoric than in practice: what do we know about assisting other nations' economic development? Not much. And how much political will or money can we deploy to make Mexico prosperous, assuming we know how? Not much either. The problem remains, and the claim by the Mexican government that Mexico should be involved in its solution is, I suspect, not the first with which we will have to deal. One may expect the Dominican Republic and Haiti also to raise questions as to whether the spigot on the American safety valve should be controlled by the American government alone.

EVEN IF we insist that American immigration policy is our concern alone, other countries can make that claim a mockery. Cuba can, and has, by forcing us to accept 120,000 Marielitos we had no intention of accepting. Vietnam can, by expelling (or allowing to leave) hundreds of thousands of boat people who in the end will find their major destination of refuge the United States. Mass expulsions, as Michael Teitelbaum has pointed out, are a new twist in the relations between immigration and foreign policy, one we did not have to deal with before World War I. Persons who fled because of political persecution there were, but they were individuals or small groups of leaders and activists, not masses. Nor did we have to deal with the issue in law at all as long as immigration was essentially uncontrolled, as was the case until the early 1920s, though polygamists, anarchists, and some other categories were banned. Even though anarchism was then something of a mass movement, the impact of this prohibition was on individuals.

It is primarily in our terrible twentieth century that political and religious persecution producing masses of refugees has become a major issue. For a while, we ignored it: the fact that Jews had to leave Germany and Eastern Europe to escape persecution made

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no dent on our immigration policies at all. If they were German Jews, they had the accidental benefit of the ample German quota of the act of 1924. If they were Polish, hard luck. A considerable degree of anti-Semitism in the State Department (and the country as a whole) made it hard, even while Jews were being sent by the millions to death camps, to effect even the slightest bending of our harsh immigration laws in their favor during World War II.

We were more considerate of refugees from communist countries in the postwar period. Our first refugee act that responded to the reality of mass emigration for political or religious or racial and ethnic reasons was passed only in 1953, and that defined a refugee as a person fleeing "from a Communist dominated country or area, or from any country within the general area of the Middle East." In 1980, a new act adopted the politically neutral language of the 1967 United Nation Protocol on Refugees: a refugee is someone who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is . . . unable or . . . unwilling to return to it." A new right of asylum was also established in the act. In 1978 the number of refugees granted this was about 2,000; the new act raised the number to 5,000. It is one of the ironies of our age of persecution that laws designed for individuals are soon overwhelmed by masses. So with the refugee act of 1980, where it was assumed that a relatively modest number of refugees, set by the president and Congress each year, would deal with the problem. The Marielitos and Vietnamese soon showed us how naive that would be, and we have set figures for refugees each year far larger than anticipated in the legislation, and still not enough to respond to mass expulsions.

Similarly with seekers of asylum: A mere 5,000 at the time of the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, they had ballooned to 164,000 by 1984. In our age, persecution, and the resulting status of refugee and asylum seeker, once the mark of an exceptional individual, become the condition of masses.

It is here that relations between immigration policy and foreign policy become most controversial and most delicate. We find it easy, understandably, to accept refugees from communist countries with whom we are at odds, and whose deprivations of human rights we emphasize—and in some cases may for political reasons exaggerate. We find it hard to accept that countries that are allied with us politically will also have people who flee in fear of persecution for their politics. A simple insistence that *no* political considerations at all may enter into decisions on admitting refugees or granting asylum status, as demanded by human rights advocates, is unrealistic. In addition, they often ignore real differences. In all the countries around which disputes as to whether to admit refugees or grant asylum status now rage, economic problems are so severe that there is a real question how to separate economic reasons for immigration—which are accommodated within the main body of immigration law—from political reasons, which are accommodated within the Refugee Act. War alone and its disorder create fear and real physical threats—but the Refugee Act was not written to aid victims of civil war.

Another difference ignored is that between persecution by government—which is the kind of persecution foreseen and attended to by the Refugee Act—and fear of reprisal by non-governmental agents. The latter is or should be a law-and-order problem within the country itself, and should not be solved by granting the right of asylum. Admittedly, for the individual threatened with death by non-governmental agents, it is hardly satisfactory to be told that his problem is not foreseen by the Refugee Act, yet in fact there are different causes of fear, and the Refugee Act does not deal with all of them. It would be difficult to take the position that law and order have so broken down in a country that we must grant refuge to its citizens in this country because their own government cannot protect them.

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I think the distinctions are real ones, whether or not they should affect our policies. However, the fact is that the demand for refuge is so great and comes from so many sources that regardless of how we decide individual cases from El Salvador or Guatemala, some kind of overall cap must be set on the demand for asylum. In some countries where we are reluctant to grant asylum for political reasons, the numbers of potential seekers of asylum are so great that even if we were to accept the claims that they advance, we would have to find other means for regulating the flow of refugees and asylum-seekers into the country.

Can foreign policy attempt to mitigate this terrible development of great streams of people being forced out of their country or desperate to leave because of persecution and internal war? Ideally, yes. Thus, the overthrow of Duvalier and Marcos, assisted or encouraged by the United States, meant that some refugees from those countries could return home. However, it hardly affected the great number of immigrants from those countries, who have reasons other than political for wishing to live in the United States. Improving the economic circumstances of those countries, which would reduce the flow, raises certain questions, as we indicated in the case of Mexico. First, do we know how to do it—and our aid policies are no sterling demonstration that we do. Further, even if we knew, would we want to spend the money and exert the political pressure that might improve their economic circumstances?

The United States has been spared up to now the most extreme consequences of immigration on foreign policy, consequences a good number of countries in the developing world have had to deal with. In some cases, a delicate ethnic balance has been threatened by immigration. This is what has been happening in Assam, as Bengalis move in, often over the international frontier with Bangladesh, with results leading to massacre and a situation of near open rebellion and threatened civil war. In the Punjab, an opposite situation exists, in which Sikh extremists are trying to drive Hindus from the state through terrorism to ensure Sikh dominance. In Lebanon, a delicate balance between various Muslim and Christian groups was upset by the mass entry of Palestinian refugees, which was undoubtedly one factor in the complicated skein of events that has resulted in endless and bloody civil war. The oil-rich Gulf countries have feared the impact of immigrants from other Arab countries—one reason they have preferred workers from Pakistan and India and Korea who cannot participate in local politics. So immigration, which may be seen as only a means of dealing with labor shortages or fulfilling humanitarian responsibilities, may under certain circumstances threaten the balance of internal politics, and even threaten the subversion of the state.

This is one rarely stated element of American concern with Mexican immigration. About ten years ago, during an early congressional inquiry into immigration issues, one witness asserted that by the end of the century there would be 140 million Mexicans, half of them living north of the Rio Grande. This was wildly exaggerated—a reflection of a time when American officials could assert there might be as many as 12 million illegal immigrants, a figure now thought to be at least three times as large as the real one. Nevertheless, at some point one will have to think about the impact of Mexican immigration on our relations with Mexico, not from the point of view of annoyances created by restricting immigration, but from the point of view of the creation of what may be considered a Mexican lobby dwarfing any other potential immigrant-ethnic lobby. This may seem highly unlikely. The assimilatory power of American society has been enormous. The fact that the Germans are the largest immigrant ethnic component of the American population, next to the English, Welsh, and Scots, has had hardly any effect on American foreign relations. It did not prevent us from entering into two wars against Germany; if there has been an underground influence of greater sympathy with

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Germany in American foreign relations as a result of this large component of the American population, it has not been obvious.

And yet, the past may be no guide to the future. One can list many differences between the mass immigration of the nineteenth century and immigration today that would suggest a different course of assimilation, with different consequences. These considerations play no role in shaping our immigration policy. In time one suspects they will.

To say something is affected by, and affects foreign policy, is to suggest that there is an answer *in* foreign policy. If there is, it is unfortunately no simple answer. It takes no great prescience to look around the globe and see possibilities—perhaps probabilities—that we will be faced by new streams of refugees, created by political developments, knocking at our doors. One hesitates to make a list of these possibilities. But consider, to take only one example, what is likely to happen when blacks rule South Africa. One need not take the gloomiest scenario to project that hundreds of thousands will want to, perhaps have to, move elsewhere—and may have some claim that puts them under the Refugee Act. This is hardly the kind of factor that should play the largest role in determining our South African policy. But it is a consideration that at some point should come into play. Just how it might affect that policy is a delicate matter. But it should be thought about, for our immigration problems are no longer a matter that can be determined solely by domestic considerations.

"How It Was" by Oscar Handlin and "New Rules of the Game" by Nathan Glazer were originally presented in different form at the Lehrman Institute during a seminar on immigration and foreign policy.

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Out of Kilter—Greeks, Turks & U.S. Policy

Paul B. Henze

DEBATE about where U.S. interests lie in connection with Turkey and Greece tends to get bogged down in who-struck-whom-first argumentation. It can easily degenerate into rancor over the rights and wrongs of Turks, Greeks, and Armenians during the final century of the Ottoman Empire. Such debate inevitably generates more heat than light. Basic truths and elementary facts that should be the basis for our policies toward these countries are obscured and ignored. I give short shrift to some of these favorite topics in this essay and stress instead fundamental facts and recent history.

Turkey is one of the twentieth century's real success stories: the neglected heart of a moribund empire that moved from defeat and foreign occupation, through dictatorship, to democracy in two generations. As a national entity, Turkey came close to disappearing at the end of World War I and, if the Allied Powers had been able to follow their original intentions, might have been broken up into unstable mini-states under European mandate or patronage, as happened to the rest of the Ottoman Empire. But there was enormous strength in the Anatolian peasantry and in the ancient towns of the plateau, which Mustafa Kemal Atatürk exploited to lay the foundations of a modern nation. His genius lay in the combination of vision and patience with which he structured his new state and defined the principles on which it would operate—toward democracy and full integration into European civilization.

It was no easy task. The new Turkey was isolated and unloved. In the 1920s there were no ready sources of aid or advice for a country that wanted to modernize and develop: the Third World had not been invented, and developed countries felt no obligation to help the less developed. Communist Russia helped Turkey build a bit of industry, but her motives were always suspect. As war clouds gathered in the 1930s, Atatürk hewed to a policy of strict neutrality. Like all great leaders, Atatürk had shortcomings, but he shielded the Turkish Republic from them. His early death in 1938 served to consolidate the system he had built in two hectic decades and his successor, the stolid and stubborn Ismet Inonu, steered the country through World War II, onto the road to full democracy and integration into the free world.

Turks took readily to democracy. The multi-party system which came into full operation with the 1950 elections was in no respect imposed from the outside. (The Republican People's Party, RPP, founded by

Paul B. Henze has been a student of the Eastern Mediterranean for more than thirty years. He was officer in charge of Greek-Turkish-Cyprus relations in the National Security Council during the Carter administration.

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Atatürk, which had governed since the foundation of the republic, was turned out of office in these elections by the Democrats, who had evolved as an RPP faction.) A fundamental tenet of the Atatürk legacy is that the Turkish military forces act as trustees of democracy, but must never permit military rule to become a substitute for political rule. On the three occasions when the Turkish parliamentary process has become stalemated, the military has stepped in to initiate a corrective process and then withdrawn. Turkey does not tend to revert to authoritarianism in the absence of pressure from abroad. European socialists and American intellectuals have had difficulty grasping this basic truth. Turks consider it unfair that liberal idealists who are ready to excuse the shortcomings of leftist authoritarian regimes tend to apply perfectionist standards to judging democracy in Turkey. A recent letter to the *Economist* expresses Turkish feelings well:

> Like children, nations too are products of their environment. If Turkey had France, Germany, Austria and Italy as its neighbors it would be Switzerland. Instead, it has Bulgaria, Greece, the Soviet Union, Iraq, Iran and Syria.

HAD IT not been for Stalin's greed, Turkey might have reverted to a policy of neutrality after World War II. But his crude demands for territorial concessions in the east[1] and "joint defense" of the Turkish Straits, made even before the war ended, confirmed deep Turkish suspicions that Russian imperialism had simply taken on a new guise under communism. Soviet efforts to install communist puppet governments in Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan propelled Turkey into full commitment to the West. Turkey participated enthusiastically in the Korean war and became a full-fledged member of Nato in 1952.

During thirty-five years in Nato, Turkey has never had to be pressured to maintain battle-ready forces. With universal military service, it provides more military manpower than any alliance member except the U.S. Turkey has been valuable to Nato as a natural bridge between Europe and the Middle East.[2] When strains developed over Cyprus in the 1960s, Turkey remained firm in its alliance commitments, as it has ever since.

Turkey fell into acute political and economic crisis during the 1970s. Many factors combined to exacerbate the disarray. One of the most serious was a massive destabilization effort mounted by the Soviet Union, implemented primarily through Bulgaria, Syria, and the PLO. Drug smugglers, who enjoyed VIP status in Sofia, played a major role. Money and guns were poured into the country through many channels and supplied to both left and right extremists. Terrorists from both ends of the spectrum were often trained together in the same Syrian camps. Weak coalition governments, the consequence of the idealistic 1961 constitution, were unable to take strong measures to control either smugglers or terrorists. By the time Turkish military leaders set aside the ineffective Demirel government in September of 1980, an average of twenty-eight people a day were being murdered.

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[1]With the exception of Finland, the northeastern Turkish districts of Kars and Ardahan constitute the only territory which belonged to the Tsarist Empire that Stalin was unable to reincorporate into the Soviet Union.

[2]During the Nixon administration it became fashionable to regard Iran as more important than Turkey. It had oil wealth and money to buy its own arms, its government was stable and the Shah had ambitions to make Iran a significant regional power. During the 1970s, as Turkey began to fall into crisis and troublesome issues between Turkey and the U.S. came to the fore (e.g. Cyprus and poppies) this trend intensified. When Jimmy Carter made his first major trip abroad at the end of 1977 he flew from Warsaw to Teheran to spend New Year's Eve with the Shah, never giving a thought to stopping in Ankara. Eisenhower was the last and only U.S. president to visit Turkey, in 1959.

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Terrorism fed too on economic crisis. During the 1960s Turkey's growth rate rose to 7 percent per year. Cheap oil and remittances from a million workers in Europe fueled an economic boom. The oil price hike of 1973 dealt Turkey a double blow—greatly increased oil prices and fewer jobs in depressed European economies, thus lowering remittances. Economic foresight and a bit of political courage could have cushioned the effect of these setbacks, but foresight and courage were hard to find among Turkey's political party leaders of the time. As Bülent Ecevit played musical chairs in the prime ministry with his arch-rival, Suleyman Demirel (three governments led by each in the years 1974–80), inflation gained momentum, agricultural subsidies and state enterprises drained the budget, and the most dynamic sectors of the economy were driven underground.

The situation had become so serious by the beginning of 1979 that President Carter mobilized Western leaders at the Guadeloupe summit to organize a rescue operation for the Turkish economy. In light of what had happened in Iran, no one wanted Turkey to collapse. But until Demirel, in desperation, gave his economic counselor Turgut Özal a free hand to draw up serious reforms, Western help could not be decisive. The economic turnaround began January 24, 1980, when Demirel decreed a series of measures that committed Turkey to an open, free-market economy. It was a challenge to the Soviet sponsors of destabilization and their surrogates. Terrorism increased to the point where the country was in a state of virtual civil war by the summer of 1980 and economic recovery, in spite of Western aid, in doubt. Meanwhile, the badly fractionalized parliament had failed to elect a new president after more than 100 ballots.

TURKISH military leaders, designating themselves the National Security Council, pushed the demoralized Demirel cabinet aside, dismissed parliament, and took over the government on September 12, 1980. All political parties were dissolved and General Kenan Evren, the chief of staff, became head of state. The population welcomed military intervention, which was bloodless. Military administration was firm but fair. Terrorists, their supporters, and those who had been duped into abetting subversive activities were arrested and called to account. The judicial process has been so meticulous that nearly seven years later some trials are still not finished.

A national assembly was convened to draft a new constitution that would correct the shortcomings of that of 1961. It was approved by 91.3 percent of eligible voters in November 1982. General Evren was simultaneously elected president for a 7-year term. He remains the most popular man in Turkey today. Next most popular is Turgut Özal, the energetic prime minister, who surprised the military leaders by gaining a clear parliamentary majority for his new Motherland party when national elections were held in the fall of 1983.

After three and a half years in office, Özal, like most democratic leaders, has seen his popularity erode somewhat, but competing party leaders have advanced no credible alternatives to his program. Though nearly two dozen new political parties have been formed in Turkey since 1983, Özal's Motherland party has proved by far the most cohesive and now has close to a two-thirds majority in the 400-member unicameral parliament. It has also produced a group of energetic young mayors, such as Bedrettin Dalan, who is putting time-worn Istanbul through a dramatic process of renewal. The Turkish generals deliberately sought to draw new men with new ideas into politics when they launched the 1982 constitution. The evolution is far from complete—Demirel and Ecevit are both attempting comebacks—but prospects are promising.

The most important economic issue in Turkey today is when and how it will become the thirteenth full member of the European Common Market. Europeans have been footdragging. Turkey's population (51,421,000 in 1985) approaches the combined total of the

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Common Market's three newest members—Greece, Spain, and Portugal. Turkey's per capita GNP is still much lower than any of these three, but the country displays greater economic dynamism. Turkey led the twenty-four OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development) members in growth during 1986: 7.9 percent. Since 1980, exports have quadrupled. Turkey produces TV sets and automobiles as well as carpets, nuts, and figs. Two-thirds of her 1986 $8 billion export total consisted of manufactured products. Özal holds up Japan, Korea, and Taiwan as models. Turkey thus represents both an opportunity and a challenge for the EEC. As a recent editorial in the *Wall Street Journal* noted: "Mr. Özal's application will be good for Europe, too. Adding 51 million consumers and producers to the Community would be just the sort of tonic for Europe's economic ailments."

FOR TURKS, membership in the European Economic Community is of enormous political and psychological importance. Trade with the oil-rich Middle Eastern countries loomed large in Turkish accounts during recent years, but with the fall of oil prices it has declined, and prospects for further rapid expansion are poor. Turks have always known that, politically speaking, the Middle East has nothing positive to offer them. The Turkish relationship to the Arab world which was once part of the Ottoman Empire remains uneasy. Revolutionary Iran, with which Turkey has so far managed its relations carefully, is a serious worry. Khomeini has been encouraging fundamentalist Islamic propaganda in Turkey. Iranian refugees keep pouring across Turkey's eastern border. Their numbers are said to have risen to almost a million.

Pakistan is Turkey's closest friend in the Middle East. Relations with Egypt have recently warmed. So have relations with Israel. Every Middle Eastern link involves complex political, economic, and cultural trade-offs as well as security considerations. Turkish construction companies make good profits in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, but Turkish workers find these conservative Islamic societies unappealing and almost never take their families with them, as they do to Europe. Libya was once a major trading partner, but relations have cooled markedly as Libya's oil revenues have fallen and the country has been caught abetting terrorism in Turkey itself. Though Turkey has won international commendation for its strict domestic controls on poppy growing and processing, drug traffickers operating from as far away as the Golden Triangle still try to use the country as a route to Europe and America.

Syria, backed by the Soviets, has for many years permitted Kurdish guerrillas to train and infiltrate Turkey's southeastern provinces. During 1986, Kurdish guerrilla operations intensified; more than 200 soldiers and officials were killed. This problem shows no signs of easing during the current year. Syria also facilitates Armenian terrorism against Turkish embassies and commercial establishments abroad. Armenian terrorists have carried out occasional acts of violence in Turkey itself, but Turkey's small Armenian minority has given them no support.[3] Under these circumstances, the value of Nato membership and the overlapping security relationship with the United States is clearer to Turks than ever. Very few Turkish diplomats, military leaders, or politicians have any illusions about where Turkey's true interests lie. The same can be said of the great majority of the population in all parts of the country.

All this should be—and to some degree undoubtedly is—discouraging to Moscow, but the Soviets are patient and subversion continues, albeit more cautiously than in the

[3]There are many reasons to believe, as Turkish security officials do, that the most active Armenian group, the Marxist Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), enjoys covert Soviet encouragement and clandestine support. It advocates incorporation of Turkey's eastern provinces (where few Armenians remain) into the Soviet Armenian Republic.

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1970s. A surprising amount of Soviet disinformation gets into the Turkish press. Leftist journals and publishing houses manage far larger print runs and more extensive distribution networks than moderates. Underground cells with links to both right and left Turkish extremists in Europe continue to be uncovered. The Turkish Communist party, which has never enjoyed legal status, continues to operate a radio station out of East Germany called *Bizim Radyo* (Our Radio). Inaugurated in 1958, it is one of the few Soviet clandestine stations that was not terminated when emphasis shifted to massive overt broadcasting in the early 1970s.

Whatever the Russians think they gain from *Bizim Radyo*, it serves to remind Turks that they can risk no wishful thinking about their northern neighbor. Kremlin leaders, after the recent riots in Alma-Ata, can hardly forget that their population includes as many Turkic Muslims as Turkey itself, and with the same high growth rate. For these peoples, the democratic Turkish model with an open society and a dynamic free-market economy, represents an attractive alternative to the dead dogmas of Marxism.

Some Turks now suspect that the Soviets are providing clandestine support and encouragement for religious extremism with the aim of building up social tension and creating the impression of instability in Turkey. Such a tactic would offer the Russians the double gain of discrediting Turkey with Soviet Muslims and alarming her Nato allies and potential EEC partners. The notion is not farfetched for it would simply be an extension of the subversive agenda of the 1970s when the Soviets gave arms, money, and other kinds of assistance to fascist terrorists and drug traffickers as well as to all kinds of leftists.

Those who know Turkey well have never seen much basis for fear that the country might go the way of Iran and fall victim to Islamic fundamentalism. Turks pride themselves on their coolheadedness and have no desire to emulate either Persians or Arabs. The country is predominantly Sunni. The Shiite minority in Turkey has neither a clerical establishment—there are no ayatollahs—nor a tradition of fanaticism. Erbakan's demagogic religious party reached a peak of 12 percent of the 1973 vote and fell steadily in appeal during the rest of the decade, a time of extraordinary political confusion and ferment when people might have been expected to turn increasingly to religion. Turkey is far more stable today.

GREEK-TURKISH enmity is neither as immutable nor as deeply anchored in history as Greek-Turkish political rhetoric and newspaper hyperbole might lead us to believe. Replacement of the Byzantine Empire by the Ottoman Empire was a long historical process which cannot be honestly described in the black-and-white terms modern Greek schoolbooks employ. During the Ottoman centuries, Greeks were junior partners in administering the Empire, especially in the Balkans, and dominated much of its economic life.

The Greek struggle for independence in the 1830s, immortalized by Lord Byron, made an indelible impact on the minds of Europeans and Americans who have always been prone to ascribe the virtues and glories of ancient Greece to the modern nation-state. Ancient Greek virtues were offset by an equal variety of shortcomings, all of which can be observed in modern Greek society. Greek political life since independence has been essentially Balkan in character, but complicated by the existence of an enormous Greek diaspora in the Balkans and Russia, the Middle East and Africa, whose roots go back to ancient times. The dream of a Greece restored to its ancient greatness and dominating culturally and perhaps even politically much of the Eastern Mediterranean infected Greek consciousness in the nineteenth century.

This desire for a *Megale Hellas*—Greater Greece—inspired the disastrous Greek invasion of Asia Minor at the end of World War I. Greek ultra-nationalists were encouraged by Lloyd George and the French. This misconceived adventure bolstered Turkish nationalism. If it had never occurred, Atatürk and his

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colleagues might have had much greater difficulty uniting Anatolian Turks behind the struggle for independence that culminated in the establishment of the republic. Nevertheless, after the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) the two great republican leaders, Atatürk and Venizelos, had the foresight to see that prolonged Greek-Turkish strains would serve the interests of neither nation and effected a far-reaching reconciliation that lasted, in all its essential features, into the 1960s.

Greece had difficulty achieving internal political stability in the nineteenth century. The European-imposed monarchy—first a Bavarian and then a Dane as king—never put down deep roots. Instability persisted in the twentieth century. Loving democracy in theory, Greek politicians found it hard to practice with restraint. World War I was a difficult time. After the Anatolian defeat, Greece had to absorb a million and a half Christians from Asia Minor who were exchanged for 300,000 Muslims from Greece. It remained a republic until 1935 when King George II was returned to the throne by plebiscite. In 1936 General Metaxas imposed a fascist dictatorship that lasted until 1941. Greece was attacked by Italy and occupied by the Nazis during World War II. Contentiousness among wartime resistance movements laid the groundwork for civil war by 1944. During the next five years, Stalin abetted a savage communist guerrilla insurgency that delayed recovery and generated poisonous cleavages in Greek life that even today leave scars.

The Truman doctrine brought Greece, like Turkey, under the protective wing of the United States and Greece received generous Marshall Plan aid. Greece entered Nato with Turkey in 1952. The monarchy was restored and Constantine Karamanlis emerged as a dynamic leader. He served as prime minister for eight years, from 1955 to 1963. During this period of rapid economic expansion and social change, prospects seemed good for relegation of old Greek-Turkish quarrels to history. Unfortunately Cyprus soon became, and remains, the nexus of Greek-Turkish tension.

Though it has been predominantly Greek in culture since ancient times, Cyprus has never belonged to mainland Greece. The Ottomans took it from rulers left over from the Crusades. In 1878 they surrendered it to Britain. Atatürk made no claim to it. After World War II a Greek-led anti-British insurgency aimed at union with Greece. The Menderes government in Ankara countered with a demand for partition of the island. Thus a pattern emerged that has persisted for thirty years: it has invariably been the Greeks on the island or politicians in Greece who have challenged whatever status quo has existed in Cyprus, while Turkey has always been reactive.

Tension rose to fever pitch in 1958, but good will and good sense prevailed and the crisis was defused with the negotiation of the London and Zurich agreements of February 1959. These led to the establishment of the independent Republic of Cyprus on August 16, 1960 guaranteed by the three directly interested powers: Britain, Greece, and Turkey. The United States, which had no fundamental interests in Cyprus, remained on the sidelines. So did the Russians.

It is one of the tragedies of modern times that statesmen aiming at justice for all have repeatedly saddled small ethnically mixed territories with complicated constitutions that would have little chance of working even in long-established states. This is what happened in Cyprus. Cypriot Greeks never reconciled themselves to broad rights for the Turkish minority. Greek and Turkish mainland governments backed their respective Cypriot communities and castigated each other. By 1963 serious tension had again built up and this time, largely because of Soviet attempts to widen a welcome crack in Nato, the U.S. became worried. Since that initial entry in 1964 into the middle of the Cyprus tangle, the U.S. has never been able to extricate itself and relations with both Greece and Turkey have suffered.

ANOTHER political constant over three decades is that strain over Cyprus has always had a more destructive

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domestic impact in Greece than in Turkey. It contributed to a period of mounting political tension in the mid-1960s. George Papandreou, father of the present prime minister, Andreas, was a major actor in a prolonged and depressing political drama that culminated in a military coup in April 1967. The junta pushed out quarrelsome politicians, claimed its action was necessary to prevent communism, and promised a return to civilian government. But in contrast to their Turkish counterparts in 1960–61, the Greek colonels found it difficult to return power to civilians. Politically things went from bad to worse during the seven years they held power.

Greece was ejected from the Council of Europe and censured by Nato but remained an active member of the alliance and continued to receive substantial U.S. military aid. As time passed with no progress toward return to civilian rule, critics in Europe and the U.S. attacked the Nixon administration for failure to take stronger action. "Our dilemma is how to deal with an ally whose internal order we disagree with yet who is a loyal NATO member," declared William Macomber, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (and future ambassador to Turkey) in the fall of 1969. The Nixon administration chose to give Nato considerations priority, just as the Reagan administration has done in the 1980s when faced with Andreas Papandreou's provocations, but the controversy over U.S. policy toward the Greek colonels has continued. On the basis of it, Greek leftists have contrived a mythology that makes the U.S. responsible for every misfortune that has befallen Greece in the past forty years.

The American liberal tendency toward self-blame has helped perpetuate these myths. A typical statement is the *Washington Post*'s of two years ago (March 13, 1985):

> The question that too few Americans ask is how a friendly democratic country such as Greece, which fought with the United States against fascism and which the United States then helped to save from communism, came to its present confusion. The key part of the answer is that Washington carelessly aggravated the fears and frustrations of Greeks of all parties by appearing too friendly to the colonels who ruled Greece in 1967–74 and to the Turks who invaded Cyprus in 1974 and hold part of it to this day.

All the *Post*'s judgments are gross oversimplifications, and the implication that all Greeks were opposed to the colonels is an illusion Greeks and Greek-Americans find comfortable to encourage. The colonels originally enjoyed wide support, for the population was tired of political turmoil. No coherent internal opposition to them coalesced during the entire period of military rule. Their oppression was more often petty and inept than brutal or thorough. Economically, Greece flourished during this period. The transformation from a peasant-based society to modern urban life that had begun in the 1950s accelerated.

Politically, however, the junta could not let go. It was far from a cohesive group. During 1973 Colonel Papadopoulos developed a program for liberalization and set a timetable for free elections, but he had lost touch with important elements in the army who feared civilian government would mean return to the political chaos of the 1960s. General Ioannides, a narrow-minded military policeman, ousted him in November and set the Greek military on the road to disaster.

Greek extremists in Cyprus were plotting at that time to kill the president, Archbishop Makarios, and incorporate the island into Greece. They were encouraged by Athens. When the coup came on July 15, 1974, Makarios walked out of the ruins of his palace unharmed and took refuge in a British sovereign base. In spite of this, the Greek Cypriot plotters and the junta in Athens might have succeeded, at least for a while, if Turkey had not moved. When Ecevit failed to persuade Britain or the U.S. to intervene, he ordered Turkish military forces onto the island on July 20. The most beneficial and immediate results of the Turkish move came in Athens:

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the abrupt collapse of military rule, the return of Constantine Karamanlis, and the restoration of full democracy to Greece. Karamanlis had left Greece for France in 1963. By the early 1970s he had become resigned to remaining in exile for the rest of his life. His unexpected political resurrection brought elation throughout Greece. He was greeted as a messiah. For a brief period there was hope that two popular leaders might, like Atatürk and Venizelos in the 1920s, be able to turn trauma into rapprochement and put an end to two decades of Greek-Turkish confrontation over an island that has only marginal value to either.

In the months that followed, however, domestic politics in Ankara, Washington, and Athens worked to frustrate settlement on Cyprus and exacerbate other issues between Greece and Turkey. Underestimating the advantages the 1961 Turkish constitution gave to his opponents, Ecevit resigned to call new elections. No elections and several months of indecisive caretaker government followed. In Athens, Karamanlis could not prevent withdrawal of Greek military forces from Nato. Soon Greek politicians were back to practicing democracy with—literally—a vengeance. Leftists who did poorly in parliamentary elections in November 1974 (Papandreou's PASOK gained only fifteen seats) resorted to extreme nationalist demagogy to increase their appeal. Karamanlis' New Democracy party could not afford to appear any less zealous about defending Greek interests.

The Ford administration, still unsure of itself, was taken by surprise when congressmen eager to embarrass Henry Kissinger censured Turkey and suspended military aid. Realizing the ease with which they could manipulate the U.S. Congress to harass Turkey and press maximal demands, Greek lobbyists and their allies destroyed all hope that reason might prevail in Washington in anything relating to Turkey, Greece, or Cyprus. Congress formalized its arms embargo against Turkey and provoked a reluctant closing of critical U.S. intelligence-gathering installations by Prime Minister Demirel in September 1975. Starting in December of that year, Congress levied a requirement on the president to submit *every sixty days* a report on executive branch efforts to promote settlement in Cyprus. This requirement has never been lifted. The seventieth of such reports is being submitted by the Reagan administration in June 1987. Even in an era of continual congressional interference in the conduct of the country's foreign relations, it is hard to find an example of more egregious and self-defeating congressional contrariness on a foreign policy issue.

The Democrats tilted toward the Greek lobby in the 1976 campaign and President Carter came into office pro-Greek. By the end of his first year, awareness of the national interest had prevailed, and a decision was taken to persuade Congress to lift the arms embargo. It was still a hard fight, finally won in August 1978, not a moment too soon in view of the impending collapse of Iran. During the final two years of the Carter administration, military relations with Turkey were restored, intelligence bases were reopened, a new defense cooperation agreement (DECA) was negotiated, and assistance levels were raised sharply. The Reagan administration inherited a positive relationship with Turkey and built on it.

BY ALL *reasonable standards*, the U.S. should have been able to restore a good relationship with Greece during this same period. Instead, relations remained neuralgic. Unlike Turkey, Greece did not fall into economic crisis in the 1970s. The economic momentum that had developed during junta rule was maintained after restoration of democracy and facilitated the political adjustments that needed to be made. Elections were held in November 1974 for parliament. Karamanlis' New Democracy party gained 216 of the 300 seats. Confident of parliamentary backing, Karamanlis held a referendum on Greece's status as a republic in December 1974. It gained almost 70 percent approval. A new constitution went into effect in June 1975.

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The Greek lobby's success in the U.S. Congress in maintaining the arms embargo against Turkey into 1978 encouraged unrealistic expectations in Greece, slowed Greek reintegration into Nato, and delayed negotiation of a new U.S.-Greek base agreement. In the parliamentary elections of 1977, Andreas Papandreou's radical socialist party (PASOK) emerged as a serious political force, winning 92 seats. Papandreou accused Karamanlis of failing to protect Greek interests when the Turkish arms embargo was lifted the next year. Actually the Grand Old Man of Greek politics had his priorities well thought out, as his actions over the next three years would demonstrate.

Karamanlis sought resumption of Greek participation in Nato not only to bolster Western ties but for domestic reasons as well. He knew a Greek military establishment committed to Nato would be less likely to venture into politics again. The price Nato had to pay for Greece's return was a series of separate commands to avoid direct association with Turkey. With enormous patience, General Bernard Rogers worked these out and put them into effect in 1980.

Karamanlis sensed that the political tide was flowing against his New Democracy party, but he had one other goal to accomplish before moving up to the presidency in the spring of 1980: Greek entry into the European Economic Community. He laid the groundwork for this decisive step during his final two years as prime minister. The country's steady economic growth during the preceding fifteen years made it acceptable to the EEC, though its economic performance had slowed in the period immediately preceding entry. Growth reached 6 percent in 1978 but fell to 3 percent in 1979 and inflation rose to 25 percent. By the time Greece became the EEC's twelfth member on January 1, 1981, it was already in a condition of mild economic crisis.

Meanwhile, negotiations between the U.S. and Greece for a new defense cooperation agreement had dragged on for years, and the status of the four major U.S. military installations remained undefined. Nevertheless, Congress regularly voted military aid for Greece at a level of 70 percent of that given to Turkey, with the specious justification that this was a way of maintaining "balance" between the two countries. The Reagan administration has been no more successful than its predecessors in convincing a sufficient number of lawmakers that this rationale is fallacious.

ANDREAS PAPANDREOU'S resounding victory in the October 1981 elections demonstrated that demagogy brings rewards in Greek politics. Gradually Greeks have realized that it also carries high costs. PASOK won 172 seats to New Democracy's 115. Papandreou campaigned on promises of prosperity and sharing of wealth, domestic reforms, reversal of the decision to join the EEC, closing of American military installations, and a shift toward neutralism in foreign policy. To avoid alarming the military, however, he did not openly advocate withdrawal from Nato. U.S. base negotiations had been suspended in June 1981. Fears that Greece might abandon the West entirely were softened by the realization that Karamanlis was safely established in the presidency, enjoyed wide popular respect, and possessed considerable residual power.

Papandreou's words have been more atrocious than his deeds, but both have been irresponsible. Among other things, he has indulged both Libya and Syria in their support of terrorism, traveled to Poland and praised Jaruzelski, welcomed a squadron of the Soviet fleet to Piraeus, frequently withdrawn Greece from cooperation in Nato exercises, concluded what comes close to a non-aggression pact with Bulgaria, and persistently maintained that Turkey constitutes a greater danger to Greece than the Warsaw Pact, while rebuffing repeated efforts by both the Turkish military and the Özal government to improve relations. None of this would necessarily discredit him at home, however, for, as the *Economist* recently observed, Greeks take pride in things that belittle them.

After a period of posturing and threatening, Papandreou finally resumed U.S. base

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negotiations and concluded a five-year DECA in 1983. He refrained from closing Voice of America transmitters in Thrace and Rhodes. Despite a good deal of huffing and puffing he took no concrete steps to withdraw from the EEC. In fact, EEC membership has saved Greece from total economic collapse from the effects of Papandreou's socialism. Greece received almost $2 billion in EEC emergency loans in 1986. More aid will be needed to set the Greek economy on the road to recovery.

Not surprisingly, Papandreou's flirtations with the communist world have brought no economic advantages. As Greece has fallen into economic crisis, the verbal abuse of Papandreou is directed less at the U.S. than at Europeans, who are increasingly impatient with Greece. Like many Americans, they are beginning to ask whether they have indulged Papandreou, and Greece itself, for too long. Greek softness on terrorists has also caused repeated episodes of strain over the past two years.

The Soviets were active in Greece before Papandreou came to power. In October 1981, on the eve of the election which brought him to office, a new Athens daily newspaper, *Ethnos*, began publication. It was brought into being by generous KGB subsidies and has gained high circulation with a mixture of sensationalism and leftist politics. It has served as a major outlet for both Soviet propaganda and disinformation. Time and again Papandreou has dignified Soviet disinformation by repeating it and accepting it publicly when it has served his peculiar political purposes. The East Germans have subsidized other anti-Western publishing operations in Greece. KGB defectors have confirmed the large scale of Soviet operations in all walks of Greek life to the embarrassment of both Papandreou and Moscow, which withdrew Yuri Andropov's son from his ambassadorial post in Athens at the end of 1984, after an unusually short tour of duty.

In Turkey the Soviets have always used surrogates and gone to great lengths to avoid open identification with the subversive operations they sponsor. Their approach to Greece stands in sharp contrast. It is difficult to understand why the Russians have expended so much effort and exposed themselves so recklessly to improve a climate already so favorable to their interests. They are undoubtedly looking beyond Papandreou.

Greek intellectual life in the Papandreou era has at times seemed to be a combination of *Alice in Wonderland* and *1984*. While critics of Papandreou's indulgence of the Soviets (e.g., the journalist Paul Anastasi) have been harassed by lawsuits, Papandreou has avoided physical repression of opposition. As his fortunes have declined, there is increasing evidence that his standing among intellectuals, and among the electorate at large, has begun to erode markedly.

DOES THE WEST need Greece? Does the West need Turkey? The first question is seldom asked because Greece is felt to be an integral part of Western civilization. The second question is now asked less often than it was during the 1970s, when it was fashionable to dismiss Turkey as a country that could not manage its affairs competently. Any consideration of Turkey's strategic value—a mere glance at a map—can produce only one answer. But Özal's Turkey insists on being judged by more than military criteria.

How Papandreou's Greece wants to be judged by the rest of the world is difficult to determine. The most serious damage Papandreou is doing to Greece may be prolongation of the political neurosis that in each generation since independence has overwhelmed the country. Are Greeks capable of operating a government and an economy over any period of time without falling into disarray? Why the compulsion always to blame their troubles on others? Why the obsession with Turkey when there is no hard evidence that Turkey has any aggressive designs on Greece at all?

Greeks are angered when Turks do not reciprocate the rancor they themselves display. Perversely and resolutely, they insist on

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ignoring basic facts. Greece has barely 10 million people. Turkey has over 52 million in an area almost six times the size of Greece. Greece's population is barely increasing. Turkey adds more than a million each year. By the end of this century, Turkey's population will be nearing 70 million. Greece may have 11 million. Greece is limited in both area and resources. The natural talents of its people nevertheless give it the potential to be a Switzerland. It cannot compete with Turkey militarily, or even economically, but if Greeks genuinely feel threatened by Turkey, what better framework for reducing the danger could be found than Nato, the EEC, and all the other European and North Atlantic institutions to which Greece already belongs?

Greece may try to block Turkey's movement toward full EEC membership. Like other negative aims on which Greece has too often expended its energy, this course must sooner or later lead to defeat and frustration. In hard economic terms, Turkey has more to offer Europe than Greece has. The same has always been true militarily and will continue to be. In the wake of PASOK's triumph in 1981, the *New York Times* commented:

> NATO could survive another Greek withdrawal . . . nor would the loss of four American bases be a grievous blow. What would cause protracted damage is angry confrontation with a socialist regime that turned equivocal neutralism into patriotic dogma.

While Greece slid downhill economically from 1980 onward and, after the Papandreou victory, into political isolation, Turkey moved steadily in the direction of political stability, economic good health and increased international respect. Prospects for Turkey continuing along its present course are excellent. The process of party realignment that has taken place in Turkey recently has increased Özal's majority in parliament. The likelihood of demagogic leadership emerging out of the Turkish political process is slight. Turkey's friends and allies can project their policies toward her with confidence because the country displays confidence in itself. Turks have no illusions about the direction of the most serious threats to their national security.

Greece, after more than half a decade of Papandreou, stands in stark contrast. Irritating as Papandreou's behavior has been to Turkey's friends and allies, the greatest damage he has done has been to Greece herself. It would be unrealistic not to recognize that she will have serious difficulty recovering from Papandreou's excesses. The road back is not yet clear. The vicious circle of political extremism is difficult to escape, though there are hopeful signs in the local elections of October 1986 where a trend toward resurgence of New Democracy under energetic men in their forties is apparent. Greece's three largest cities: Athens, Piraeus, and Salonika, where half the country's population lives, defeated PASOK candidates and elected New Democracy mayors. Miltiades Evert, who has the difficult job of dealing with the capital's multiple problems of overcrowding and pollution, is already a national figure.

Like Özal's new Motherland party in Turkey, New Democracy is attracting pragmatic young men who aspire to elected office to serve their country's best interests, not simply to posture and enjoy the prerogatives of power. When the Greek electorate has the opportunity to push Papandreou and PASOK into the past and elevate some of these practical realists to national leadership, the hard task of using EEC support to undo the damage Papandreou has done can begin in earnest.

There could be hope then, too, that successful pragmatists in both Greece and Turkey might join to settle the differences on which both countries have wasted so much time and energy for more than a decade. The interests of both countries will be well served when this occurs, for there are no major sources of intractable strain between them. Cyprus will be settled, if it is ever settled, only by Turkish-Greek agreement, both in the island and between the two countries, without either side bringing pressure from the outside on the other.

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It is in the interest of the United States to help both Turkey and Greece realize their full potential. We have more than enough examples from the past two decades of approaches that do not work. Threatening letters don't work. Arms embargoes don't work. Entangling ourselves in details is counterproductive. The U.S. Congress, in the absence of strong leadership, always tends to give parochial interests and short-term concerns priority over larger principles and fundamental interests. The actions of Congress in the spring of 1987 in cutting military aid to Turkey and adding conditions relating to Cyprus and the Armenian issue[4] have, as of this writing, provoked an impasse in U.S.-Turkish relations. Ratification of the DECA initialed in December 1986 has been suspended and President Evren has postponed his planned visit to Washington, which would have been the first by a Turkish president in twenty-five years. The executive branch has a far better record than Congress for articulating the national interest in respect to Greece and Turkey, but it too has sometimes been shortsighted and fallen into the trap of overinvolvement in issues that neither affect our national interest nor are susceptible to American manipulation.

Primary among the issues that need less attention is Cyprus. The people who live on Cyprus, both Greeks and Turks, are as entitled as any others in the world to enjoy the benefits of freedom and prosperity. But nothing gives them a special claim on American protection. American security interests there have been confined to a broadcast monitoring operation and use of British sovereign base facilities for overflights of nearby Middle Eastern regions. Alternatives for both could easily be found. If the signatories to the London and Zurich agreements (Britain, Greece, and Turkey) should at some future date decide that Cyprus would be better permanently partitioned and/or incorporated into Greece and Turkey, we would have no basis for objection and no American interest would be harmed. The most constructive action for Congress would be to terminate the requirement for the 60-day Presidential Progress Report on Cyprus, which serves only the interests of those who wish to keep exploiting the problem for narrow ends, not settle it.

Congress has long misled itself in pretending that a 7:10 ratio in military aid ensures "balance" in Greek-Turkish military capabilities. The notion can be disproved with 4th-grade arithmetic. It has resulted in squandering of scarce military aid on Greece, whose contribution both to Nato and to bilateral U.S. strategic requirements can never be as great as Turkey's. It has restricted aid to Turkey, which gives the best value per dollar of any U.S. military aid recipient. In recent years, the executive branch has successfully resorted to several stratagems to reduce the impact of the 7:10 formula: increased economic aid to Turkey, better financial terms, use of Nato infrastructure funds and grants of excess equipment. If the executive branch could persuade Congress to stop imposing the 7:10 formula, Greece might see the unwisdom of basing its policies on manipulation of the American legislative process.

An already discernible trend needs to be accelerated: broadening of the American-Turkish relationship beyond the military sphere. Prime Minister Özal is serious when he stresses trade over aid. So are Turkish businessmen whose influence on all aspects of Turkish life is increasing. They place high value on access to U.S. markets and mutually advantageous partnership arrangements with U.S. industry.

Both Turkey and Greece are valuable U.S. allies. Neither country should be permitted the illusion that it can force us to choose between them. It is in the interest of the U.S. to keep both in Nato and to support the participation of both in European and other free world institutions. In this way we will also serve best the genuine interests of both these allies.

[4]What happened to Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and why is a task for historians to keep investigating. Congressional resolutions can only exacerbate, not solve, debate over issues such as this. The executive branch needs to exert itself even more than it has to persuade a majority of congressmen of the pointlessness of such initiatives.

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American Soldiers in Europe: a Bulwark of Freedom

John W. Coffey

WITHIN certain conservative intellectual circles, anti-Europeanism and isolationism, never far below the surface of the popular mood, have again come into vogue. Unlike the old isolationists who advocated holing up in "fortress America," Melvyn Krauss, in *How NATO Weakens the West*, proposes instead to scrap our alliances for a tough, unilateralist approach to world affairs; yet, on inspection, it becomes evident that he would do little to cultivate even a very shrunken garden.[1] This flight from responsibility can perhaps be expected in a nation as new and inexperienced as America in international politics, but in this century much American blood and treasure have been expended in learning that the world is round and that the United States cannot retreat from the struggle over the world balance of power.

Alleging that "Europeans have made a Faustian deal with the devil that severely undermines U.S. national security interests," Krauss contends that European self-Finlandization, not a Soviet invasion of Europe, poses the main threat to the West today. Because the U.S. has footed the bill for them in the Western alliance, Europeans have adopted a "classic free-rider strategy," downplaying the Soviet threat and assuming a neutralist stance. Europe's affluence, he believes, no longer justifies its dependent status inherited from the postwar era. According to Krauss's data, in 1984 the U.S. share of the total Nato GDP (gross domestic product) was 44.5 percent, while Europe's GDP share amounted to 34.18 percent; nevertheless, the U.S. contributed 64.73 percent of Nato's defense spending compared to Europe's 29.45 percent. In 1983 the U.S. spent 6.6 percent of its GDP on defense; Japan spent 1 percent, and the European allies ranged from Luxembourg's 1.2 percent to Britain's 5.3 percent. Krauss estimates that its Nato commitment costs the U.S. at least $134 billion per year. Europeans, he says, have relied on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, which U.S.-Soviet nuclear parity has ren-

John W. Coffey is a policy assistant for negotiations policy in the office of the assistant secretary of defense (international security policy). The views expressed here are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. government.

[1]Melvyn Krauss, *How NATO Weakens the West* (Simon and Schuster, $18.95).

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dered incredible, skimping on conventional forces to prime their welfare states. With the U.S. effectively subsidizing their dole, Europeans have pursued a policy of "detente as defense" by bribing the Soviets with subsidies and trade and obstructing the U.S. in the UN and in the support of democratic forces elsewhere in the world.

Krauss maintains that although containment was once necessary, "corrupted" Atlanticist leaders conspired to preserve the U.S. subsidization of European weakness. Worse, our multilateral approach to security has given the Europeans, and through them the Soviets, a veto on U.S. policy, thereby sabotaging the foundation of containment—indeed, Europe has become a Soviet "proxy." In order to uphold "Atlantic unity," the U.S. has to swallow European appeasement of Moscow, with the result that Europe has become the tail wagging the American dog. According to Krauss, though, Europeans need us more than we need them. He recommends that the U.S. withdraw from Nato and sever its defense commitment to Europe. Krauss denies proffering a "beggar-thy-neighbor" policy, since it would be therapeutic for these "silent allies" of Moscow to force them to pull together and stand on their own feet.

Reallocating our freed economic resources, acknowledges Krauss, would present "nontrivial adjustment problems" for the U.S.; on the European side, although a "purely economic analysis" yields no certain answer to how Europeans might respond, Krauss reasons that since defense is not sensitive to price, an increase in price will be unlikely to depress demand. Admittedly, a U.S. pullout from Europe means "a big step involving real risks." A demoralized Europe might stampede to Moscow for protection, but if so, "good riddance to a false ally," as Krauss puts it. Alternatively, the Soviets might attempt to exploit the situation militarily, but we can check this by phasing our withdrawal and selling the Europeans arms; at any rate, the Kremlin will probably refrain from aggression to avoid scaring Europe into a military build-up. What the Soviets most fear is a Europe, above all Germany, armed with nuclear weapons. Krauss believes that de Gaulle perceived how nuclear weapons were conducive to national well-being; the key to Europe's security lies in having German fingers on the button. Anticipating that some may regard his therapy as radical, Krauss likens a U.S. pullout to a cancer operation where the patient may die on the table, but will certainly expire if nothing is done.

Japan and Korea need similar medicine. Japan, which spends less than a third as much of its GDP on defense as Germany does, is an even guiltier free-loader. America's resource transfer for Japan's security abets Japanese welfarism, sapping Japan's economic vitality and the dynamism of the Pacific basin. Japan should either compensate the U.S. for its protection or, amending its "no war" constitution, contribute more to regional defense. Krauss argues that Japan should rescind the ban on nuclear weapons on its soil and prepare eventually to go nuclear. A U.S. pullout from Europe would shock Japan out of its minimal defense posture and compel its neighbors to accept a remilitarized Japan. Although Krauss repudiates President Carter's (aborted) troop withdrawal from South Korea (undertaken for human rights reasons), he does believe that a U.S. withdrawal is required to stiffen Korean resolve and military capability. South Korea does not need nuclear weapons as long as North Korea does not receive them from Moscow. Together Japan and Korea can carry the burden for containment in the Pacific. Krauss thinks no better proof for his policy's correctness exists than that all the "experts" oppose it.

After dismantling America's entire alliance system, Krauss would have us go it alone in the world, or at least within the Western hemisphere, under the aegis of a revived Monroe doctrine. But in Krauss's strategic vision, countering the Soviet threat in this hemisphere and in the Third World generally need not entail the use of American military power. Despite his unilateralist bluster, Krauss proposes to contain communism

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in the Third World through the spread of the free market, thereby giving poor nations a vested interest in capitalism. Above all else, underdeveloped countries need access to the U.S. market; consequently, the U.S. must discard protectionist policies that subvert its security interests. America should declare war on communism in Central America by establishing a U.S.-Caribbean Basin Common Market. The Soviets will lose hands down in market competition with the U.S. In selected cases such as El Salvador, the U.S. may need to supply limited military assistance, but we must never use U.S. ground troops in a foreign conflict. The "lesson of Vietnam" demonstrates that we must "help our friends help themselves" rather than " 'Americanize' their troubles." "Once capitalism spreads," Krauss predicts, "communism will contain itself."

A MEAN-SPIRITED and mischievous book, *How NATO Weakens the West* jettisons four decades of Western statecraft without offering a serious alternative. To begin with, since Krauss perpetuates the canard of European free-loading in Western defense, this issue demands some perspective. Krauss is simply wrong to say that during the 1970s Europe's contribution to Nato remained static. In fact, while U.S. defense spending declined 20 percent in real terms during that decade, European members of Nato, possessing a combined GDP 25 percent smaller than the U.S. GDP, increased their defense spending at an average rate of over 2 percent annually. By 1983 allied spending was 27 percent higher than in 1971. In a Nato-Warsaw Pact conflict, the European allies would contribute roughly 60 percent of Nato's total ground and tactical air combat power. Since 1975 the allies have increased their active military strength in Europe by 182,000, while the U.S. has augmented its presence by 32,000. Allied active forces number over 3 million with total mobilized forces, including reserves, standing at nearly 7 million. The U.S. has active forces of slightly over 2 million and a total mobilized strength of 3.5 million; unlike most of its allies, the U.S. does not pay the high political cost of maintaining conscription.

More salient than these statistics, however, is the point that estimating the "cost" of Nato to the U.S. is an illusory exercise because most of our forces can be used for non-Nato as well as Nato contingencies and because U.S. planning must proceed on the assumption that there could be multi-theater aggression by the Soviet Union and its surrogates. The U.S. force structure does not contain a Nato/non-Nato seam, and Krauss's $134 billion Nato price tag covers all forces that might be used for Nato, not only those stationed in Europe. As a result, we cannot reduce support for Nato forces without diminishing our overall defense capabilities. U.S. forces are designed to achieve our national security objectives, and even without our Nato commitment we would need to maintain many of our overseas forces and those in the U.S. designated for rapid reinforcement. All the scenarios for European withdrawal that provide for a rapid return of withdrawn forces to Europe in an emergency would increase our defense expenditures. The additional cost ranges from $3 to $19 billion, depending on the size of withdrawn forces and the procurement of extra sealift and airlift capacity, plus prepositioned supplies, for their quick return. The only options that reduce cost also decrease the U.S. force structure and preclude our timely reinforcement of Europe. In short, forward deployment of American forces in Europe offers the most cost-effective way of meeting our collective security requirements, and without our Nato allies we would face higher defense budgets than we presently do. But, then, Krauss is uninterested in returning to what he calls "the old continent" because he sees no need for collective security.

The reader will search this book in vain for any comprehension of how to work with democratic allies or of why we have allies at all. Finding it intolerable that the allies do not follow America's lead on every issue that arises, Krauss reacts by threatening to take

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his marbles and go home. His notion of the proper relation between America and its democratic allies mirrors the subordination of Soviet clients to Moscow: "The desirable unity is one in which weaker members align their policies with the strong."

Several specious arguments illustrate Krauss's misunderstanding of containment. Containment once worked, he grants, but our defense of Europe has undercut the European regionalism we tried to foster; therefore, the failure of regionalism refutes the efficacy of U.S. intervention. Further, recent European accommodation toward the Soviets provides "evidence" that the U.S. presence in Europe has "hurt, not helped, containment." Finally, Krauss calls for the U.S. to abandon Nato because "the present system of Western deterrence no longer is working." But our postwar intervention to stabilize a ravaged Europe vulnerable to Soviet aggression and subversion demonstrably succeeded; we wished also to promote regionalism, but that was never within our power to accomplish alone. Considering historic European nationalism, however, remarkable harmony and cooperation have been realized. What Krauss labels anti-Americanism is not "evidence" of containment's failure; rather, it simply reflects the reality of Europe's recovery and with that the loss of its deference to the U.S. Europe's often vexing independence testifies to containment's success in creating forty years of peace and prosperity in which people naturally, if regrettably, tend to forget the source of their well-being and in which a younger generation does not remember World War II and its aftermath. The claim that deterrence no longer works disregards the palpable fact that deterrence of Soviet aggression, the fundamental purpose of Nato, marks Nato's signal achievement. Nato's principal mission has been and remains successful, and from the beginning Nato partners have recognized that, beyond a common, overriding alliance objective, they have different, legitimate security interests. We do well to recall this when we disagree with our allies over subsidiary matters.

Krauss does not comprehend why the U.S. has alliances. America deploys armed forces in forward positions around the world in alliance with other nations not as an act of charity, but as an act of profound geopolitical self-interest, namely, to provide a tangible, credible deterrent to a Soviet bid for domination of Eurasia and other regions vital to the freedom and prosperity of America. America entered two world wars to prevent Eurasia from falling under the domination of a hostile power, and preserving the independence and territorial integrity of Western Europe ranks second in strategic importance only to the defense of the continental United States. Withdrawal from Europe and other critical areas would most likely lead to their Finlandization and to Soviet global hegemony. And the elementary datum is that we cannot contain Soviet expansion alone. As Eugene Rostow observes: "Like Great Britain over the centuries, we lack the population, the resources, and the geographical positions to do the job alone. For us, alliances with like-minded nations are a strategic necessity. Alliance diplomacy is sometimes tiresome, but the alternative is worse."

Krauss considers the apprehension that a U.S. withdrawal from Europe would decouple the alliance to be "little more than" a "theory." Although Moscow's primary objective since World War II has been to promote U.S.-European separation, not simply to expel American troops from the continent, a U.S. pullback would furnish the necessary, if not sufficient, condition for decoupling. Removal of U.S. forces from Nato, Krauss opines, would create pressure on the Soviets to disengage from Eastern Europe. He forgets that the Kremlin garrisons troops in Eastern Europe as much for internal control as for intimidation of the West, and the history of arms control negotiations teaches that the Soviets never seriously negotiate until confronted with resolute strength. If Krauss desires to reduce Soviet military forces in Europe, a unilateral U.S. withdrawal would utterly defeat that goal.

America need not turn its back on the Europeans altogether, Krauss suggests, be-

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cause we could still sell them weapons, and "we could even return to Europe if need be," though he concedes U.S. re-entry would be "unlikely." Meanwhile, he claims, the Soviets would not seize the opportunity to move militarily on the central front or one of its flanks. Why an economist, who holds that people respond rationally to material incentives, should believe this to be so Krauss neglects to explain—particularly since European rearmament would take a long time, and it would make no sense for the Soviets to wait until their prey was armed to the teeth. Not a scintilla of historical evidence supports the assumption that the Soviets would pass up a moment of weakness and disarray among their enemies to capture a major strategic prize. Krauss says the possibility that the U.S. could re-extend its nuclear umbrella to Europe would have a "deterrent value," but why should the U.S. risk its existence at that point when Krauss thinks it foolish to do so now? Extended deterrence works because the united political and military resolve of the allies creates unacceptable risks for the Soviet Union; Krauss's scheme would shatter that unity. Krauss concludes his case for abandoning Europe to its own devices with the bizarre proposal that because Turkey is a valuable and strong ally we should arrange a bilateral defense pact with Turkey.

KRAUSS'S FORMULA for U.S. global retreat contains exceedingly dangerous implications. Taking France as his model, he would repair a deteriorating military balance in the Pacific along with Asian and European free-loading by enlarging the nuclear club. Far from enhancing anyone's safety and security, this reckless ploy would make the world a much more explosive place (quite apart from vitiating our long-standing non-proliferation policy) as many more nations acquired the means of inflicting mass destruction themselves and of precipitating a nuclear strike by one or both of the superpowers.

For domestic political reasons Britain and France cannot possibly field an equivalent nuclear counterpart to the Soviet Union's, and a nuclear Germany and Japan simply will not soon come to pass. Even if this were politically possible, Europe could not develop a credible nuclear force for many years, and geography will always leave Europe and Japan vulnerable to devastation. During the interim Krauss's plan could well invite war. Does he really think the Soviets would sit by idly and wait to confront a nuclear-armed Germany and Japan? The possibilities for Soviet preventive action or for unforeseen catastrophe abound. What would happen if the Soviets launched a surgical strike against German and Japanese nuclear facilities or if West Berlin disappeared? What would happen if less cautious leaders came to office in the USSR or in Europe, if, for instance, a Hitlerian revanchist rose to power in Germany? Krauss's plan opens the way to major world instability and possibly even to war.

The author's analogy of a U.S. withdrawal from Europe to a cancer operation reveals a radical flaw in his analysis. His narrowly economic view of the world excludes a sense of any collective or common political good; like the fictitious "economic man" of marketplace theory, each nation rationally seeks its own immediate self-interest. Krauss's medical analogy fails because, unlike the individual patient, the statesman bears responsibility not just for himself but for the fellow citizens entrusted to his care, for posterity, and for the larger community to which he belongs. A prudent statesman cannot sacrifice a greater political good for the sake of an apparent, immediate advantage; he understands the necessity to start with given conditions and to preserve while improving them. Edmund Burke criticized theorists who ignore experience in their grand designs for mankind's happiness, for "in these gentlemen there is nothing of the tender parental solicitude which fears to cut up the infant for the sake of an experiment." Change should be gradual and cautious, Burke warned, especially when the "subject of our demolition and construction is not brick and timber, but sentient beings, by the sudden alteration of

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whose state, condition, and habits, multitudes may be rendered miserable."

The absence from Krauss's mind of a common political good explains why the meaning of the Western alliance eludes him. Because he does not understand what Nato defends, he views the U.S. commitment to European defense as an incentive to allied free-loading. Krauss scorns the "conventional wisdom" that America must underwrite the defense of Western Europe because the military imbalance favors the USSR, and he asserts that the U.S. can leave Nato yet still "help the Europeans defend *their* values" (emphasis added). On the contrary, these values are *ours* as well, and Krauss woefully misses the point that America has extended a commitment to Europe on behalf of a way of life, shared values, and a heritage that make us who we are and that alone make the sacrifice and risk worthwhile. America is in the same boat with its European allies because we are the custodians of a common trust—our Western civilization bearing the traditions of Athens and Rome and Jerusalem, which affirm the dignity and rights of man possessing a rational soul. A lucid sense of political meaning and purpose animated the architects of America's postwar foreign policy. When President Truman pledged the United States to the reconstruction and defense of Western Europe, he knew that American freedom could not survive alone in a world dominated by communist power and influence and that the fate of republican self-government based upon the natural rights of man was at stake. Our entire way of life, Truman told Congress, depended upon the survival of European liberal democracy and "the maintenance of a civilization of free men and free institutions."

These considerations do not intrude upon Melvyn Krauss's thinking. His frivolous solution for containing communism by spreading capitalism expresses the smug myopia of a materialist who thinks all the people of the world need and want are TVs, Big Macs, bluejeans, and rock music. How these accoutrements of commodious bourgeois living will halt communist bullets and tanks Krauss does not vouchsafe to tell us, nor does he explain how U.S. businessmen will obtain access to markets in an alien, hostile world. Krauss solves the problem of defense free-loading and of a defense burden altogether because he has no foreign policy.[2] In a 1975 speech sponsored by the AFL-CIO, his first address after being expelled from the Soviet Union in 1974, Alexander Solzhenitsyn implored Americans not to reject the role of world leadership thrust upon them by history. He condemned the cowardice and hedonism conveyed by the attitude, "Go ahead, give it up," which would desert our friends and allies around the world so that Americans could safely cultivate their own garden. Solzhenitsyn aptly described the spirit of today's neo-isolationists:

> Just let us live in peace and quiet. Just let us drive our big cars on our splendid highways; just let us play tennis and golf, in peace and quiet; just let us mix our cocktails in peace and quiet as we are

[2]To see the unholy congruence between left-wing and right-wing thinking about American security policy read Ronald V. Dellums, *Defense Sense: The Search for a Rational Military Policy* (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1983). The libertarian Earl Ravenal, an authority for Krauss, advances the new foreign policy recommended by his radical left co-critics. We must abandon the entire foreign policy of the last generation: scrap overseas alliances and all foreign intervention to hole up in America with a few missiles for last-ditch protection. After all, what would we need arms for without a foreign policy? This book shows how left-wing radicalism and right-wing libertarianism converge in a policy of isolation and appeasement out of a materialist understanding of the American regime. The left regards America as too evil for the world and would dedicate the regime to the material gratifications of the welfare state. Libertarians, unwilling to sacrifice the pursuit of private pleasure to afford a foreign policy, see America as simply a place to eat and sleep.

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accustomed to doing; just let us see the beautiful toothy smile with a glass in hand on every advertisement page of our magazines.

Krauss believes that America should ally itself with "great nations" and that to help our weakling allies "become great again" will require "creative statesmanship." If the West is to prevail, creative statesmanship will surely be required. This book offers a recipe for global chaos, as friend and enemy alike absorb its lesson that Americans should save their own skins and hunker down in "fortress America" to enjoy the life of material well-being. That this good life will not long last nor this fortress long stand should give readers pause.

American Soldiers in Europe: Hostages to Fortune

Angelo Codevilla

WHY would anyone with an I.Q. above room temperature suggest that under current circumstances most of the 330,000 American troops and the over $100 billion dollars a year that the U.S. government devotes to Europe would be more usefully employed otherwise? From most of the reviews that have greeted Melvyn Krauss's book, *How NATO Weakens the West*—which so suggests—no one could possibly understand the question. That is because the reviews do not allow the reader to suspect that there is a problem with the present trilateral alliance (United States-Europe-Japan) to which U.S. troop withdrawal might be a solution. The reviewers do not argue against Krauss's answer by sketching out their own answers. Instead, they treat Krauss as if he had committed sacrilege.

The problem with the alliance is, *tout court*, that whereas a generation ago it strengthened all its members against Soviet military aggression and political subversion, the alliance today is weakening its members both militarily and politically. Honest and intelligent men may disagree on the best course of action for decisively reversing this trend; but to shut one's eyes and repeat the mantra "Nato in 1948; Nato forever" is neither intelligent nor honest.

My purpose here is to show that the exorcists' chorus with which the American foreign policy establishment has greeted *How NATO Weakens the West* is one more symptom of the incompetence that is turning Nato, once the bulwark of the West, into a liability. I will begin by describing the military and political problems that, by all accounts, beset the alliance. Then I will try to explain why the reviewers would rather denigrate Krauss than confront reality.

The military situation is horrid. The Soviet Union's ability to put its forces on the Rhine and in the Belgian ports in a week or two, using only conventional weapons, is not simply a stray opinion that once somehow found its way into General Bernard Rogers's remarks. For years, U.S. and Nato staffs have tried to figure out how to beg, borrow, or steal

Angelo Codevilla is a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

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victory from a Warsaw Pact force that—along with the element of surprise, and the advantage of choosing the time and place of attack, as well as the advantage of concentrating its forces at the point of attack—enjoys a three-to-one edge in tanks, a five-to-one edge in infantry fighting vehicles, a five-to-one edge in artillery, better than parity in attack aircraft, a monopoly on automated tactical fire control, a one-and-a-half to one edge in manpower, a huge edge in chemical weapons, and a virtual monopoly in 50- to 500-mile range ballistic missiles. Year after year, this unhappy prospect has elicited the gimmick *du jour*. Lately, "Assault Breaker" (clusters of precision-guided munitions delivered just above tank formations), and "deep strikes on follow-on-forces," and the "air-land doctrine" have served as excuses (the last one, quite explicitly) not to face head-on the fact that American and European governments do not *want* to propose to their peoples the kinds of forces and strategies that would give allied forces a measurable chance of victory.

Once upon a time this did not matter, because the Soviets knew (we did not have to threaten) that if they started a war, we would use nuclear weapons to turn the outcome in our favor. But then, beginning some fifteen years ago, the Soviets acquired enough accurate nuclear forces so that we know (they do not have to threaten) that the outcome would be worse for us and better for them in a nuclear conflict than in a conventional one.

Today, the Soviet military plan is as obvious as the Schlieffen plan was in great-grandfather's day. Soviet ballistic missiles would destroy or contaminate all of Nato's C^3 targets, airfields, nuclear weapons storage sites, major supply dumps, and parked concentrations of armor. The Soviets have no wish to stage a mega-battle of Kursk in the suburban thicket that is now north-central Europe. That would be bloody, destructive, and slow. Rather, the Soviets see conventional armored forces as a means of securing a victory already largely predetermined by initial strikes. Today, ballistic missile accuracy is such that in most cases missiles can perform their initial decapitating mission by carrying conventional or chemical munitions. Hence, modern missile war in Europe would not be as destructive as previous wars. Moreover, the Soviets have the option of carrying out some of their precursor strikes not with missiles, but with *spetznaz* troops. We are as unprepared to deal with them as we are to defend against Soviet missiles. And what if the Soviets were to use nuclear weapons in their precursor attacks? The surgical decapitation of Nato would be doubly sure. In that case, who would recommend that the U.S. "nuke" Moscow? Given the transcontinental military balance, I know of no American or European who would do so.

U.S. troops in Europe, then, are not—and are not about to become—part of a coalition of forces that stands a reasonable chance of victory, or even of defending itself. Are they then a "trip wire," threatening to bring on American nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union? Emphatically, no! Under current conditions, although many can conceive how Soviet preemptive strikes could lead to Soviet victory, no one can conceive how any kind of American strikes against the Soviet Union would make any sense whatever. Therefore, the destruction of U.S. forces in Europe would break many hearts, but trip no wires.

By all accounts, then, American troops in Europe serve only the political function of holding the alliance together. But before we examine this political usefulness, let us consider for a moment what would happen to those 330,000 uniformed Americans and to their one million American dependents in case of war. These human beings would become either corpses or prisoners, whom the Soviets (as is their custom) would use for hard labor and as bargaining chips.

In peacetime, however, the lexicon of contemporary statesmanship tells us that American troops in Germany are "coupling devices" that reassure Europe and help to keep the alliance together. But surely we do no favor to Europe to reassure it of a military protection we know we cannot deliver. The Europeans of course know that we cannot deliver. Yet the very presence of American troops recalls a time

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when their presence meant safety, and makes it possible for Europeans to avoid fully facing up to the fact that times have changed.

EUROPEANS are pursuing what one might call a diversified approach to security: keeping enough forces to convince the Soviets that an attack would not be cost-free, yet pointedly refusing to build forces that might threaten the Soviet Union's superiority. This proves to the Soviet Union that it can have many of the economic and political benefits of conquest without having to go through the bloody business. Indeed, many Europeans are also eager to give the Soviet Union one benefit that it could *not* gain through military conquest and that it insistently demands: indirect influence on the affairs of the United States.

Such influence is very valuable to Moscow. No one can read the literature that passes between Moscow and its European friends without getting the message that the number one Soviet objective in Europe is to convince Europeans to use their influence to shape U.S. policy. Without doubt, since the late 1960s "the Europeans" have been the foremost lobby working to convince the U.S. not to defend itself seriously. In recent years, whenever Americans have debated whether or not to build neutron bombs, whether to rely on missiles or treaties, whether to oppose Soviet conquest of some corner of the world, or whether to build anti-missile defenses, "the Europeans" have weighed into our political process with this message: If you do this thing that you naively believe will add to your strength and security, you will "lose" us.

No one who reads communist literature can fail to notice that the Soviet Union's main message to its followers in Europe is *not* to "decouple" the U.S. from Europe, but to use that coupling to Soviet advantage. Since Nato's importance to the U.S. has long been axiomatic, the U.S. government, for Nato's sake, has again and again weakened itself militarily, pulled its punches in the Nicaraguas of this world, and worst of all, confused its own policymaking.

Finally, it is essential to note that the "Europe" that thus influences U.S. national security policy is actually only one of many political tendencies on the old continent, but that the American foreign policy establishment, most of whose leaders are largely sympathetic to that tendency, packages this one tendency as "Europe" in order to enlist "Europe" in its own domestic struggle to retain control of U.S. policy. Thus, for example, during the first two years of the Reagan administration, Lawrence Eagleburger and Richard Burt succeeded in shaping much of U.S. national security policy their way by appealing to the "need" to keep Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in power by appeasing the left wing of his Social Democratic party, and by equating this enterprise with "maintaining good relations with the Europeans."

Nowadays when Secretary of State George Shultz uses "Europe" to convince a sleepy president that he should not allow the building of American anti-missile devices, he carries notes from Gemany's Genscher and Britain's Carrington. But Shultz neglects to mention that the biggest party in Europe's most important country, the French Gaullists, favor anti-missile defenses, as does Italy's Minister of Defense Spadolini, and, for that matter, Germany's Minister of Defense Manfred Woerner. The establishment's "wing" in the news media reinforces this caricature of a "Europe" that demands American weakness. Month after month and year after year, for all practical purposes, for the American people "Europe" means Hans Dietrich Genscher telling us how unsophisticated some of us are in our excessive concern with the Soviet Union. This weakens pro-defense forces in the U.S. In turn, when the U.S. establishment courts the Genschers of Europe it legitimizes them by telling Europeans that we Americans agree that the Genschers' approach to security matters is just fine. Any Europeans who think their countries should do more than the Genschers say they should now have to argue against the U.S. as well.

Thus it is that, through the alliance connection, dominated by peculiarly likeminded

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people on both sides of the Atlantic, the polities of the U.S. and Europe are becoming less and less willing to support realistic military preparations and more and more willing to slide into joint appeasement, sedated by the false security of unserious military arrangements.

Melvyn Krauss, like others before him, thinks that we are better off without this kind of relationship. De Gaulle saw early on that the mechanisms of the alliance were working against the purposes for which the alliance had been established; he pulled his country out of most of those mechanisms and out of the illusions they foster. "*Ce n'est pas sérieux*" he said of the Nato military structure. He then set about giving his country a serious military force. Today, in the military realm, France outclasses the rest of the free world except the U.S., and American politicians could take lessons from the French on the management of national security affairs. De Gaulle did not want to scrap France's alliance with the U.S. Neither does Krauss. Yet today, as in 1965, we read incompetent remarks to the effect that ditching the forms of the alliance is a "retreat from the struggle over the world balance of power." The critics simply confuse the forms with the purpose that ought to animate them. The question for Krauss and other responsible persons is how to struggle *effectively* over the world balance of power.

John Coffey charges Krauss with "dismantling America's entire alliance system" and with seeing "no need for collective security." But Coffey simply does not evaluate the present system's ability to fulfill the goals of the alliance, including "collective security." Krauss and others do see the need for collective security, and hence argue that if our European and Japanese allies were put on notice that they would bear the primary and final responsibility for their own safety, they would be better able to help themselves and more disposed to help us. Without the psychological and financial burdens of present arrangements, we too would be better able to take care of ourselves and also to help our allies in time of real need. This argument may be mistaken, but it deserves serious examination rather than caricaturing. Moreover, in order to attack this argument one would have to show that what we have today is really an alliance that produces "collective security." Yes, Nato's present arrangements were once useful. But the prudent question is "What have these arrangements done for us lately, and what are they likely to do for us in the future?"

IT IS SAD to read reviews by officials of the U.S. Department of Defense affirming the rightness of keeping American troops in Europe because these officials are the very people who, over the years, have abdicated their responsibility to provide our troops in Europe with the means to protect themselves. They could at least insist that if American troops are to remain in Europe they must be provided, first, with an anti-missile defense, and second, with everything else that they would need in order to stand a reasonable chance of winning. Instead, Coffey, like others similarly placed, is content to leave in Europe a force that is not a "credible deterrent," but rather, a set of hostages.

Coffey complains that Krauss and others find it "intolerable that the allies do not follow America's lead on every issue that arises," and that in fact the Europeans work against us only on "subsidiary matters." Once again, it is vital to point out that Krauss, and others who think as he does, are not talking about all, or even a majority of, Europeans, but rather about the American establishment's favorite Europeans. These, however, do not disagree with us, as Coffey claims, about "subsidiary matters" only, but rather about the most important questions before us. Should the free world do what it can to protect itself against Soviet missiles? The Genschers of Europe say "no." Who should win the war in Central America? The Genschers of Europe are pulling for the Sandinistas. Should we entrust our security to arms control despite the past generation's experiences? The Genschers of Europe are pushing us to say "yes." Should there be a net transfer of resources and technology into the Soviet empire? Again, the Genschers of Europe are involving an American establish-

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ment that is willing to be involved, in the answer "yes."

Coffey charges that "Krauss does not understand why the U.S. has alliances." But it is Coffey and Krauss's other critics who have forgotten why. Alliances are meant to strengthen their members for the achievement of certain purposes. Now, today's Nato mechanism is weakening us militarily and, worst of all, is fostering the prominence of people in Europe who seem not to share our purposes with regard to the most important questions. Why, then, is Coffey so enamored of that mechanism?

What would happen if the U.S. delivered to Germany and other European countries a timetable of, say, five years for reducing the American military presence on the old continent to the level needed for liaison? No one can know. Krauss is betting that the Europeans would be braced by the responsibility that would be thrust upon them, and, grappling with hard choices, would make good ones in good time. This would mean that the Genschers and La Fontaines of Europe—and all they stand for—would become less prominent, while the Chiracs, Woerners, and Spadolinis—and all they stand for—would become more prominent. Krauss is betting that the gradual decrease of American troop strength would be more than made up for by an increase in European strength. No one argues that this would be comfortable. Who in Europe wants to see the Bundeswehr armed with nuclear weapons? Precisely nobody. But if the choice were between a nuclear Bundeswehr and the immediate prospect of becoming—at best—Soviet tributaries, Europeans may well be reasonable enough to forget World War II for the sake of avoiding World War III. Coffey tells us that "for domestic political reasons, Britain and France cannot possibly field an equivalent nuclear counterpart to the Soviet Union's." An American troop drawdown would surely change those domestic political conditions. No one can be sure how.

But would not the absence of U.S. troops encourage the Soviet Union to try disarming nuclear strikes against European nuclear forces? Surely the danger of such Soviet strikes is real—not just for Europe, but for the U.S. as well. To prevent such Soviet strikes, both Europe and the U.S. need anti-missile defenses. The best argument that anyone could make for retaining today's Nato arrangements would be that these arrangements are helping both us and the Europeans to acquire such anti-missile defenses as quickly as possible. Alas, the opposite is true. Today's Nato is the biggest obstacle in the way of Americans—and Europeans—receiving the anti-missile protection that technology can deliver, and which the Soviet Union is beginning to provide for its own people.

Perhaps an American announcement of a timetable for converting our relationship with all our allies into the sort of relationship we now have with France would scare European politicians into the arms of Moscow, and European electorates would let this happen. If Europeans were so lacking in attachment to their own civilization as to sell themselves out, simply imagine what they would do, were U.S. troops still in their midst, if the Soviets were about to win. What would prevent such people from ingratiating themselves with their Soviet suzerains by selling them their American defenders? Krauss, and many others, think better of the Europeans than that. But all should agree that it is more prudent to put the Europeans to the test under benign circumstances rather than to put off the day of reckoning until the middle of a rout.

The silliest part of Coffey's attack is his attempt to give the impression that "our Western civilization bearing the traditions of Athens and Rome and Jerusalem" somehow argues for a Nato military command resigned to defeat, and for alliance politics the common denominator of which is Hans Dietrich Genscher. Such an attack shows a mind untrained by Athens, a heart unsteadied by Rome, and the sort of faith that comes not from Jerusalem, but from too many good meals at Nato conferences.

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Canada—the Empty Giant

Daniel Casse

THOSE FEW who care to study Canada today are certain to see a nation of paradoxes: an enormous geographic area that remains largely unpopulated; a resource-rich country with a modern economy that suffers from slow growth, lagging productivity, and an enormous deficit; and a nation that, despite its proximity to and friendship with the United States, remains, in its own peculiar way, among the most anti-American countries in the West.

Canadians would like to believe that Americans are endlessly perplexed by these paradoxes. They are not. Canada is simply a victim of American benign neglect, and that, in a phrase, is the heart of the Canadian dilemma: On the one hand it yearns to be recognized by the United States and on the other fears being absorbed by it. When *The New Republic* challenged its readers to find a more boring headline than "Worthwhile Canadian Initiative," Canada was hit in its weakest spot. Although there was some grumbling on Canadian editorial pages about unappreciative Americans, it was accompanied by the reluctant recognition of the truth: Canada has failed to make an impression on the world.

Daniel Casse is managing editor of *The Public Interest*.

Canada's decline into international obscurity seems especially remarkable given its enormous potential only forty years ago to become a great nation. After World War II, a war in which Canadians had fought heroically since 1939, Canada was the third largest naval power on the globe and a distinguished member of the alliance. At home there was every reason to expect bright days ahead. The country had a huge surplus of food and industrial goods, the domestic economy was expanding, and immigrants began to pour into the country as they had into the United States before the war. Canada seemed destined to become a North American Switzerland, a snow-covered, bicultural, sophisticated, productive, modern nation-state. Yet Canadian leaders at the time seemed to borrow more from Swiss politics than from Swiss social and economic examples. In searching for a role in the world, they declared Canada a "middle power" and proceeded to seek out any opportunity to place the country firmly in the middle.

The chance arrived with the formation of the United Nations, which Canada joined as a founding member in addition to becoming active in a host of international organizations. Then-prime minister Mackenzie King—a kind of Canadian FDR—had become a devotee of collective security and encouraged

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what he thought was Canada's natural role as peacekeeper. His minister for external affairs, Lester B. Pearson, was an eloquent spokesman for the "middle power theory," and the 1956 Suez crisis gave him a chance to put theory into practice. Rather than side with its mother nations, England and France, in their attempt to secure the Suez Canal zone, Canada took an independent stance. Pearson proposed sending a UN peacekeeping force into the region, to be followed by the withdrawal of French, British, and Israeli forces. His plan earned him the Nobel Peace Prize and the adoration of the Canadian public for making Canada a player on the international stage. Seven years later he was elected prime minister.

While Pearson's role in shaping Canadian foreign policy was largely overshadowed by the flair and charisma of his successor, Pierre Eliot Trudeau, his views on "middle power diplomacy" and "peacekeeping" remain the bedrock of today's Ministry of External Affairs. Despite the declining popularity of this liberal internationalist view of foreign affairs, Canada insists on seeing itself as a member of the "international community." In the introduction to a recent foreign policy discussion paper, for example, we read that Canada considers itself a North American nation, a Commonwealth nation, an Atlantic nation, a Pacific nation, part of La Francophonie, and an Arctic nation. While technically correct, so complex a self-description seems intended not to define but to obscure Canada's more obvious status: neighbor and principal ally of the United States. Yet so singular a truth is rarely mentioned in Canadian foreign policy circles. Here, for example, is the External Affairs view of Canada's international role as stated in the same discussion paper: "It is clear that it is in our security interests to play an active role *between* East and West and . . . to work for stability in the Third World" (emphasis added).

Remaining *between* East and West must mean, of course, distancing oneself from the goals of the West, which, one supposes, is where Canada's security interests would lie. But in the name of an "independent course," Canada frequently acts in a way that seems altogether contrary to Western interests. For example, Canada's contribution to Nato, when measured as a percentage of GNP, is lower than that of any other member nation. As Edward Luttwak has remarked, in its relationship to the Nato alliance, Canada is not an equal partner, only a "free rider." Even Canada's commitment to its own defense has deteriorated. In 1964, members of the Canadian Armed Forces numbered 124,000; today that number has shrunk to less than 85,000. Their amount of equipment, too, has dwindled, and what remains is often obsolete and in poor repair. The entire Canadian navy, for instance, consists of twenty frigates, four destroyers, and three 1950s submarines. As for the air force, it has undergone a rapid decline since the early 1970s, reducing the number of fighter/interceptor planes from 355 in 1971 to 210 in 1985. Although the recent purchase of modern CF-18 Hornet fighters has upgraded the air force somewhat, their numbers still do not provide an adequate air defense for a nation with 44,000 miles of coastline. Moreover, Canada lacks the necessary surveillance equipment to guard its northern territory—some nine million square miles. Experts have recommended the purchase of at least four AWACS-style surveillance aircraft to properly maintain this region, but small Canadian defense budgets have so far made such a purchase unthinkable.

In remarkable contrast to this poor record on defense matters was Canada's announcement, in May of this year, that it intended to purchase ten nuclear powered submarines at a cost of nearly five billion dollars, and deploy them in its Arctic waters. Yet to judge from Canadian officials' own statements, strategic concerns were not the primary reason for this relatively extravagant purchase. As the Minister of External Affairs, Joe Clark, explained, acquiring nuclear submarines is "one pure sovereignty issue of truly major proportions." What Clark was referring to is an old dispute with the U.S.

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over the Northwest passage, a strait in Canada's Arctic north in which Soviet subs capable of launching nuclear missiles routinely cruise unmolested.

The United States does not recognize Canada's claim to sovereignty over the strait, and insists that its ships be given unlimited access to what it regards as international waters. In fact, in 1985, a U.S. icebreaker did enter the strait without informing the Canadian coastguard. But to its surprise, the ship encountered neither interference nor protest, suggesting that the Northwest passage was indeed safe for navigation—by U.S. and Soviet vessels alike. However embarrassing the incident proved to Canadian officials, it now, apparently, serves the interests of the Ministry of Defence, which can avoid a genuine defense program in coordination with its allies by focusing instead on the alleged threats to Canadian sovereignty by American icebreakers. (Ironically, Canadian peace groups have opposed the purchase of the submarines precisely because they believe this draws Canada closer to U.S. naval strategy!)

This somewhat spurious commitment to sovereignty is reflected—at least in word, if not in deed—in the support given to the claims of sovereignty and territorial integrity so often invoked at the United Nations, by Canada's ambassador to the UN, Stephen Lewis, who describes himself as "a lifetime socialist." He has been an ardent defender of the organization and a vicious critic of its detractors. So while Britain and the U.S. have both recognized the futility of remaining in Unesco, Canada insists that it can "reform Unesco from within." Ottawa's foreign-policy establishment, for its part, still plays with the long-forgotten concept of a "North-South dialogue," as Canadian academics and many politicians urge the government actively to support the interests of the Third World. In the face of such pressures, Ottawa accepted Nicaragua's request to open a trade office in Toronto.

These positions, many Canadians argue, reflect the maturity of an independent Canada that refuses to toe the U.S. line on every issue. Yet it can be equally argued that these policies have nothing to do with "independence," but are rather part of an elaborate attempt to create a "middle power" role and identity for Canada that simply does not exist.

CANADA'S desperate need to define and assure itself of an identifiable national character seems an unusual pursuit for a modern state. Australia and New Zealand, which like Canada are both former British colonies, have managed to assert self-confident foreign policies and distinct national identities. The obvious difference is Canada's proximity to the U.S.: the famous "world's longest undefended border" that has become, for Canada, the world's longest source of national inferiority. The border, undefended or not, however, has not been enough to create a sense of security among Canadians. Since Confederation in 1867, and for many years before that, there has existed north of the forty-ninth parallel, a defiant anti-Americanism that has rightly been described as *the* defining Canadian characteristic. Many of Canada's early settlers were loyalists who fled north at the time of the American Revolution and were, thus, naturally anti-American. Yet even those who had no particular quarrel with the revolution to the south still suspected that Manifest Destiny would lead Americans northward at the first opportunity. (Fearing such a move, Colonel J. Sutherland Brown proposed that Canada launch a pre-emptive strike against the U.S. in 1939.) That same suspicion, albeit in a milder form, remains part of the Canadian worldview today. The flipside of that kind of suspicion, however, is envy—although rare is the Canadian who would admit it. Yet when the U.S. State Department announced a lottery for 10,000 permanent resident visas open to citizens of thirty-six countries, nearly 80,000 Canadians applied in the first week. Despite the sentiments of these Canadians, federal government policy on all issues is still driven by an ingrained anti-Americanism. The govern-

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ment has fashioned an endless number of regulations—such as "Canadian content" laws for broadcasters and various costly protectionist economic policies, including the establishment of a state-owned petroleum company—whose sole purpose is the creation of an expressly non-American environment.

Few people raise the point that if a fiercely nationalist identity can only be achieved through rules and regulation, it is probably not an identity Canadians wanted very much in the first place. Peter Brimelow, a British writer at *Forbes* magazine who spent many years in Canada, dares to make this argument and thereby places his book, *The Patriot Game*,[1] well outside the bounds of virtually all Canadian political discourse. For this reason alone, it is probably the most provocative and original attempt to make sense of Canadian political culture ever published. The model for his study is Goldwin Smith's 1891 work, *Canada and the Canadian Question*, a book that one Canadian historian described as "the most completely pessimistic book" ever written about Canada. Clearly, Brimelow wishes to challenge that title. He begins by suggesting that Canada isn't a very stable nation—in fact, isn't really a nation at all but, rather, a geographical entity that has found itself sitting atop the United States. He further contends that Canadian politics since the 1970s under Pierre Trudeau has been fueled by four "isms"—nationalism, bilingualism, socialism, and centralism. In pursuit of these directives, Brimelow argues, Trudeau left the economy in ruin and left the citizens with no better sense of national identity than before. Even today, under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservative government, the four tenets of Trudeau's vision survive. Their strength, argues Brimelow, stems from the questionable but widely-accepted premise on which they are based; namely, that Canada is a single, unified country whose citizens share a common sense of patriotism. Brimelow attacks this idea in a way that no Canadian politician ever would—at least if he had any hope of re-election. Canadian nationalism, he insists, is a creation of the Liberal party of Pierre Trudeau and his predecessors; a grand myth created by a New Class of bureaucrats who have succeeded in making Canadians believe that after more than a century beneath the yoke of British imperialism, an independent, unified and "officially bilingual" Canada emerged in 1982 under a new Charter of Rights and Freedoms written by the Liberal party mandarins.

Brimelow takes issue with this revisionist view of Canada. Most Canadians have forgotten that John A. Macdonald, Canada's first prime minister, initially proposed that the new nation be called "the Kingdom of Canada," but in deference to anti-imperialist sentiments south of the border he accepted the less provocative "Dominion of Canada." Today, any reference to the word "Dominion" has been removed from all government communication, and official documents are stamped with the more Orwellian "Government of Canada/Gouvernement du Canada." But such cosmetic changes cannot alter the fact that the country remains a package of diverse regions—the West, the Prairies, Ontario, Quebec, and the Maritimes—whose residents give little thought to one another and, hence, share no national purpose.

As for bilingualism, the bugaboo of every Ottawa bureaucrat, it is fair to say that outside of Quebec and a few scattered francophone communities, French is a foreign language in Canada. The cruel fate of bilingualism is that while it was attempting to unite a country, Quebec nationalists were busy planning to break it apart. Although the separatist Parti Quebecois has since been defeated in Quebec, the very existence of a French-Canadian separatist movement demonstrates—just as a burgeoning Western separatist movement confirms—that there are cracks in the wall of Canadian national unity that are beyond government repair.

Over the past two decades, perhaps only three events have united Canadians in a spirit

[1]Peter Brimelow, *The Patriot Game* (Toronto: Key Porter Books, $24.95).

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of pride and genuine patriotism: the 1968 election of Pierre Trudeau; Team Canada's defeat of the Soviet national hockey team in 1972; and the success of Ken Taylor, Canada's ambassador to Iran, in smuggling six Americans out of Tehran in 1979. But Trudeau left office a despised politician; the Russians have since proved themselves to be equal, if not superior, in hockey; and Ken Taylor has taken up permanent residence in Manhattan.

Canada's days in the international spotlight, it seems, have passed, and Canadians are seeking a way to restore a sense of national pride. After two decades of failed experiments in promoting a national culture that would impress the world, politicians and citizens are today turning their attention to the battered economy. Every Canadian anxiously hopes for the day when his $0.79 (U.S.) dollar will once again be worth $1.05, as it was ten years ago. Many observers say that free trade is the only path Canada can follow. Although talk about free trade with the U.S. has been around since Confederation, Canada has usually backed down, preferring to protect its small-scale economy from the American industrial giant. Still, Canada and the U.S. are one another's largest trading partners, exchanging some $200 billion of goods every year, and for the current round of negotiations, Canada has come to the trade table with a different attitude. After his election, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney announced that Canada was open for business again and welcomed American investors. A special Royal Commission was established that, after two years of research, surveys, and forecasts, concluded that Canada's only chance of regaining its lost economic strength was through a free trade policy with the United States. But large sectors of the Canadian public were unconvinced. In fact, so much opposition to free trade was voiced, especially from Ontario, the manufacturing center of the country, that soon one no longer heard about "free trade" but only "freer trade" or "trade enhancement." Such economic-policy euphemism serves not only to give warning about the many qualifications the government intends to amend to any trade agreement—such as protecting "cultural" items—but also to make clear Canada's ambivalence about forging an open, close, and cooperative relationship with the United States.

One need only look at recent Canadian strategy in dealing with the U.S. to understand the consequences of this ambivalence. Despite Prime Minister Mulroney's insistence on maintaining "superb relations," Canada has sought to make an issue of any differences between the two countries by "standing up" to the Americans. Thus acid rain, fishing limits, and exports of softwood lumber, hardly central issues, have become the thrust of the Canadian agenda in Washington. However important these issues may be, one cannot escape the conclusion that Canada sought these peripheral policy matters precisely because they offer the opportunity to disagree publicly with the United States. And the Canadian media does their best to foster an image of a United States always at odds with Canada. A vivid example of this tendency occurred in April of this year after President Reagan met with Prime Minister Mulroney in Ottawa. As Reagan left the summit, which was marked by a friendliness and intimacy unknown in most head-of-state visits, the *Globe & Mail*, Canada's national newspaper, ran a banner headline that screamed: "Big disputes unresolved as Reagan goes home." Ironically enough, it seems that the most frightening aspect of a free trade pact, in the eyes of some Canadians, is that the U.S. might actually agree to it.

PETER BRIMELOW understands the Canadian desire to distance itself from the United States as another feeble attempt to deny historical reality. The destiny of English Canada, he writes, is to "assert its North American identity." These words will surely strike Canadian readers as smacking of fifty-first state-ism; Brimelow, they'll say, is a modern-day advocate of Man-

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ifest Destiny, stating in public what most Americans believe in private.

To be sure, Brimelow's enthusiastic forecasts of the dissolution of the Canadian confederation are premature. While his analysis of the contradictions in Canadian cultural policy are as perceptive as any written, he brushes aside too hastily the character of individual Canadians that accounts for so much of the country's political parochialism.

The earliest settlers in the U.S. came seeking religious freedom and, later, wealth. By contrast, early nineteenth-century immigrants to Canada had to be lured from Europe by offers of enormous packages of Crown land. Thus began a tradition of dependence on government that remains entrenched in the Canadian way of life. There were few ideological seekers of liberty, either economic or religious, during the colonization of British North America and so it remains today. As S.M. Lipset has pointed out in two studies written in 1965 and 1985 on the differences between Canada and the U.S., the sensitivity towards violation of civil liberties and property rights one finds in the U.S. simply does not exist in Canada. Rather, the Canadian tradition is one of law, order, and social harmony. Lipset provides one rich example: While the opening of the American West was left to lawless explorers, fortune-seekers, and assorted "rugged individuals," the Canadian Northwest was secured by the Mounted Police, who made sure that order was established before settlers arrived.

These historic differences have created a more restrained social and political culture for Canada. A few statistics, reported by Lipset, are perhaps the most vivid illustration of the nature of Canadian society. Canadians are much less likely to commit violent crime than Americans; the murder rate in 1981 was nearly fifty times higher in the U.S. than it was in Canada. A similar degree of restraint can be seen in politics: Between 1968 and 1977, there were 1,005 protest demonstrations in the U.S., while in Canada there were only three. And when asked whether government should guarantee everyone at least $3,000 per year whether he works or not, 36 percent of Canadians agreed, while only 14 percent of Americans did.

These statistics only confirm what is readily observable to any American who spends time in Canada, whether it be in Toronto, Quebec City, or Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan. Despite the enormous influx of European and Asian immigrants over the past forty years—a trend that has transformed sleepy Anglo-Saxon towns into teeming, genuinely cosmopolitan cities—Canada remains an unusually peaceful society where deference to authority and racial tolerance are the order of the day.

If Brimelow doesn't recognize that this social character is central to Canadian politics, he at least acknowledges that the quiet, restrained way of life doesn't make for the kind of high-brow culture Canadian policymakers strive to create. If future ministers of culture insist on designing a Canadian identity based on some quasi-European model, he argues, the country risks its most valuable asset:

> The supreme artifact of societies like Switzerland and Canada is civilization itself: safe cities, clean streets ("antiseptic" or not), the implicit honesty that makes possible efficiency, the high degree of freedom. This humble combination is exceedingly rare in human history. New Yorkers appear to be losing the knack. Yet it is prerequisite of progress. Leonardo comes later.

Brimelow believes, however, that the internal rifts within Canada, exacerbated by a policy of forced unification, must inevitably lead to greater demands for regional independence, especially from Quebec. But he forgets that Canada is a country not given to social or political upheavals. The kind of sectional division he anticipates would have to defy the acute attachment of both citizens and government to the status quo. Sectional division will remain and Canada will likely never achieve the degree of national unity found in the United States no matter how much Ottawa does to foster it.

"Canada," writes Brimelow paraphrasing the Canadian Marshall McLuhan, "is a national village. And it has the failings of a village:

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insularity, parochialism, complacency, lack of sophistication." The description is accurate, a result of years of cultural, economic, and foreign policies geared only to achieve a pseudo-independence from the United States. To reverse this trend, to give Canada the sophistication and self-confidence that any modern state with its resources should have, is the real challenge for Canadian government. If Canadians insist on believing that their unique geographical location makes it necessary to fight creeping Americanism, they should cast their eyes outside their own borders to discover that the whole world is succumbing to American culture, American styles, American business. Canada's proximity to the United States no longer makes it a special case and, thus, is no longer an excuse for a protectionist mentality. The question remains whether Canada can exploit and profit from its special relationship with the U.S. or whether it will remain protective, isolated, and, invariably, left behind.

The *Economist* noted last year that Canada's two largest creators of new jobs, McDonald's and Northern Telecom, were producers of hamburgers and microchips—a sure sign that Canada is in step with the twentieth century. But the twentieth century, according to the early Canadian prime minister Wilfred Laurier, was supposed to *belong* to Canada. The prophecy remains unfulfilled because Canadians have not yet decided if they want their government to stay in the "culture business" or to return to the more mundane tasks of managing a national economy. But many of them are waking up to the fact that if they wish to maintain the quality of life to which they are accustomed, Canada must become a productive, aggressive, and competitive economic force that can use the U.S. as its route to the world. Un-Canadian perhaps, but that is the price of being a prosperous, industrious, and free nation.

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Culture & Development

Joshua Muravchik

AN UNDERLYING THEME of the debates about U.S. policy toward Central America—and indeed toward Latin America as a whole—is the theme of American guilt. Many Latin Americans argue that the agonies and privations of Central America are attributable in large part to past or present transgressions by the United States, and many Americans acquiesce in these charges. The fact that the United States furnished foreign aid to Nicaragua during the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza Debayle and his predecessors is offered, for example, as proof of U.S. culpability for Nicaragua's misgovernment.

Even those who do not blame the United States explicitly for Latin America's sufferings often assume implicitly that America's own blessings are merely the fruits of good fortune, and hence something to feel guilty about. If the United States is not the active cause of Latin America's miseries, it can still be seen as the passive cause by virtue of its indifference. As Lawrence E. Harrison, for two decades a Latin American specialist for the U.S. Agency for International Development, puts it: "Like many young people who worked for AID in the early years of the Alliance for Progress . . . I was convinced that Latin America was in trouble principally because of U.S. neglect."[1]

The same compassionate concern for Latin America that led Harrison to a career at AID led Jeffrey W. Barrett to enlist in the Peace Corps, where he worked as a community development specialist in Lima, Peru.[2] The same frustration—one might even say disillusionment—has now led each to write a book based upon his experience. Both conclude that the blame for Latin America's problems lies not in the United States but in Latin America itself. And both conclude that the problem is rooted not in this or that political or economic structure, but in the very culture of Latin society.

Harrison's essay aims mainly to prove the point that culture is the essential determinant of development. His method is to offer a series of comparisons. First he compares Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Nicaragua's political history has alternated between sanguinary internecine strife and brutal dictatorship,

Joshua Muravchik is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.

[1] Lawrence E. Harrison, *Underdevelopment is a State of Mind: The Latin American Case* (The Center for International Affairs, Harvard University and University Press of America, $16.95).

[2] Jeffrey W. Barrett, *Impulse to Revolution in Latin America* (Praeger, $39.95).

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while Costa Rica has developed Latin America's stablest democratic institutions. Costa Rica's per capita GNP is two-and-one-half times that of Nicaragua, according to statistics adduced by Harrison, and its citizens enjoy a life expectancy of 70 years compared to Nicaragua's 56. And yet, says Harrison, natural endowment favors Nicaragua, which has almost three times the space of Costa Rica to accommodate a population of roughly equal size. Moreover, Nicaragua has a large advantage in arable land and mineral resources.

What accounts for the difference, says Harrison, are "the differences between the ways that Nicaraguans and Costa Ricans see themselves, their compatriots, and the world. We are talking about two very different cultures." But weren't both settled by the same conquerors at the same time, and didn't both achieve independence at the same time? Indeed, weren't they for some years part of the same country (the United Provinces of Central America, 1824–1838)?

Yes, agrees Harrison, although with the caveat that the Spanish settlers of the two countries may not have been the same: he cites fragmentary evidence that many Costa Rican settlers may have been Marranos, Spanish Jews who had been forcibly converted to Catholicism. But the big difference, he argues, was, ironically, Costa Rica's natural poverty. The conquistadors attracted to Nicaragua constituted a parasitic class living off the labor of subjugated Indians. But Costa Rica, with little gold, poor soil, and few Indians, attracted a different breed. "Colonists were by self-selection different from the conquistadors: they had to work the land themselves if they were to survive." The elite that evolved from these origins was more productive and more amenable to an ethos of civic equality, hence better equipped to lead their country toward prosperity and democracy.

HARRISON next compares the Dominican Republic and Haiti, two states that inhabit the single island of Hispaniola. During the eighteenth century, Haiti was a vastly wealthier colony than the Dominican Republic. During much of the nineteenth century, "the Haitians dominated, even terrorized, the Dominicans." Yet today the Dominican Republic is a middle income country where democratic rule has prevailed for more than two decades, while Haiti is one of the poorest nations on earth, living in a political limbo in the wake of the fall of a cruel and venal dynasty. The cause, says Harrison, "is something going on in the minds of the Haitians that impedes progress and facilitates the perpetuation of a stagnant, exploitative, repressive system." Haiti resembles its neighbor republic less than it does one of the states of West Africa, whence most Haitians are descended.

But Harrison is quick to scotch any implication that Haiti's failure has a racial or genetic basis. His next comparison matches Haiti against Barbados, another black Caribbean country whose populace's ancestry is indistinguishable from the Haitians'. And like Haiti, Barbados is a densely populated island with a history of slavery and one-crop economics. The two islands have similar climates, and Barbados's natural endowments are mediocre. Yet Barbados is a democracy, with a per capita GNP in excess of three thousand dollars, an adult literacy rate of 99 percent, and life expectancy of 71 years. What accounts for the contrast, says Harrison, is "Barbados's absorption of British culture over three hundred years." Thus, "British values and attitudes have largely supplanted the African culture of the slaves," creating a nation of "black Englishmen."

Indeed, Harrison observes some "striking similarities" between Barbados and Australia, a society derived from British roots, which he examines in comparison to Argentina. The latter is among the world's most richly endowed countries, and early in this century boasted one of the world's highest standards of living. Australia was less developed than Argentina then, but today its per capita GNP is four times Argentina's, and it has enjoyed stable democratic government,

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while Argentina has been plagued by coups, *Peronismo*, guerrillas, and death squads.

The most important comparison for Harrison's argument is the one he makes between Spanish America as a whole and Spain. There he finds striking cultural similarities and the roots of Spanish America's difficulties. In contrast to the northern half of the new world, Spanish America was conquered by representatives of a society that was itself still largely medieval. The regressive character of the culture they brought was compounded by the process of subjugating the indigenous population as a labor force rather than conquering the land with their own labor. This culture breeds neither the interpersonal trust on which a stable democratic polity depends, nor the psychic incentives that unleash man's material creativity. South America's lag behind North America thus mirrors, albeit in exaggeration, Iberia's lag behind the rest of Western Europe. Accordingly, the belated democratization and Europeanization that Spain is now experiencing spells hope for the future of Latin America.

JEFFREY BARRETT'S book is largely devoted to describing the "modernization-impeding values" transmitted by Latin culture that serve as a brake on development. Most of these values derive from the extreme sensitivity to hierarchy in Hispanic culture. This has had numerous consequences. A critical one for economic development is that manual labor is marked as a token of lowly status. Barrett writes: "Social elites were swayed by an ethic that may justly be called 'conspicuous indolence.' Instead of admiring the ideal of work, they were actively hostile to it and made every effort to avoid the appearance of engaging in useful labor."

Thus, members of the elite tend not to become entrepreneurs. Those individuals who do become entrepreneurs, of whatever class origins, do not tend to be held in high esteem. They, in turn, tend to seek status through conspicuous consumption, and as a consequence reinvest a far smaller portion of their earnings than do businessmen in Anglo-Saxon countries. In addition, their entrepreneurial success is limited by their extreme reluctance to engage in any "hands on" activity in the management of their businesses. Moreover, Barrett finds the same anti-work ethic among the "working classes." "That overall the standard of living of the laboring masses has been low . . . has been the result of too little production rather than too much exploitation," he says.

Extreme sensitivity to hierarchy also yields a society low in interpersonal trust and high in envy. Lack of trust inhibits the growth of democracy, which depends critically on the assumption that if I play by the rules, others will too. Envy retards economic development, says Barrett, by discouraging initiative. While invidious pride keeps members of the elite from entrepreneurial activity, fear of their neighbors' jealous retribution keeps talented members of the lower classes from seeking their fortune through small businesses. Moreover, intense status consciousness, as described by Barrett, atomizes societies. Its diverse consequences range from such concrete ones as voracious governmental corruption to such evanescent ones as pervasive psychic anxiety.

These two books effectively debunk the theories that blame America or the West in general for Latin America's plight. Thus the theories of Raul Prebisch, the single most influential thinker in the United Nations development activities, argue that the raw materials exported by poorer countries suffer perpetually worsening terms of trade compared to the finished goods exported by rich countries. But when a UN commission undertook a study designed to test this thesis, it found that the evidence did not confirm it. A kindred theory much in vogue, "dependency theory," holds that the heavy role of American multinational corporations in Latin economies holds them back. But Barrett points out that Australia and Canada are the two countries that have absorbed the greatest amount of foreign investment per capita in

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the world, quite apparently not to their detriment; and Harrison shows that the decades when Argentina surged to a place among the world's wealthiest countries were times of heavy foreign investment and that the subsequent decline in such investment coincided with Argentina's slide into second-rate economic status.

In summarizing the argument, Harrison invokes the long view:

> Both Latin America and North America are richly endowed with resources. The U.S. started the nineteenth century in roughly the same economic shape as Latin America. U.S. economic involvement in Latin America for most of the nineteenth century was extremely limited. (To be sure, British involvement, particularly in Argentina, was substantial.) By the end of the century, the U.S. had become a world power—more importantly as a result of foreign (European) investment, by the way—while most Latin American countries were essentially the same stagnant, exploitative, inequitable societies they had been since the sixteenth century as Iberian colonies.

Bitter truths such as these, says Barrett, have given Latin Americans a "national inferiority complex" which they soothe by applying theories of dependency and imperialism, all of which amount to nothing more than alibis. In exposing these alibis and encouraging Latin Americans to come to grips with the failings of their own societies (and by implication encouraging U.S. policy toward Latin America to do likewise), these two books perform a service. Their argument that these failings cannot be understood apart from an understanding of popular attitudes is compelling; but it still leaves some large questions unanswered.

If it were Argentina's culture that prevented it from keeping pace with the other most advanced countries after 1930, what was it that enabled that country to be so successful until then? Further, if "culture"—rather than "structures"—is the main determinant of development, what determines culture? And what can be done to encourage development in countries whose culture has until now impeded it?

Barrett contrasts the corrupting effects that the plantation system of agriculture had on Latin American elites with the constructive effects that living by their own labors had on American pioneers. This mirrors Harrison's argument about the roots of Costa Rica's success story. But if the causality they hypothesize is correct, these are examples of attitudes themselves being determined by structures. Elsewhere, Barrett suggests that certain parts of Latin America have less severe traditions of violence in part because "the substantial middle-class populations of these areas have less need to be socially aggressive than people who constantly suffer from economic insecurity." This may be so, but Barrett's main theme is that the lack of a substantial middle class is the result of socially aggressive patterns of behavior. Which way will he have the causality flow?

Moreover, Barrett implies that culture itself cannot be changed by the mere transmission of ideas. He writes:

> When egalitarian ideas finally arrived in Latin America, mainly through the influence of the French Revolution, they were eagerly seized upon and excitedly discussed by participants of certain intellectual circles who found them alluring and avant-garde; but so alien to the emotional experience of Latin Americans was the notion of the essential sameness and equality of human beings that the ideal had no real effect. It simply appeared and hovered above Latin American life like a bright but faraway star.

If culture itself is not shaped by the transmission of ideas, but by structures, then what force is there to the argument that culture rather than structures is the prime determinant of development?

HARRISON'S conclusions consist of speculations about what "societies [can] do both to assure that their values and attitudes change in ways that enhance progress, and to accelerate the process." Some of the things Harrison names, how-

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ever, simply cannot be controlled by will. Inspired national leadership and religious doctrines that stress progress and this-worldliness, two items on his list, are not things that can be had for the asking. Other things he suggests sound prosaic, but ought not to be dismissed for that reason. He would encourage reform in education, child-rearing, the news media, and management practices, all with an eye toward inculcating those values—trust, cooperation, initiative, civic egalitarianism—that he believes are essential to development, and he would focus development projects on programs that serve similar ends.

Harrison would grant that he doesn't know exactly how to achieve the progress he wants, but he would insist that we will not succeed at helping others to achieve prosperity and democracy without helping to change how they think, particularly about their interpersonal relationships.

I am prepared to go along with this argument a good way, but the conclusion of Barrett's book serves as an unintended warning against going too far. Barrett argues that totalitarian impulses flow inevitably from the wish of nationalistic elites in backward societies to shake their fellow citizens out of the torpor engendered by archaic cultures. Thus, to Barrett, Fidel Castro was nothing more than a nationalistic democrat who only discovered once in power that he had to move in totalitarian directions in order to accomplish desired changes.

Barrett starts out as if he intends to caution us that the Third World's natural affinity for totalitarianism presents a formidable challenge. But he ends up arguing that there is little we can do about it, and he seems to get swept up himself in the totalitarian impulse, delivering a broad endorsement of Castro's rule.

Barrett's praise of Castro goes well beyond the familiar citations of improved delivery of health care to the poor and elevated literacy rates. He applauds the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, the block committees that enforce conformity; he compares Cuba's criminal justice system favorably with our own; he argues that Castro's rule has given Cubans heightened control over their own lives; and speaks admiringly of Castro's principled independence in foreign policy. He believes that Cuba's regimentation has succeeded in overcoming the destructive social aggression that he finds endemic in Latin society, but he ignores the substantial evidence—for example from Armando Valladares—that such behavior has not been eradicated but appropriated by the revolution and given outlet in the behavior of officials of the criminal justice system and the block committees that Barrett admires.

The only thing that Barrett seems not to like about Cuba is socialism, an economic system for which Barrett has no use and which he believes has held Cuba back. Barrett's ideal would seem to be a Leninist state with a capitalist economy—a fettered populace and a free market. To what end, one wonders?

Is the strange turn that Barrett's book takes mere idiosyncrasy? Or does it reveal an underlying danger in emphasizing culture as the determinant of development? The flip side of ignoring the cultural roots of Third World backwardness is attaching so much importance to those roots that the task of change seems hopeless, short of the use of brute force. Without coercion, cultural change is necessarily slow, but *not* hopeless. It can come through changing structures that influence how people think and through directly communicating ideas to them. America should be able to help other countries in both of those areas, and a self-confident America is likely to do a better job of it than an America wracked by false guilt over sufferings that we have not caused.

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Kristol and Human Rights

There are three fundamental flaws in Irving Kristol's argument (" 'Human Rights': The Hidden Agenda," Winter 1986/7) that the "hidden agenda" of the human rights movement is to delegitimate the market economy and American foreign policy.

1. Contrary to Kristol's claims, the leading human rights groups do not assert a moral equivalence between civil and political rights that are respected in the West and social and economic rights that are purportedly respected in communist countries. Virtually every major human rights organization confines its reporting of human rights abuses to civil and political rights alone. For example, when Amnesty International and Americas Watch criticize Guatemala, they do so on the basis of torture, disappearances, political killings and lack of due process, and not on its health system or employment rate.

Even in the highly politicized Human Rights Center of the United Nations, civil and political rights dominate discussion. Special Rapporteurs and Working Groups examine the extent of torture, disappearances, religious intolerance and denials of emigration rights worldwide. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides for a complaint procedure for individual victims of such abuses. There is no comparable emphasis on economic and social rights.

2. Contrary to what Kristol asserts, human rights groups do criticize regimes not friendly to the United States. In the last few years alone, hard-hitting human rights reports have been issued by Amnesty International on Ethiopia, Cuba, Bulgaria, Syria, and Iraq; by the International League for Human Rights on Uganda, the Soviet Union, North Korea, and Romania; by the Cambodian Documentation Commission on Cambodia; by the Helsinki Watch on all the Soviet-bloc countries. Soviet dissidents Anatoly Shcharansky, Andrei Sakharov, and Joseph Begun probably would not be alive and free today were it not for the persistent efforts of these and other groups such as the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, the American Jewish Committee, and B'nai B'rith. If this reporting does not get publicized, it is the fault of the press, not the human rights groups.

In their many reports on governments friendly to the United States, the goal of human rights groups is not, as Kristol asserts, "to unnerve American foreign policy by constantly exposing the 'immorality' of its relations with authoritarian allies." It is quite simply to improve their human rights performance. To some extent this approach has succeeded in the Philippines, Argentina, Uruguay, and El Salvador, which arguably are stronger bulwarks against communist subversion than when their governments ruled without the consent of the citizenry.

3. Also inaccurate is Kristol's implication that the human rights movement is a uniquely American phenomenon—a substitute for political activity that normally takes place in socialist parties. As a matter of fact, the most prominent and by far the best funded human rights organization in the world is Amnesty International, which is based in England and has no affiliation with the Labour party. Virtually every country in Western Europe has one or more human rights groups and some, including France, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, and Norway, have government posts equivalent to the U.S. assistant secre-

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tary of state for human rights. Several West European governments provide sizeable funding to the human rights movement and at least one—Norway—supports a Norwegian version of the annual State Department country reports on human rights on which it bases foreign aid decisions. The Commission and Court on Human Rights of the Council of Europe are extremely active and well-respected throughout the continent. All twenty-one government members of the Council of Europe have signed the European Convention on Human Rights.

To the extent that the human rights community in the United States follows a partisan agenda, it is that of the liberal wing of the Democratic party, who have been much more committed to the advancement of human rights internationally than have conservative Republicans. It is perhaps this identification with the liberal Democratic agenda that explains the reluctance of some human rights groups to criticize Nicaragua sharply for the same abuses for which they castigate Chile or South Africa, and conversely stridently attack *contra* abuses even though they customarily ignore abuses by guerrilla movements elsewhere.

However, even on Nicaragua, which has become the acid test for human rights even-handedness, unflinching critiques have been published by the International League for Human Rights, the Indian Law Resource Center, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States, and my own organization, the Puebla Institute.

Human rights groups perhaps can be faulted for focusing on individual atrocities while insufficiently appreciating the importance of building democratic institutions to safeguard human rights, such as an independent judiciary, a free press, trade unions, elections, etc. The Reagan administration's support for the National Endowment for Democracy and democratic elections has helped to change this. Nevertheless, the human rights community will continue to distrust American conservatives if they adhere to the type of knee-jerk hostility towards human rights exhibited by Mr. Kristol.

Nina Hope Shea
Washington Director
The Puebla Institute

Correction: Due to an editing error, the following line appeared on page 86 of Whittle Johnston's essay, "The Containment of John Gaddis" (Winter 1986/7): "This, in its turn, is supplanted by Nixon's symmetrical strategy of detente." The line should have read ". . . asymmetrical strategy of detente."

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Principle and Circumstance

Owen Harries

FROM Thomas Jefferson's proclamation of the newly formed United States of America as the "Empire of Liberty" down to Ronald Reagan's characterization of the Soviet Union as the "Evil Empire," it has been an article of faith for the great majority of Americans that their country exists not only to promote the freedom of its citizens but to serve the cause of freedom throughout the world. Where disagreement has existed, it has almost always centered not on whether the commitment should be honored, but on how it should be implemented—by force of example alone? by transforming the whole international system of power politics into something else? by accepting and practicing power politics?

Since World War II that commitment has been reaffirmed again and again: in the Atlantic Charter, the Truman doctrine, the Eisenhower-Dulles goals of "liberation" and "rollback," the Kennedy pledge to "bear any burden . . . to assure . . . the success of liberty," and most recently in the Reagan doctrine.

How valid is this proclaimed moral or ideological commitment to the cause of freedom? What substance is there in the criticisms leveled at it? What answers can be given to these criticisms? By far the most formidable critique of the claim that American foreign policy is concerned to advance freedom has come from the realist school of writers on international relations. Consider three leading realists on the subject of morality and foreign policy: First, Hans Morgenthau:

> . . . man's aspiration for power over other men, which is of the very essence of politics, implies the denial of what is the very core of Judeo-Christian morality—respect for man as an end in himself. The power relation is the very denial of that respect; for it seeks to use man as means to the end of another man. This denial is particularly flagrant in foreign policy; for the civilizing influences of law, morality, and mores are less effective here than they are on the domestic political scene.

Second, George Kennan in a recent *Foreign Affairs* article:

> Let me explain. The interests of the national society for which government has to concern itself are basically those of its military security, the integrity of its political life and the well-being of its people. These needs have no moral quality. . . . They are the unavoidable necessities of a national existence and therefore not subject to classification as either 'good' or 'bad'.

Third, the English realist, Martin Wight, putting it more bluntly:

Owen Harries is co-editor of *The National Interest*.

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A foreign minister is chosen and paid to look after the interests of his country, and not to be a delegate for the human race.

There are many comments one could make about these statements—it will be news to many, for example, that respect for man as an end in himself is the core of Judeo-Christian, as opposed to humanistic, morality. But let us stick to the central issue. The realists maintain that international politics is, of necessity, power politics. There being no international government, no enforceable law, and (despite a lot of claptrap about "the global village") hardly any sense of community, anarchy in the strict sense prevails, and there is no arbiter except power. Or, as someone put it more wittily and succinctly: When there is no agreement about what suit is trumps, clubs are always trumps. As there is no one else to look after its interests, the first and overriding concern of every state must be to look after its *own* interests—the most fundamental of which is sheer survival. Power and self-interest: that is the beginning and the end of it, and all the rest is decoration.

All this seems to me to contain a great deal of truth—certainly it is much nearer the truth than the view of those who believe and put their trust in an underlying harmony of interest between states, or international law, or the United Nations, or the natural evolution of interdependence.

But the conclusion usually then drawn—that foreign policy is a completely amoral activity—does not follow. First, to say that all states pursue their own interests is *not* to establish that the interests of all states are the same, or have the same moral worth, or are all devoid of any moral content. While some interests of all states are dictated by the conditions of international anarchy, others reflect the nature of the internal characters of countries, and these vary greatly and in ways that are morally significant. Even interests that superficially appear identical—the interest that all states have in security, for example—are in fact different, for the society that one government is intent on securing is different from the one that another government protects—often in morally significant respects.

Second, and more particularly, for a free society freedom itself is an interest. It is so in the obvious sense that a free society wants to preserve the freedom that it enjoys. But it is so also in the sense that—other things being equal—its own freedom is made more secure insofar as freedom is established elsewhere. For the historical record shows that while free democratic societies have their differences, they go to war against each other very rarely. All the major wars of this century have been fought either among authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, or between democratic countries on the one hand and authoritarian or totalitarian ones on the other. (As an illustration of the point, contrast the state of the long border between the United States and Canada with that between the Soviet Union and China. On one there are no military forces, on the other over a hundred divisions. Even more striking, consider the state of the border between France and Germany now that they are both democracies.)

Third, even if all states are motivated by self-interest, the matter does not end there. One must look at consequences—actual and potential—as well as motives. In the contest between the United States and the Soviet Union, is the outcome—which of them prevails—a matter of moral indifference to someone who values freedom? To ask the question is surely to answer it. One does not have to assume moral purity and perfection on America's part. A successful United States might well *permit* a continued curtailment of freedom in parts of the world, might even find it convenient on occasion; but it certainly would not *demand* a drastic curtailment of freedom wherever its influence prevailed, as, on all the evidence, the Soviet Union would.

ANOTHER CHARGE frequently and effectively leveled against the claim that American foreign policy is concerned to promote freedom is the charge of

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inconsistency and discrimination—and thus of hypocrisy and double standards. Again, George Kennan:

> Practices or policies that arouse our official displeasure in one country are cheerfully condoned or ignored in another. What is bad in the behavior of our opponents is good, or at least acceptable, in the case of our friends. What is unobjectionable to us in one period of our history is seen as offensive in another.
>
> This is unfortunate, for a lack of consistency implies a lack of principle in the eyes of much of the world; whereas morality, if not principled, is not really morality.

There is some tendentious and slippery language in this passage, but let it pass and let's consider the argument at its strongest. It is undoubtedly true that the United States *is* discriminating in its concern with freedom (though its discrimination is more usually agonizing than cheerful). But the crucial point is that the conclusion we are invited to draw—that its apparent concern is therefore hypocritical and phony—does not follow.

For to say that America puts high value on the goal of extending and preserving freedom in the world is not to claim that that is the *only* goal she pursues. She has other goals, including some that—*pace* Kennan—themselves have a moral worth: among them, justice, peace, security, equality, order, and material prosperity. Unless one believes that all these ends are necessarily and always in harmony with one another, that each reinforces all the others in all circumstances—and that is surely a false belief—this means that choices have to be made concerning priorities and balance among goals. And these choices will vary from situation to situation, as circumstances vary. Even if we consider the goal of extending freedom on its own, and much more so if we consider it along with other goals, circumstances are crucial. For as Edmund Burke put it, "Circumstances (which with some gentlemen pass for nothing) give in reality to every political principle its distinguishing colour and discriminating effect. The circumstances are what render every civil and political scheme beneficial or noxious to mankind." In any situation, what is gained in terms of one goal has to be measured against what is endangered or sacrificed in terms of others. That is, *judgment* is involved, not merely the automatic application of a general principle. To believe otherwise is to be, in Burke's phrase, "metaphysically mad."

In his famous essay on *Two Concepts of Liberty*, Sir Isaiah Berlin makes the same point more somberly:

> If, as I believe, the ends of men are many and not all of them are in principle compatible with each other, then the possibility of conflict—and of tragedy—can never be wholly eliminated from human life, either personal or social. The necessity of choosing between absolute claims is then an inescapable characteristic of the human condition.

Not hypocrisy, not double standards, but "an inescapable characteristic of the human condition."

If all this seems rather abstract, consider it in relation to what has come to be called, unwisely I think, the Reagan doctrine. President Reagan first announced, in his State of the Union Address in February 1985, that his administration would assist anti-communist forces fighting against newly installed and externally supported communist regimes on the periphery of the Soviet empire—in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia. Almost immediately there was a demand, in the name of consistency in the application of principle, for an extension of the doctrine to commit the United States to the support of what are called "third forces" opposing authoritarian governments in countries with whom the U.S. has friendly relations: the Philippines, South Korea, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Chile were among those frequently named.

But apart from the fact that both groups of countries have repressive governments, they are different in respects which are very relevant to American foreign policy. First, and most obviously, one group is hostile to

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the U.S. while the other is generally supportive. Some in the second group, indeed, provide very important strategic assets to this country—a conduit of aid to the Afghans in the case of Pakistan, the bases in the Philippines—just as communist countries constitute assets for America's principle adversary. Second, it is surely relevant that communist regimes are much more permanent repressors of freedom than regimes in which repression is tied to the personal rule of one man or clique, as in most of the second group. (The Brezhnev doctrine, of course, seeks to underwrite that permanence, much as the Reagan doctrine seeks to undermine it.) Third and crucially, while both groups of countries repress their own subjects, it is generally only the communist regimes that pose serious threats to the freedom of others beyond their borders. This is particularly true of recently established communist regimes in Third World countries, the outriders of the Soviet system. Witness Cuba, witness Vietnam, witness Nicaragua (and in a somewhat different category, though with close links to the Soviet Union, witness Libya). On the other hand, only rarely do non-communist authoritarian regimes that have friendly relations with the United States threaten the freedom of others.

Collectively these are formidable differences, sufficient one would have thought to deter informed people from arguing for the automatic extension of a principle from one group to the other. Certainly they are differences that should and must weigh heavily on policymakers.

Two things need to be made clear: First, to argue against the application of an extended Reagan doctrine to those right-wing authoritarian governments that are allies or render us other services is *not* to advocate that we embrace and endorse them. Approval or disapproval of an alliance with a regime and approval or disapproval of the regime itself are two very different matters. This was understood clearly during World War II, when it was not felt necessary to approve or condone communism in order to support the alliance with the Soviet Union required to defeat the Nazis; there is no reason why it should not be understood now.

Second, my concern here is not to say what American policy towards this or that third force should be, but rather to indicate what should and should not be the criteria for reaching a decision. In some circumstances on some occasions there may well be a case for assisting a third force against a friendly authoritarian regime; but that case will *never* depend on the "consistency" argument.

AS I HAVE been critical of the realists, let me say that there is one thing they assert that I agree with very much. When Kennan talks about "the avoidance of what might be called the histrionics of moralism," or when other realists—Walter Lippmann for instance—have criticized the American penchant for doctrines, I think that they are right. Doctrines, by their nature, have to be simple, general, and inspirational. They are very crude instruments for shaping policy in the area where morality and foreign policy intersect. They arouse expectations that cannot be met and encourage a way of thinking that, proceeding in terms of the simple, consistent application of general principles, cannot come to terms with the complexity of the issues—and thus prepare the way for a rapid descent from idealism to cynicism and alienation. There is much to be said for a more careful, qualified, and intellectually demanding rhetoric that sacrifices a little inspiration for the sake of greater viability. It would avoid a good deal of embarrassment, have a longer shelf-life, and contribute to the emergence of an educated public capable of rendering support when difficult decisions have to be taken.

To ask for such a rhetoric is not to ask for insipid language or a retreat from the assertion of basic truths. In recent years Ronald Reagan has often been criticized and reviled by American intellectuals for asserting that the central conflict of our time is a moral conflict—a conflict between Jefferson's "Empire of Liberty" and "the Evil Empire." It is an assertion that is found by many to be

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crude, presumptuous, embarrassing, and dangerous. And certainly his language and style are not those of intellectuals and are not characterized by fine distinctions. But what he is concerned to convey is not so very different from what was said by the man whom many consider the pre-eminent political philosopher of our time, when he gave a famous inaugural address at the University of Oxford:

> . . . our own attitudes and activities are likely to remain obscure to us, unless we understand the dominant issues of our own world. The greatest of these is the open war that is being fought between two civilizations and two systems of ideas which return different and conflicting answers to what has long been the central question of politics—the question of obedience and coercion.

On this issue it seems to me that Ronald Reagan and Sir Isaiah Berlin have more in common than either has with the typical American intellectual.

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